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SOFT POW ER STRATEGIES IN US FOREIGN POLICY: ASSESSING THE IMPACT 
OF CITIZEN DIPLOMACY ON FOREIGN STATES’ BEHAVIOR
Stephen Macharia Magu 
Old Dominion University, 2013 
Chair: Dr. David C. Earnest
This dissertation empirically demonstrates that the isolated effects o f  citizen 
diplomacy correlate positively with foreign policy behavior as a non-military, foreign 
policy strategic option. The dissertation also finds that soft power, o f which citizen 
diplomacy is a key component, is a viable foreign policy strategy. The findings are 
important to the academy and to the foreign policy-making process for states in search o f 
effective, non-military strategies that leverage foreign state needs and attributes to 
achieve their foreign policy goals. Using a mixed methods approach, the dissertation 
investigates the correlation between Peace Corps Volunteers (citizen diplomat) placement 
and congruent voting with the US at the UN General Assembly. The question o f interest 
is, do citizen diplomat recipient countries vote more with the US at the UN General 
Assembly? Is there a difference in countries’ voting patterns on key votes than on all 
votes, and what are the implications o f congruent voting behavior for US foreign policy?
I develop several hypotheses and test for the effects o f citizen diplomacy through 
four models: the omnibus, factors o f bilateral attraction, host country variables and 
temporal and regional effects models. Using data from two sources, first, Voeten and 
Strehnev and second, Dreher, Strum and Vreeland, I find that in twelve o f the sixteen 
models, citizen diplomacy is positively correlated with congruent voting with the US at 
the UN General Assembly. Countries vote more with the US at the UN on key votes than
they do on all UN General Assembly votes (observed in seven o f eight models). The level 
o f democracy is positively correlated with congruent voting in four o f eight models and 
also positively signed. The level o f globalization. GDP per capita and region are 
important explanans for voting in congruence with the US at the UN General Assembly. 
As expected, failed states vote less in congruence with the US at the UN.
These findings are augmented by case studies based on three qualitative models. 
The issue linkages model finds that the US links citizen diplomacy to its national security 
interests. The interpersonal model finds that citizen diplomats affect foreign policy 
through individuals and elites. The foreign policy approach finds that cit'zen diplomats 
have contributed to building and changing national infrastructure and development and 
thereby countries’ foreign policy trajectory. The dissertation concludes that citizen 
d ip lo m acy  matters: there is a positive and strong correlation between citizen diplomacy 
and foreign policy behavior o f recipient states towards the US. As a soft-power strategy, 
citizen diplomacy is a viable foreign policy option.
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This chapter begins by situating the specific research in the overall international relations 
scholarship. It begins by setting out the research question, explaining the puzzle and 
looks at the theoretical and political developments in international relations. It then 
defines the major concepts that will occur throughout the chapter.
The purpose o f this dissertation is to determine how, and to what extent citizen 
diplom ats’ international volunteer acti vities affect the foreign policy behavior o f foreign 
states towards the US. By zeroing-in on the case o f the US Peace Corps, the research 
hypothesizes that unlike civil society groups, citizen diplomats like the Peace Corps 
depend upon the state for funding, training, deployment. Such groups include, for 
example, the United Kingdom’s Volunteer Service Overseas (VSO), and the United 
States Peace Corps, whose second goal is to “help promote a better understanding o f 
Americans on the part o f the peoples served.” This goal can be classified as a foreign 
policy strategy, and evaluated to determine whether its accomplishment has strategic 
benefits for the US in terms o f advancing US Foreign Policy and the national interest.
The research isolates the effects o f citizen diplomacy, given all other possible 
explanans o f states’ foreign policy behavior. It evaluates how these effects, if any. can be 
measured and correlated with empirical measures o f  foreign policy behavior, especially 
congruent voting with the United States at the United Nations General Assembly. It 
provides the first empirical measurement o f the effect o f citizen diplomacy as a foreign 
policy strategy. The research provides a better understanding o f how aspects o f non-
2
traditional, non-military aspects o f  statecraft can change states influence other states’ 
behavior, and how the successes or failures citizen diplomacy can be applied to foreign 
policy strategies. Specifically, the research answers a number o f questions. Among these: 
to what extent does citizen diplomacy, through international volunteering, influence 
recipient states' foreign policy preferences? Does citizen diplomacy correlate with 
alignment o f  foreign countries preferences with those o f the US as measured by voting on 
key votes at the United Nations General Assembly?
This research derives its focus from the events o f the past sixty years, when 
citizen diplomacy in the form o f US Peace Corps Volunteers was proposed by the 
presidential candidate John F. Kennedy in 1961, as a foreign policy strategy to counter 
Soviet expansion and influence through provision o f technical assistance to newly 
independent countries in Africa and the Third World. The "Peace Corps" comprised o f 
groups o f young men and women who would serve in the newly independent and 
developing countries, assisting those countries meet their need for trained manpower, 
among other developmental goals.
The Peace Corps was formally established on March 1, 1961, through Executive 
Order 109241 and authorized by Congress on September 22, 1961, with the passage o f the 
Peace Corps Act (Public Law 87-293)2. With a total o f  more than 200.000 volunteers and 
trainees in placed in 139 countries since the program 's inception in 1961, the Peace 
Corps reports that o f these volunteers, 95 percent have at least an undergraduate degree
' JFK Library. "Peace Corps." http://wvyvv.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Peac 
Corps aspx. (Web). Accessed i i/08/2012.
2 Ibid.
while 11 percent have graduate studies or graduate degrees.3 The volunteers work in 
various fields, such as Education (36 percent). Health & HIV/AIDS (21 percent), 
Business (15 percent). Environment (14 percent). Youth (6 percent), Agriculture (5 
percent) and other (4 percent). On average, the Peace Corps volunteer time since 
inception was spent in the LDCs and developing countries (35 percent o f  the countries 
served were in Africa), representing 49 o f the 53 countries. The role and function o f the 
volunteer varies. In the development field, the Peace Corps views the volunteer as a 
combination o f a Learner, a Change Agent, a Co-Trainer, a Co-Facilitator, a Project Co- 
Planner, and a Mentor.
Study background
For much o f the earlier part o f 20th century, conflict was an enduring part o f  interstate 
relations. During a period covering about 30 years, interstate wars killed over 100 million 
and unleashed the Cold War, which pitted two diametrically opposed ideological, 
economic and political systems. Around the middle o f the 20th century, the attractiveness 
o f wars in Europe began diminishing economically, militarily, ideologically and morally 
and a new world, characterized by increasing integration, cooperation, military and 
economic alliances and internationalism began emerging. The US simultaneously shared 
this new, post-World War II Cold War order with the Soviet Union, and set the stage was 
set for an ideological struggle; this provides the grounding for this research.
This nascent post-World War II order changed with the fall o f the Berlin Wall 
beginning November 1989, followed by the collapse o f communism and the sudden rise
3 US Peace Corps. ‘‘Fast Facts.” http://www.peacecorps.gov/about/fastfacts/. (Web). 
Accessed 11/08/2012.
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and preponderance o f  the United States after 1991. Old foes and known threats were 
gone, diminished or reinvented; new challenges to world order arose. The field o f 
international relations theory, previously grounded on studies centered on the East-West 
ideological divide, security dilemmas, military alliances and how countries dealt with 
them, scrambled to characterize and understand the new world order.
Amid the flux in the global geopolitical and geostrategic realities especially 
during and after the Cold War period, states continued to use traditional tools o f power -  
mainly hard power -  such as military capabilities, military alliances, traditional bilateral 
and multilateral diplomatic relations, investments and foreign trade— often interspersed 
with protectionism— to cultivate influence with other countries. Because o f  the bipolar 
distribution o f  power in the international system, United States and Soviet Union’s 
influence and patronage was valued by different client states. The two superpowers 
utilized traditional and non-traditional tools o f statecraft, including culture, music, food, 
education, technical assistance, economic assistance and religion, among others to 
maintain power and influence.
The events o f the late 1980’s to early 1990’s left the world dominated by a single 
hegemon, a world characterized as more unstable, experiencing rapid globalization and 
resurgence o f  competing ideologies— for example, the Chinese communist growth 
model. Russia's sovereign democracy and rise o f  international terrorism. The latter was 
especially facilitated by the rise in the number and incapacity o f  fragile, failing and failed 
states, rise and diversification in actors in the international system.
To successfully navigate changes in the international system, states today utilize 
traditional and emergent tools and approaches to advance their positions in the world,
relative to themselves and to others. Economic and military capabilities, limited territorial 
conquest, technological advancement, ideology and cultural tools, among others, have 
been critical in advancing states' national interest, their citizens’ welfare and in assuring 
their national security and preponderance over others. Countries often look to and beyond 
their own borders, secure them militarily and economically, form alliances, balance other 
powers and use diplomatic and other means to extend their influence.
While there is no discernible point at which emphasis on military power as the 
sole determinant of a country's predominance in the world system gained preference or 
inevitability, more nations have turned to non-militarv tools and strategies, in addition to 
traditional tools to extend their influence. This incorporation o f traditional "hard power" 
and newer, alternative tools and approaches occurred gradually since the late 1940’s.
The genesis o f these alternative approaches can be seen in the Marshall Plan, the 
Berlin Airlift, in Trum an’s Doctrine, Germany’s 1949 reunification, the gradual founding 
o f  the European Economic Community, provision o f Soviet technical assistance and the 
formation o f the US Peace Corps. By retaining military capability as one o f  the tools of 
foreign policy and leveraging other approaches such as trade, technology, diplomacy and 
culture to buttress this supremacy, nations began to move towards alternative approaches 
in supplementing the hard power in the toolbox o f  their foreign policy. These alternative 
approaches that have seen increasing importance will be defined as soft power.
According to the text o f its mission statement, the three objectives o f  the Peace 
Corps is to change foreigners' perception o f the US, change Americans' perception o f the 
world and provide recipient countries with trained manpower. Fifty years after its
4 The term "Soft Power’’ was first used by Joseph S. Nye in 1990 to articulate the 
alignment o f  one country’s preferences with a second country 's preferences. For a more expanded 
definition o f  soft power, see section the definitions section o f this chapter.
inception, this altruistic undertaking which also served as a foreign policy strategy to 
counter Soviet activities in the-then Third World has neither been sufficiently studied in 
terms o f  its outcomes, nor empirically evaluated for its effectiveness, especially its 
outcome in changing foreigners’ perception o f  the United States.
Increasingly, soft power core tenets such as citizen diplomacy and peer-to-peer 
exchanges are growing in importance as an augmentative pillar to traditional US foreign 
policy. Over the past fifty years, the US spent billions o f dollars to send more than 
200,000 citizen diplomats to 139 countries around the globe. Also, where support for -  
and spending on other foreign policy strategies such as foreign aid -  is diminishing, the 
Peace Corps continues to attract significant public, executive and congressional support 
even among fiscal conservatives.
The puzzle o f the Peace Corps, its continuing public support, consistent budgetary 
allocation and its very existence is one o f great interest in the context o f its founding and 
its dual role as a foreign policy and international development agency. Congressional 
appropriations for the Peace Corps have continued to increase year after year, topping 
$375 million in 2011. Its support is largely bipartisan in the US congress and mostly 
escapes the calls for restructuring or starvation o f  funding unlike most o f  the rest o f 
foreign assistance. Neither are there sustained efforts to tie its budget, outcomes and 
allocation o f citizen diplomats made contingent to the foreign policy behavior o f recipient 
countries.5 Its funding and support is evident for example in the 111th Congress (2009 - 
2010); the Senate Bill S. 1382 (Peace Corps Improvement and Expansion Act o f 2009) by
‘ See, for example, Carol Lancaster. Transforming foreign aid: United States assistance 
in the 21s1 century. (W ashington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000): 4 and T. Y. 
Yang. "US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis o f Important Issues." International Studies 
Quarterly, 43, No. 1 (1999): 199 210 "
7
Senator Chris Dodd, with 18 cosponsors, was designed to "improve and expand the Peace 
Corps for the 2U l century, and for other purposes."6
The Peace Corps is often ridiculed as anything from a "government-subsidized 
vacation for well-to-do white kids."7 However, most o f  the self-reported evidence points 
to its effectiveness and ability to accomplish its stated goals. During its 50th anniversary 
celebrations, more than 82 percent o f  returned volunteers from a sample o f  11.138 
volunteers articulated that the organization was effective in its goals, especially goal 2.8
In theoretical and policy debates alike, civilian, cultural and person-to-person and 
peer exchanges form one o f the key pillars o f the soft power approach. Yet, for all its 
overwhelming public support domestically, the number o f citizen diplomats placed, 
economic resources spent and perceived utility to US foreign policy, few empirical 
studies measure the impact o f citizen diplomacy on the recipient communities especially 
when such citizen diplomacy is characterized as a foreign strategy option.
Even more puzzling is how such impact, if any, translates into recipient countries’ 
support for US foreign policy preferences in multilateral forums. Questions abound, o f 
how citizen diplomacy— sometimes derided as ’’social work”— can change foreigners'
6 The US Congress. S. 1382. "A bill to improve and expand the Peace Corps for the 21st 
century, and for other purposes." http://wvvw.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BlLLS-l 11 s 1382rs/pdf/BlLLS- 
i l ls l3 8 2 rs .p d f  (W eb.) Accessed 11 /08/2012.
' Alexandra Le Tellier. "Debate: Is it time to retire the Peace Corps?” 
http://opinion.latim es.com /opinionla/2011/05/debate-is-it-time-to-retire-the-peace-corps.html 
(W eb). Accessed 11 /08/2012
8 David L. Caprara, "Peace Corps at 50." 
http ://w w w.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2Ql 1/09/21-peace-corps-caprara) (W eb). Accessed 
11/05/2012, See also Gal Beckerman, “The Peace Corps: What is it for?” 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011 /OS/15/the peace corps what is it for/? 
page=full, (W eb). Accessed 11/05/2012 and Lex Rieffel. "Reconsidering the Peace Corps." 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2003/i2/globalgovernance-rieffel (Web). Accessed 
11/05/2012.
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perceptions o f the US, given PCVs’ target population. Neither has scholarship studied the 
extent to which such favorable opinion translated to pro-US state behavior in matters o f 
its Foreign Policy. This research will undertake to resolve these issues.
The quantitative research part o f this dissertation finds that citizen diplomacy is 
positively correlated with congruent voting with the US at the UN General Assembly, in 
twelve o f  the sixteen models. Countries that receive more foreign investment, military 
aid, wealthier countries and more industrialized countries vote more with the US at the 
UN General Assembly. Countries vote more often in congruence with the US at the UN 
General Assembly on key votes -  votes o f national interest to the United States as tracked 
and reported by the US State Department -  than they do on all other votes. The three case 
studies highlighted in chapter six support these findings and demonstrate that as 
ex p ected , c itizen  d ip lo m acy  is a  v iab le  foreign po licy  strategy.
Research focus
The primary aim o f this research is test whether citizen diplomacy is a predictor o f 
foreign policy behavior towards the US; i.e. the extent to which countries that receive 
citizen diplomats align their foreign policy preferences with those o f the United States.
Do citizen diplomat-recipient countries, as a result o f these bilateral exchanges, alter their 
foreign policy strategies and preferences to favor those o f the United States?
To date, the most comprehensive conceptualization o f the non-governmental 
conduct o f inter-state diplomatic relations can be found not in the academy per se, but in 
the practical applications o f citizen diplomacy as outlined in the occasional papers o f the 
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD). IMTD identifies nine tracks o f  diplomacy;
9
these include government, professional -  including trained personnel, business, such as 
direct and indirect investment, multi-nationals, private citizens, research, training and 
education, activism, religious, funding, and public opinion/communication 9 Although 
the formal and traditional government-to-govemment practice o f diplomacy remains the 
most widely acknowledged avenue o f  diplomatic engagement, the other eight tracks are 
attracting considerable attention, application and even government funding.
This research concentrates evaluating the impact o f private citizens (track four), 
activism (track six) and funding (track eight). Track five (research, training and 
education) is often inextricably intertwined with the other three tracks: through education 
and training, individuals become more activist, often source funds -  even as citizen 
diplomats -  and serve in foreign countries where they provide training and education 
such as in maternal health or on reducing HIV/AIDS transmission. This research bundles 
the activities o f tracks five, six and eight as essential to what track 4 diplomacy is -  
citizen diplomats carrying out some social activity beneficial to a target community.
By studying the place o f  citizen diplomacy rather than the traditional, bilateral, 
official government-to-government, ambassador-embassy and special-envoy variant o f 
formal diplomacy, this research evaluates the contributions o f citizen diplomats to 
advancing the foreign policy interests o f the sending country. The research narrows the 
focus to only those individuals who act in a private capacity but with the full backing o f 
the sending government, such as Peace Corps Volunteers. Effectively, these are non- 
traditional diplomats. The research omits other international volunteers such as 
missionaries, tourists and international philanthropists.
'J John W. McDonald. ' ‘Multi-Track Diplomacy.” 
http://im td.server295.com/?page_ id-d 19 . (Web). Accessed 11/03/2012.
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The research also seeks to determine how target recipient countries respond to 
these non-coercive, non-traditional avenues o f international interaction, and whether they 
change their public behavior towards the citizen-diplomat sending country. This 
approach addresses questions o f practical appl ication and also builds scholarship in the 
area o f  diplomacy and statecraft, o f  which Steiner asserts, “no area o f world politics has 
reflected a greater gap between experience and theory than diplomatic statecraft".10
Focus on citizen diplomacy
The US continues to utilize bilateral, multilateral and institutional approaches and 
strategies to maintain and expand its power and influence. One o f the most enduring 
approaches to US bilateral relations is the Peace Corps, a government-funded program 
that sends thousands o f volunteers abroad each year to countries in need o f  training 
manpower in several areas, including education, health, HIV/AIDS, among others.
The cost o f the Peace Corps Volunteer program is approximately $400 million 
dollars a year but the actual value o f the volunteer time and friendships is probably much 
higher. Person-to-person exchanges o f a diplomatic nature are often referred to as citizen 
diplomacy. For the past 50 years that this program has been running and attracting a lot 
o f public support, there has been little research on the extent to which it serves as a 
foreign policy strategy, and whether the program actually achieves its foreign policy 
objectives. Assuming that one o f  the US and program goals is to create friendships with 
the receiving country, the most public expression o f  “mutual attraction” towards the US 
ought to be congruence in voting with the US at the UN This research therefore proposes
10 Barry Steiner. "Diplomacy and International Theory" Review o f  International Studies, 
30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004): 492.
to interrogate the correlation between citizen diplomacy and foreign policy behavior o f 
countries in dyadic relationships with the US.
Research problem
The second Peace Corps goal is "helping promote a better understanding o f  Americans on 
the part o f the peoples served."11 The Peace Corps began as a foreign policy strategy to 
counter Soviet influence and provision o f  technical and skilled labor to newly 
independent countries. The extent to which the citizen diplomats o f the Peace Corps have 
achieved the second goal remains unknown. Secondly, there has been no study on the 
import o f  “promoting a better understanding o f Americans” -  the intended outcome o f 
this goal o f citizen diplomacy. As a social work activity, citizen diplomacy is legitimately 
a desirable activity that allows volunteers to teach children English, teach baseball, 
educate youth on dangers o f  HIV and AIDS, teach mothers proper nutrition, small 
business skills and assist communities to build wells.
As a strategy to increase other countries’ favorability view o f the US, the “so 
what” remains unanswered. Is the premise that by sending citizen diplomats to a foreign 
country ostensibly to improve foreigners’ views o f the United States and Americans ill- 
advised, an overreach, ambitious or simply naive? Is there merit in achieving this goal -  
that is. if  foreigners like Americans and America, so what? How does "liking America 
and Americans" translate into some tangible benefit for the United States?
The implied assumption is that there is a) some benefit that the United States 
accrues by sending citizen diplomats to a second country, and b) that there exists some
11 See: Peace Corps. “Mission.” http: /wvvw.peacec'.»rps.gov /aboul'rn ission/ (W eb). Accessed 
4/21/2012.
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way to measure the benefit which is hypothesized beneficial to the United States and its 
foreign policy. The logical path o f "getting others to align their interests with ours" 
suggests that there should be a way o f measuring the extent to which the interests are 
aligned with those o f  the sending country, in this case the United States.
Such measures can be quantitative, for example, voting with the US at the UN on 
key votes (which tire recorded, analyzed by the United States State Department and 
reported to Congress on an annual basis), increased trade opportunities, military 
cooperation or more tourism. The "mutual attraction" factor can aiso be qualitative and 
expressed, for example, through trade, cooperation, support o f US positions on a range o f 
international issues and expression o f solidarity for US-preferred positions in bilateral 
forums. Still, given the prior discussion on the role o f signaling, a more visible way o f 
evaluating the impact o f soft power, o f which citizen diplomacy is a key variable, would 
include categorical actions, such as voting with the US at the UN General Assembly.
This research does not assert causation: citizen diplomacy does not necessarily 
lead to citizen diplomat-recipient states voting more in congruence with the United 
States. A finding o f no correlation between citizen diplomats’ placement and the recipient 
country’s alignment o f foreign policy preferences with those o f the US is significant 
since citizen diplomacy has been a IJS foreign policy strategy since 1961. A finding o f 
some correlation, controlling for all other rival explanations, is o f equal significance. It 
indicates that recipient countries are likely to align their foreign policy choices with the 
US conditional upon receiving citizen diplomats. It is important to point out that this 
research concentrates on the narrow goal o f investigating the relationship between citizen 
diplomacy and congruent voting with the US at the UN General Assembly.
Problem statement
To what extent does citizen diplomacy influence the foreign policy behavior o f states? 
Does citizen diplomacy influence foreign policy behavior o f states or is there a spurious 
correlation? What other variables can affect the behavior o f states towards other states? 
What does qualitative evidence show regarding the effect o f citizen diplomacy?
Approaches and data
This research uses a mixed methods approach to determine how citizen diplomacy affects 
foreign policy behavior o f states. It examines data on citizen diplomacy and its 
correlation with state behavior especially towards the IJS. The research also looks at how 
other variables o f bilateral and multilateral interactions influence foreign policy behavior. 
The research examines whether host-country attributes -  such as democracy, state 
cohesion or fragility and wealth -  affect how countries conceptualize their foreign policy 
options. It also examines how regional and temporal variables affect how countries 
behave towards the US. It examines and explains correlations between citizen diplomacy 
and other potential explanans.
The research data is drawn from several sources. The data on congruence in 
voting with the IJS, the key indicator o f country voting affinity, comes from Voeten and 
Strehnev and from Dreher, Strum and Vreeland. Data on citizen diplomacy j s  d-'awn from 
the US Peace Corps through the agency’s annual congressional budget justification 
Other data sources include the State Department, the Center for Systemic Peace, the 
United Nations and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
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Citizen diplomacy
One o f the major aims o f this research to conceptualize ‘citizen diplomacy’, which to 
date has not sufficiently defined by scholarship. Much o f the current citizen diplomacy 
scholarship constructs the concept as one o f  three options: citizen's diplomacy, citizen 
diplomacy, and public diplomacy. This research briefly discusses the major differences, 
differentiating between citizen diplomacy and public diplomacy, and specifies a 
definition that closely mirrors the definitions provided by the US State Department,
NC1V and the United States Center for Citizen Diplomacy.
Public Diplomacy is defined as an “an instrument that governments use to 
mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the publics o f other countries, 
rather than merely their governments.” 12 Nye further specifies that public diplomacy is o f 
two kinds: “slow media o f cultural diplomacy” such as art, books and exchanges, and the
“fast information media” which include(d) radio, movies, and newsreels” and no doubt
1 ̂
includes modern methods o f  communication.
The intersection o f individuals, groups and governments to influence foreign 
publics is at the heart o f Delaney's definition o f public diplomacy. Delaney argues that 
public diplomacy is "the way in which both government and private individuals and 
groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear 
directly on another governm ent's foreign policy decisions.” 14 Cowan and Arsenault’s 
definition approximates Delaney’s; their definition o f public diplomacy drawing from US
12 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals o f  the American 
Academy o f  Political and Social Science, 616 (2008): 95.
13 Ibid. 98.
14 R. F. Delaney. “ Introduction.” In A. S. Hoffman (Ed.), International Communication 
and the New Diplomacy. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968): 3.
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Information Agency’s three layers o f public diplomacy which includes “monologue, 
dialogue and collaboration” but is based on government-agency involvem ent.b
The United States Center for Citizen Diplomacy (USCCD) defines citizen 
diplomacy as the concept that ordinary individuals, such as students, teachers, athletes, 
artists, business people, humanitarians, adventurers or tourists have “the right, even the 
responsibility, to help shape US foreign relations 'one handshake at a time.'” 16 The 
USCCD includes “a broad range o f programs and activities” that the citizens support as 
partial definition o f  citizen diplomacy.
The “Citizen Diplomats” website defines citizen diplomats as individuals doing 
work in “promoting international understanding and cross-cultural friendship” 17 The 
National Council for International Volunteers (NCIV)’s definition o f citizen diplomacy 
mirrors that o f the Center for Citizen Diplomacy. These definitions have been adopted
1Xfrom the US State Department’s definition o f “citizen diplomat.” Second track or 
"citizens'" diplomacy may be broadly defined as the bringing together o f  professionals.
15 Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault. “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to 
Collaboration: The Three Layers o f  Public Diplomacy.” The Annals o f  the American Academy o f  
Political and Social Science, 616(2008): 10.
16 US Center for Citizen Diplomacy. “W hat is Citizen Diplomacy?” 
http://uscenterforcitizendiplomacv.org/pages/what-is-citizen-diplom acy/. See also: N O V . 
“Discover Citizen Diplomacy.” http://www.nciv.org/Top/discover-citizen-diplomacv.html (Web). 
Accessed 11/4/2012.
17 Citizen Diplomats Organizations, http://citizendiplomats.coni/cdorg.html (Web). 
Accessed 11/05/2012.
18 The State Department further holds that individuals who "work on an issue o f 
international importance; travel on an international service project; host people from other 
countries in your home, workplace, school or community or have a passport..." are citizen 
diplomats. See: http://diplomacy.state.gov/discoverdiplomacy/references/169794.htm (Web). 
Accessed 11/4/2012.
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opinion leaders or other currently or potentially influential individuals."19 Davies and 
Kaufman argue that citizen diplomacy "complements...official diplomacy, opening up 
opportunities for communication, cross cultural understanding."20 The research does not 
find significant differences between “citizen's diplomacy” and “citizen diplomacy” but 
clarifies that citizen diplomacy as a predictor o f states’ foreign policy behavior towards 
the US is the key variable.
Apart from social, economic and cultural development, the service o f  citizen 
diplomats is often associated with peace-keeping activities. Bernards defines citizen 
diplomacy based on the actions o f the individual and acting in the area o f peace-making. 
Bernards further writes that "citizens play a major role in transforming the perceptions, 
understandings and solutions aceepto nations in conflict." Citizens either assign 
themselves the duty o f intervening for peace where the government will not, or have 
utilitarian reasons for seeking peace and the ability to bridge differences based on 
common interests.
This provides for citizen diplomats to meet “the needs o f both com m unities... for 
example, in South A frica: the citizen ‘peace committees' played a crucial role in 
preparing the population for the tremendous changes that took place in ending 
apartheid."21 Formation o f the Wisconsin Council for Coordinating for Nicaragua
19 Ibid.
20 John Davies and Edy Kaufman. Second truck'citizens' diplomacy: concepts and 
techniques for conflict transformation. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002): 2
21 Reena Bernards. "Women as Citizen-Diplomats." Women's Studies Quarterly, 26, No. 
3/4, Internationalizing the Curriculum (Fall - Winter, 1998): 51. Bernards notes citizens’ 
effectiveness in diplomacy, acting as "an unofficial, informal interaction between members o f 
adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and 
organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict."
17
(WCCN) in the 1980's at the height o f the Nicaragua civil war was based on the view that 
"diplomacy is essentially the art o f helping the world...and WCCN took responsibility for 
furthering citizen diplomacy while formally separating from the official US state 
department policy.""
Broome affirms this view o f citizen diplomats as peace-makers, discussing 
Interactive Management as an approach to "to citizen peace-building groups"23 and an 
effort to "support citizen-based activities that seek to foster greater contact among 
individuals and groups from the two sides o f  the conflict place.”24 Gopin offers a 
“conflict-solving” approach to citizen diplomacy. He defines citizen diplomacy as "an 
activity that is much larger than merely religion and conflict resolution...it refers to a 
whole variety o f ways in which individual citizens across the planet are engaged in 
efforts to reach out to civilizations and countries that may be in conflict with their 
own." These scholars therefore view citizen diplomacy more as a peace-making and 
peace building activity that targets local populations than as a state endeavor.
Williams and Goose articulate the non-state actor or private institutional view, 
discussing the role o f the citizen diplomacy in the context o f the Ottawa Process to ban 
land-mines. They write that "when six non-governmental organizations came together in 
October 1992...the process that evolved in those years and brought about the...Ottawa
22 Clare Weber. Visions o f solidarity: US peace activists in Nicaragua from war to 
women's activism and globalization. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006): 41-42.
2j Benjamin J. Broome. "Participatory Planning and Design in a Protracted Conflict 
Situation: Applications with Citizen Peace-Building Groups in Cyprus. Systems Research and 
Behavioral Science. 19, (2002): 314.
21 Ibid.
25 Marc Gopin. To Make the Earth Whole: The Art o f Citizen Diphnnacy in an Age o f 
Religious militancy. (Lanham, MD: Row man & Littlefield Publishers, 2009): 93.
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Process— gave the promise o f a new dimension in diplomacy, of'citizen diplomacy' and 
generated hope for its wider applicability."26 Other attempts at citizen diplomacy 
concentrate on lower-level concerns such as sister-city initiatives or student exchanges. 
Leviton highlights such diplomacy (citizen participation) by GZPP (Ground Zero Pairing 
Project), "one of the largest suppliers o f educational materials concerning US -  Soviet 
Relationships to schools, its goal is to promote friendships between children o f the two 
countries" with the clear objective that held that "having knowledge and contact with 
'enemies' helps people come to see each other as individuals rather than in terms o f
77
stereotypes and labels."
Malek defines citizen diplomacy as “unofficial, state-funded contacts between 
people o f different nations, as opposed to official contacts between governmental 
representatives; it can include direct contacts in joint programs or situations mediated or 
facilitated by unofficial (non-government) third parties -  NGOs, private peacemakers,
7R
scholars, or any other unofficial ‘bridge builder.’""
So far defmitionally, citizen diplomats are for the most part individuals, acting in 
individually or in a small group, without the access to extensive government machinery 
and support or public means o f outreach to the public such as radio stations, embassies
26 Jody Williams and Stephen D. Goose. "Citizen Diplomacy and the Ottawa Process: A 
Lasting Model?" in Jody Williams; Stephen D Goose; Mary Wareham, Eds. Banning landmines: 
disarmament, citizen diplomacy, and human security. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2008): 181.
27 Daniel Leviton. Horrendous death and health: toward action. (New York: Hemisphere 
Pub. Corp., 1991): 49.
28 See: Cate Malek, "Citizen Diplomacy", accessed on 4/2/1011. (W eb). See also Chigas, 
Diana. "Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy. August, 2003. Accessed on 4/2/701 I (Web). This view o f 
Track Two (Citizen Diplomacy), however, is more focused on post-con diet and conflict 
resolution intervention by third-party, non-invested persons and/or organizations. A more 
positivistic view o f Track II (Citizen Diplomacy) provides for pro-active actions to influence a 
positive view o f a country, people, or entity as an ideological preference.
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and key government officials and other resources that public diplomacy employs. The 
limited in-country support for Peace Corps Volunteers therefore qualifies them to be 
citizen diplomats, even where their work might eventually support non-governmental or 
citizen organizations in the countries where they work.
This research excludes public diplomacy in its analysis. Gopin defines citizen 
diplomacy as “a whole variety o f ways in which individual citizens across the planet are 
engaged in efforts to reach out to civilizations and countries,"29 often to complement the 
efforts o f  government leaders who "can do surpri singly little to promote positive change, 
given the confines o f their mandate" by individuals whose mandate in "citizen diplomacy 
and peace building is steady, positive change."30
The view o f public diplomacy being influenced or driven by some aspect o f 
government is well established. Tuch, for example, defined this form o f diplomacy as "a 
government's process o f  communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about 
understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its 
national goals and policies" while Frederick argues that public diplomacy includes 
"activities, directed abroad in the fields o f information, education, and culture, whose 
objective is to influence a foreign government, by influencing its citizens.”' To these 
operational definitions, Gilboa added "the interactivity between states and non-state 
actors; utilization o f ’soft power,’ two-way communication, strategic public diplomacy,
29 Gopin, To Make the Earth...: 93.
30 Ibid., 96.
31 Tuch, Hans. Communicating with the World; US public diplomacy overseas. (NY: St. 
Martins Press, 1990): 3.
32 Howard H. Frederick. Global communication and international relations. (Belmont, 
CA: Wadsworth, 1993): 229.
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media framing, information management, public relations, nation branding, self­
presentation, and e-image; domestication o f foreign policy; and addressing both short- 
and long-term issues.”’’
Citizen diplomacy is often confused with other forms o f interaction with foreign 
publics -  at home or abroad. Most scholars conceptualize and measure citizen diplomacy 
through the lens o f "propaganda, public relations (PR), international public relations 
(IPR), psychological warfare, and public affairs"34 -  with the most common measuring 
tools derived from and through public opinion polls and media coverage.
The premise o f citizen diplomacy exceeds international volunteering (service), 
service learning. Gap Year Abroad, missionary work, tourism, scholarly exchanges, 
business investment conferences and foreign direct investment abroad, or retirement 
abroad by American citizens. It is also outside the scope o f armed intervention, because 
to the extent possible, citizen diplomacy is essentially counter to armed intervention: it 
brooks mutual attraction. Mutual attraction can be assumed to portend some level o f 
commonality such as language, ideology, culture or other variables.
Diplomacy o f the medieval to modem times seems to have provided a major 
legacy to modern-day citizen diplomacy; that "statesmanship was based on the fair and 
open principle o f sincerity, and indeed, such a policy will be found in all cases where it
33 Eytan Gilboa. “Searching for a Theory o f  Public Diplomacy." Am.als o f  the American 
Academy o f  Political and Social Science, 616, Public Diplomacy in a (h an g in g  World (Mar., 
2008): 57-58.
34 Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory o f Public Diplomacy,” : 56.
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has been adopted to have been eminently successful." ’5 This openness is leveraged by 
citizen diplomats when they interact with individuals in the target country.
Citizen diplomacy is one o f the central, constituent elements o f  soft power, a 
strategic approach that continues to gain wider acceptance in interstate relations as the 
primacy o f the use o f force and relevance o f  interstate wars among Great Powers 
continues to diminish. But what is citizen diplomacy? Is citizen diplomacy a new 
concept? How does citizen diplomacy differ from the traditional diplomacy, that is, state 
to state or formal diplomacy?
C itizens as diplom ats
If citizen diplomacy encompasses the work o f individuals who volunteer to work in 
foreign countries, supported by government through training, placement, remuneration 
and extraction, citizen diplomats can be defined simply as the individuals who perform 
this volunteer work. Sharp discusses citizen diplomacy based on who is represented and 
to whom they are represented. He writes that "citizen diplomats c laim ing] to represent 
themselves, collectivities such as sub-state, supra-state, and trans-state communities, 
sovereign states on occasion, single person enterprises and ideas or policies".36
The second group o f  citizen diplomats consists o f individuals who attempt to 
influence the international community, states and non-state actors. Sharp identifies four 
types o f citizen diplomats; the first is a go-between, interacting with countries otherwise
j5 Murray, Embassies andforeign courts: 45.
76 Paul Sharp. "Making Sense o f Citizen Diplomats: The People o f  Duluth, Minnesota, as 
International Actors." International Studies Perspectives, 2 (2001): 137.
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difficult to access useful for deniability and access.’7 Secondly, the citizen diplomat can 
be seen as representative for a sectoral, regional, or local economic interest,38 for example 
city-sponsored business investors.
The third type o f citizen diplomat is the citizen diplomat as a lobbyist or advocate 
for a particular cause.39 A recent example o f this kind o f advocacy for a particular cause 
was George Clooney's involvement in the peace process in the Sudan (2010/2011). This 
type o f involvement can range across different interests, and reach across different actors, 
domestic and international. The fourth type o f  citizen diplomat is the "subverter and 
transformer o f  existing policies and/or political arrangements, domestic and / or 
international."40 It can be assumed that since the citizen diplomat o f  the Peace Corps is 
less o f  these definitions and is truly altruistic.
Perhaps the idea o f  citizen diplomacy was derived from the belief that if we 
"bring ordinary people together from the different sides o f their respective political 
divides and they will discover the common humanity which they share. If this is done 
with sufficient numbers o f  people, then it will become impossible for their respective 
governments to maintain hostile relations."41 It is this idea that regular citizens can 
impact a nation’s international relations that is captured in Leonard and Alakeson’s 
Going Public, report acknowledging the British governments need to involve all its
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 138.
39 Ibid., ! 39.
40 Ibid., 140.
41 Paul Sharp. "Making Sense o f Citizen Diplomats: The People o f  Duluth. M innesota, as 
International Actors." International Studies Perspectives, 2 (2001): 140.
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citizenry, in which they argue that "building links with overseas publics will matter as 
much to foreign policy as talking to governments; influencing people abroad must be 
central to our strategy. The Foreign Office must unleash the energy o f  60 million budding 
ambassadors in Britain's schools, businesses, local authorities, political parties and 
communities to build deeper links across the world."42
Lee and Hudson discuss the paradigmatic change in the conduct o f foreign policy, 
pointing to the rethinking o f the function o f inter-governmental relations. They suggest 
that increasingly, governments are integrating commercial activities with diplomacy, and 
are restructuring their diplomatic institutions to better serve 'commercial diplomacy' e.g. 
mergers o f  trade and foreign ministries as has been the case in Canada, Australia, 
Belgium, thereby instituting formal business-government partnerships.43 Other 
governments may not combine their ministries or their functions, yet in the case o f the 
Peace Corps, the US embassy in the destination country has coordinating functions such 
as administering oaths o f  service and coordination with the destination country.
The objective o f rethinking citizen diplomacy is to dispel the notion that 
volunteering is simply “helping others with no expectation for rew ard/' While the 
motivation o f  volunteers may be benign and altruistic, the choice o f a government agency 
as the avenue through which volunteers serve inadvertently imparts governmental 
structure to the selection, training, deployment, interactional terms, extraction, 
indoctrination and outcomes that such state-funded volunteers provide in their volunteer 
service. Government agencies may support altruistic motives, but in the case o f  the US
42 Mark Leonard and Vidhya Alakeson. “Going public: Diplomacy for the information 
society.” M ay 2000. (Web). Accessed 3/12/2012.
4j Donna Lee and David Hudson. "The Old and New Significance o f Political Economy 
in Diplomacy." Review o f  International Studies, 30, No. 3 (Jul., 2004): 383.
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State Department and the US Peace Corps, their objectives for bilateral outcomes trump, 
but leverage citizen diplomats' altruistic motivations. Government agencies too have 
institutional functions and existential preferences that are served by the citizen diplomats. 
The involvement of the government therefore leverages altruism for altruism 's purposes, 
and for purposes of influencing foreign governments.
This recoriceptualization o f citizen diplomacy argues that state-funded volunteers 
fulfill a mandate o f supporting government objectives and ideals. It further suggests that 
citizen diplomats impart specific values to the communities and countries where they 
serve. They interact with citizens and elites in the receiving countries and are therefore 
volunteer citizen diplomats, serving the interests o f  their countries. This redefines the 
concept o f  state-supported international volunteering into a concept o f citizen diplomacy.
Citizen diplomacy actualizes the promise and practice o f foreign policy through 
international volunteer service and person-to-person exchanges. Since volunteering 
within a country' has no conceptual outcomes for foreign policy, the research concentrates 
on international volunteering and excludes domestic volunteering. Within international 
volunteering, the research concentrates on state-funded, or state-supported international 
volunteering which it conceptualizes as citizen diplomacy. The difference is that while an 
individual may volunteer for their church and thereby travel abroad for example in the 
2010 Haiti earthquake, the lack o f government support excludes such volunteering.
Citizen diplomacy, the state-sponsored international volunteering, encompasses 
programs such as the United Nations Volunteers, the “technical experts” that the Soviet 
Union placed during the Cold War in third world countries, to other overtly-run 
government programs that aim to increase one country's unofficial presence in and
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interaction with the citizens and elites o f another. There are many examples o f state- 
funded volunteer programs; the best-known o f these is the United States Peace Corps 
Volunteers (PCVs). The Volunteer Service Overseas, with a vision o f  “a w'orld without 
poverty”44 is the United Kingdom’s premier volunteer agency, and perhaps the w orld's 
oldest, government-funded citizen diplomacy program.
Importance o f  international volunteering
The practice o f international volunteering is occurring in a rapidly changing international
landscape, one that features increasing globalization, which facilitates greater
inteipersonal connections. Globalization, on average, has facilitated quick movement.
instant communication and travel, and allows individuals to become more involved in the
affairs -  whether to improve or otherwise -  o f foreign places. Citizen diplomacy has
benefitted from increased globalization. It is, however, important to think o f globalization
and its relationship with citizen diplomacy.
Scholte defines globalization in terms o f "multiple and overlapping geographical
scales", and as "the growth o f social spaces o f  transplanetary proportions" that create, and
involve "global social relations involve direct exchanges and significant
interdependencies among persons located anywhere across the earth, hence their
'transplanetary' quality."4' Khan defines globalization as:
the growing economic, political, technological, and cultural linkages that connect 
individuals, communities, businesses, and governments around the world. 
Globalization also involves the growth o f multinational corporations (businesses 
that have operations or investments in many countries) and transnational
44 VSO. "Vision and mission." http://w \vw ys(\org,uk/ (Web). Accessed 2/5/2012.
45 Jan Aart Scholte. "Reconstructing C ontemporary Democracy." Indiana Journal o f  
Global Legal Studies, 15, No. 1. Winter 2008): 305.
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corporations (businesses that see they functioning in a global marketplace). The 
international institutions that oversee world trade and finance play an increasingly 
important role in this era o f globalization. Globalization is a comprehensive term 
for the emergence o f a global society in which economic, political, environmental, 
and cultural events in one pan  o f the world quickly come to have significance for 
people in other parts o f the world. Globalization is the result o f  advances in 
communication, transportation, and information technologies.46
The interpersonal exchanges that are the central tenet o f international volunteering are a
constituent characteristic o f globalization, and include business and cultural exchanges.
person-to-person contacts and interactions, cultural information sessions, humanitarian
activities, international volunteering. Thus, globalization has the potential to create
knowledge and inspire international volunteers to participate in international volunteering
for altruistic purposes. The volunteering and other contacts with foreign countries
through different forms o f  exchange, translated into political and foreign policy
strategies, are non-iraditiona! strategies and are increasingly becoming more important.
The importance o f these strategies— specifically the state-sanctioned international
volunteering— is the focus o f this analysis.
The new conceptualization o f international volunteering as citizen diplomacy is
supported by global geo-political changes. Not only are there changes in the diplomatic
nature o f  the interactions o f nations, traditional concerns for states have been in flux since
) 945, accelerating in 1990 with the collapse o f the Soviet Union and the communist
ideology. Joseph Nye points out that, “while military force remains the ultimate form o f
power in a self-help system, the use o f force has become more costly for modern great
powers than it was in earlier centuries.
Himayatullah Khan. "Gioba'ization -  Challenges And Debates.’* COM SATS Institute 
o f  Information
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Other instruments such as culture, instant communication, organizational and
building o f institutional skills, and manipulation o f interdependence have become quite
important.’*4' The implications o f these changes are captured by Lancaster who, in
asserting the new priorities for foreign aid, writes that
the traditional purposes o f aid -promoting US security and supporting 
development in poor countries -  are no longer pressing in the post-Cold War 
world o f American dominance and new emerging markets. These changes... have 
also raised new challenges and opportunities for US leadership...to help preserve 
peace, address the challenges o f globalization, and improve the quality o f life.48
There has been little evidence that citizen diplomacy was influenced by either the failure
o f the primary thinking about foreign aid. or a search for an alternative means o f deliver
foreign aid. Indeed, while the UK VSO was inaugurated in 1958. the US Peace Corps'
genesis was then Senator John F. Kennedy's speech at the University o f Michigan in 1960
before he was elected president in part emphasizing service and serving a foreign policy
function o f countering Soviet influence.49
Traditional diplomacy and humanitarian approaches to foreign aid have been long
plagued by inefficiencies in distribution, use. being prone to corruption, poor impact and
perceived short and long-term benefits to countries and their populations, but especially
to donors. Indeed, Collier and Dollar contend that "evidence suggested that donors had
little control over how a recipient government used the finance for a particular project",50
unless o f course it was given as materials. Naturally, scholars contend these findings:
47 Joseph S. Nye. "Soft Power." Foreign Policy, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn, 
1990): 158-9.
48 Carol Lancaster. "Redesigning Foreign Aid." Foreign Affairs, 79, 5 (2000): 74-75.
49 US Peace Corps. ”50!h Anniversary'.” (web). Accessed 05/27/2012.
50 Paul Collier and David Dollar. “Development Effectiveness: What Have We Learnt?” 
The Economic Journal,. 114, No. 496, Features (Jun.. 2004): F244.
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some scholars believe that, correlated with economic development, foreign aid has, 
without qualification, promoted economic growth;51
Programs that directly place citizen diplomats and provide on-site skills, training 
and other forms o f expertise are more difficult to misappropriate. The investment and 
focus in such programs is in human and technical capacity, mostly provided directly by 
the sending nation. This approach recognizes that most o f the studies evaluating the 
impact o f  foreign aid have based their evaluation on direct correlation between direct 
foreign aid (economic development assistance, direct and indirect foreign investment and 
military assistance) with the change in GDP per capita.
Citizen diplomats: functions
E xisting  lite ra tu re  on c itizen  d ip lo m ats and d ip lom acy  focuses on the ro le  o f c itizen s in 
taking action locally especially in the area o f peace-making. Pratt writes that "the citizen 
diplomat today is more sensitive to the needs o f visiting leaders and has more expertise in 
receiving them."' ' Pratt further writes that, "these guests include students, doctors, 
businessmen, judges, diplomats, engineers, social workers, [and] writers; short-term 
visitors are here for a period o f weeks or months."53
The citizen diplomat label can be applied to the millions o f  American citizens 
who visit foreign countries as tourists, conduct business or are stationed in near and far-
51 see for example. H. Hansen and F. Tarp, F. ‘"Aid and growth regressions”, Journal o f  
Development Economics, 64, No. 2, (2001): 547-570.
32 Alice Reynolds Pratt. “Citizen Diplomat: The Community's Role Today.” Annals o f  the 
American Academy o f  Political and Social Science, 424. International Exchange o f Persons: A 
Reassessment (Mar., 1976): 97
”  Ibid.. 98.
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abroad in military capacities- Their duties, objectives, intentions, interactions with locals 
and length o f stay depend on their roles; however, apart from tourists, these citizens serve 
limited US foreign policy goals. This is where the international volunteers are located.
While this definition emphasizes unofficial contacts as the defining factor in the 
interaction, the definition I propose to use bridges these unofficial contacts with 'public 
diplomacy', where the 'unofficial contacts' are often state-sanctioned (for example, 
humanitarian assistance, social and economic development and volunteer programs (1JS 
Peace Corps) where public diplomacy is conducted by 'private individuals' partly in 
support o f  official foreign policy goals. This study holds that "citizen diplomacy" is semi­
official or official contacts between individuals and non-governmental entities within 
different nations, carried out by private individuals on altruistic basis, in which aspects o f 
formal and public diplomacy are transmitted.
Citizen diplomats are instrumental in furthering the humanitarian and foreign 
policy paradigms o f  source countries. In the farewell address to the first Peace Corps 
Volunteer group, President Kennedy intimated as much: “and if  you can impress them 
with your commitment, to freedom, to the advancement o f the interests o f people 
everywhere, to your pride in your country and its best traditions, and what it stands for, 
the influence may be far-reaching.”54
International volunteers serve in different capacities in the countries where they 
serve: they work as educators, with youth and community development, health, business 
and information and communication technology, agriculture, environment, HIV/AIDS.
54 See: Jerome Socolovsky. ‘"At 50, US Peace Corps Still Draws Volunteers.” VOA 
News, March 1, 2011. (Web). Accessed 7/27/2012.
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food security and different occasions.5' They operate within frameworks often proposed 
and implemented by recipient countries and in line with national social and economic 
development goals. The extent of their involvement or efficacy o f volunteers’ actions 
towards their presumed goals have not been measured and are sometimes contra to the 
recipient country or the sending country' goals. However, I assume that their actions 
support the goal o f poverty eradication and that at some level, their work is successful.
This volunteerism abroad is inextricably interwoven with national narratives, with 
the concept o f what a nation is. The United States has a high rate o f volunteering, with an 
average o f 20 per cent o f its residents volunteering local in any given year. The support 
for international volunteering for example the expansion o f the Peace Corps is often 
linked with volunteerism within the United States. For example, on 1st April, 2011, 
President Obama signed The Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act, which 
reauthorized and reformed the national service laws.56
This act, passed with bipartisan congressional support, demonstrated support for 
public diplomacy programs, especially the AmeriCorps program with the creation o f five 
new service programs including the Clean Energy, Education, Healthy Futures, Veterans 
Service and Opportunity Corps. The other significance o f this legislation is the formal 
recognition o f September 11, 2001, the then-tenth anniversary o f the attacks in 
Washington DC, Pennsylvania and New York as the "National Service and 
Remembrance Day”, illustrating the connection between non-traditional public 
diplomacy and the national consciousness.
55 US Peace Corps. "What do Volunteers Do?" (Weh), Accessed 2/5/2012.
56Govtrack.us. "H.R. 1388; Serve America Act." Accessed on 7/27/2011 (W eb). See also: 
Peace Corps. "United We Serve." (Web). Accessed 7/27/2011.
Projects undertaken by citizen diplomats abroad support a range o f functions,
from poverty eradication to education, health, agriculture, small business development,
social and technical capacity building. As relates to international development, in his
discussion on causes and strategies for escaping the trap o f poverty, economist Jeffery
Sachs attributes poverty’s existence to the idea that "poor people do not save enough, so
that physical capital accumulation fails to keep up with depreciation and population
growth". The lack o f savings is also, according to Sachs, evident in human capital. This
view has been prevalent since 1940's, and has suggested that foreign assistance is one o f
the most viable ways o f  breaking this trap.57 International volunteering provides
especially the technical capacity and volunteers who work in critical areas whose
improvement could significantly reduce poverty.
Citizen diplomats often they bring special skills gained through academic
training, political activism and civic participation in their countries o f origin. These skills
include community organizing, participating in, and encouraging democratic processes
for example in the selection o f a village development project. Citizen diplomacy also
takes the form o f peace-making, resolving conflicts and bridging cultural barriers on
taboo subjects and long-entrenched practices, thereby causing shifts in paradigms. This
approach is supported by literature on the role citizen diplomats, either as direct
practitioners or as facilitators. Bernards, for example, writes that
with support from the (US-based) Center for Strategic Initiatives o f  Women, 
women in the Horn o f Africa have received training in conflict-resolution skills, 
learning from South African trainers in particular. Peace centers in villages in
57 William Easterly. ‘'Reliving the 1950s: The Big Push. Poverty Traps, and Takeoffs in 
Economic Development.’' Journal o f  Economic Growth, 11, No. 4 (Dec., 2006): 294.
32
Sudan and Somalia are staffed by trusted indigenous women leaders who help to 
resolve intertribal conflicts before they become violent confrontations.38
Citizen diplomacy as a third arm o f foreign assistance is often removed from formal
channels o f diplomacy. It is difficult to perceive a citizen diplomat promising a sixth
grade English student in a Cameroonian classroom some o f benefit if  they are supportive
o f their (JS foreign policy. On the other hand, Kuziemko and Werker write that rent-
seeking within formal diplomacy, particularly in decision-making bodies such as the UN
Security Council, is rife. "Indeed, the United States reported issued 'promises o f rich
rewards’ to rotating members o f the UN Security Council in exchange for their support
during the run-up to the 2003 invasion o f Iraq.”59 The average increase in the amounts o f
foreign aid benefits for UN Security Council rotating membership includes fifty nine
percent increase in aid from the US and an eight percent increase from the UN.60
It is important to restate the aim if  this research: the dissertation evaluates the
impact o f  the citizen diplomacy on host countries’ alignment o f preferences with those of
the United States, as measured by the frequency o f voting in congruence with the US at
the United Nations General Assembly. The selected indicator for citizen diplomacy is the
US Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs). PC’Vs, with the financial and logistical backing of
the US government through the State Department and embassies abroad, serve in a
number o f  foreign countries in social and economic development capacity. This research
58 Reena Bernards. “Women as Citizen-Diplomats.” Women’s Studies Quarterly, 26, No. 
3/4, Internationalizing the Curriculum (Fall -W inter, 1998): 49.
59 Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker. “ How Much I -, a Seat on the Security Council 




is inform ed by the lim ited em pirical evidence that the volunteers are prom oting a better 
understanding o f  Am ericans am ong the people around the world the volunteers serve.
C oncluding thoughts on citizen diplomacy
The foregoing discussion structured the debate on citizen diplomacy through international 
volunteering, especially where a state applies its resources to advancing national interests 
through individual cultural exchanges between its citizens and foreign nation(al)s. The 
research expanded the definition o f  citizen diplom acy through careful synthesis o f  tracks 
four, six. seven and eight o f  M ulti-Track Diplom acy (M TD). This section recast citizen 
diplom acy by studying the definitions, practices, logistics, and some citizen diplom ats' 
outcom es, and their effect on foreign citizens and inter-state relations.
Citizen diplom acy is heavily influenced by social and econom ic developm ent 
functions carried out by altruistic individuals, in foreign countries. H ow ever, this research 
has dem onstrated that, while volunteers may volunteer to fulfill an altruistic desire to do 
good, one can hypothesize their service has other unintended outcom es that nevertheless 
serve national interests. Also, that a different class o f  volunteers exists, w hose 
m otivations and funding is directly supported by serving the national interest, for 
exam ple spreading dem ocracy. Finally, many states— not ju s t the United States— actively 
pursue non-traditional strategies o f  diplom acy, which include international volunteering 
w ith state backing and funding.
The section further challenged the idea that citizen diplomacy is lim ited to actions 
where Americans host foreign nationals visiting the U nited States The section redefines 
citizen diplom acy as any official and/or unofficial cont *. be*ween individuals acting on
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behalf of. or w ith support and funding from a foreign government in support o f  specific 
and strategic foreign policy options. This expanded definition allows us to apply known 
concepts (diplom acy) to an expanding corps o f  individuals and activities undertaken with 
support o f  the governm ent, and which differs from the traditional conduct o f  diplom acy 
by consular officials. This is the definition this chapter and the rest o f  the study use.
Definition of terms
Soft p o w er
An am orphous, non-specific concept, the m odem , w idely applied definition o f  soft pow er 
was first cast in the present terms o f  the debate by Joseph Nye, in the 1990’s. N ye 
defined soft pow er in term s o f  “mutual attraction", and “shaping others preferences to 
align w ith one's ow n.” N ye’s definition o f  soft pow er is further discussed in this section; 
however, it is im portant to think o f  soft pow er and its origins, and w hether soft pow er is a 
new concept or one that is as old as society itself.
Soft power: new wine in old wineskins?
W hile the term “soft pow er” was first used in 1990 by Nye. questions rem ain over
w hether or not soft power is a new concept or w hether it has only been recently  defined
in these explicit terms. This section interrogates this question, and finds consensus that
the practice o f  soft power is not a new phenom enon, but the term itse lf is. Som e scholars
insist that soft pow er and its practice is new: for exam ple, in discussing R ussia's soft
pow er in the Brookings B rief "Moscow' D iscovers Soft Power", Hill argues that
since 2000. R ussia 's greatest contribution to the security and stability  o f  its 
vulnerable southern tier has not been through its m ilitary presence on bases, its
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troop deploym ents, or security pacts and arm s sales. Rather, it has been through 
absorbing the surplus labor o f  regional states, providing markets for their goods, 
and transferring funds in the form o f  rem ittances (rather than foreign aid). 
M igration to Russia has becom e the reg ion’s safety valve.61
Hill im plies that Russia's soft pow er may have begun in 2001, arguing that "after 2001,
Putin began paying m ore attention to foreign policy. In conjuncture w ith his carefully
planned overtures to the United States, he put an end to the freewheeling and chaotic
foreign policy o f the Yeltsin period" by seeking to exert its influence on the form er
Soviet Republics. Hill evidences Russia's perceived beginning of leveraging o f  soft
power by pointing to a 2004 m eeting o f  Russia's am bassadors where M oscow 's
leadership noted that "Russia had not yet learned to use 'sufficiently w 'dl the historical
credit o f  trust and friendship, the close ties that link the peoples o f our countries'—  in
other w ords Russia’s soft powrer resources."62 However, o ther scholars write o f  soft
power tenns o f  countries influencing others through several approaches, and this view o f
non-m ilitary influence holds even before the m odem , Westphalian state system.
The origin o f  the definition and the concept o f  soft pow er can be best understood
by parsing the definition o f  power even before it is divvied up into soft and hard pow er.
Scholars have widely defined powder -  especially in international relations -  as the ability
o f one country or actor to get a second country or actor to do what they otherw ise
wouldn't do; that is, com pulsion or persuasion. The preoccupation w ith pow er is alm ost
retroactive: Lentner notes that "power is the central concept in the international politics
61 F iona Hill. ‘‘M oscow discovers Soft Pow er.” C urrent History. 2006. 
w wvv.brookings.edu (W eb). Accessed 5/12/2012.
62 Ibid., 345.
36
literature o f  the post-W orld W ar II period."63 It is clear that power did not suddenly 
em erge in the post-W orld War II period; rather, the study o f  the phenom enon o f  the 
relationships between states attracted more attention and study post-W orld W ar I and 11. 
However, the sam e is true for the entire political science discipline.
According to Lentner, M orgenthau first defined pow er in the 1970's as "a 
psychological relationship o f control o f  an exercise and the one controlled."64 He further 
distinguished political pow er as inclusive o f  "the threat to use physical v io lence."65 
Power o f  the military kind has been widely used to conceptualize relations between 
states, and their dom inance thereof. There is a scholastic merging o f  pow er, the state and 
hegem ony, that is, a hegemon is a state that has m ostly  m ilitary pow er over and above all 
other states in the same system. Claude, for exam ple, defines power as "essentially 
military capability -  the elem ents which contribute directly to  the capacity to coerce, kill 
and destroy."66
The definition o f pow er subsequently attracted distinctions betw een its theoretical 
definitions and its practical applications. For exam ple. Knorr (1973) considered coercive 
influence to be power, but added capabilities (the m eans to the intended goal) and 
outcom es which he characterized as putative /  actualized power. O ther definitions o f  
pow er included its dim ensions (weight, scope and dom ain), reciprocation o f  pow'er
63 Howard H. Lentner. "Hegem ony and Power in International Politics." H egem ony and 
power: consensus and coercion in contem porary politics. In M ark Haugaard and H ow ard H 
Lentner, Eds. International Political Science Association Research Committee on Political Power 
Meeting. Lanham , M D : Lexington Books, 2006): 91.
64 Ibid.
6" Ibid.
66 Inis C laude Jr. Power and International Relations. (N Y : Random H ouse, 1962): 6.
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(w eaker and stronger parties) and capabilities and control. Truitt restates pow er’s core 
definition and its dim ensions thus: "total capabilities o f  a state to gain desired ends vis-a- 
vis other states; these capabilities which are also types o f pow er are political, econom ic, 
diplom atic, propaganda, and m ost im portantly, m ilitary powrer."67
To arrive at the idea o f  soft power. it is im portant to reconsider the idea o f  a 
pseudo-paradigm  change: one that recognized that power, defined in term s o f  m ilitary 
and material capabilities, was necessary but not sufficient. The definition o f  the 
additional sources o f  influence between states can then be seen in w hat V asquez refers to 
as the paradigm  as exemplar, that is, the notion that scientific education aim s to "solve 
problem s." By solving problem s to which answ ers are already known, students gain the 
ability to solve current and new problem s.68
This analysis cart be applied to the problem  o f  defining power in international 
relations: i f  scholars could define pow er (as a mix o f  capabilities, m eans and outcom es), 
they could then apply the same objectivity to think about influence between and from 
countries that did not necessarily involve material and m ilitary means. Their influence 
was driven (or propagated) by changes and growth in new technologies, ideologies and 
interactions such as cultural and interpersonal connections, thereby necessitating new 
thinking old problem s influenced by novel w ays o f  resolving them.
The concept o f  soft power, therefore, stems from the iteration o f  the form  and 
function o f  powder. Just as states interacted w ith each other and capabilities that included 
political, econom ic, diplomatic and military influence over other countries, I argue that
6 W esley B. Truitt. Power and Policy: Lessons fo r  Leaders in Government a nd  Business. 
(Santa Barbara. CA: Praeger, 2010). 16.
68 John A Vasquez. The power o f  power politics, from  classical realism to 
neotraditionalism. (Cam bridge, UK: Cam bridge University' Press, 1998): 20-21.
38
they also had the capacity to influence others through non-m ilitary m eans, such as 
diplomacy, trade, culture, sports, entertainm ent, ideology and sim ilar avenues.
Soft pow er then was not necessarily isolated, or identified as a w ay that one 
country exerted influence over another. One o f  the reasons therefore is the tim eline o f  the 
developm ent o f  these avenues; for exam ple, global sports (such as the O lym pics; were 
not w idespread until the early 20th century; neither was film  or radio. To the extent that 
scholarship had not quite studied or separated the independent studies o f  the effect o f  
such non-traditional approaches to international relations and identified them  as having 
utility in statecraft, these activities had not been form ally defined as soft pow er. Yet. 
there is evidence that even w ithout the specific definition as soft power, the application o f  
these influencers was on-going. Exam ples o f  the recognition and utility o f  soft pow er are 
num erous and include, for exam ple, countries’ com petition in sports such as the W orld 
Cup, the Olympics, grow th o f the entertainm ent industry and the w idespread appreciation 
o f  artifacts o f  the Renaissance, music, tourism  and today, the internet.
Predating these more m odem  notions and expressions o f soft pow er, scholarship 
shows that even in pre-m odem  state, kingdom s, bishoprics and principalities recognized 
the lim itations o f  military' pow er and sought to use other m eans to influence areas they 
ruled or intended to rule. Neal, for exam ple, writes that "M ercian pow er in early Anglo- 
Saxon England (about 600-800 AD) rested on at least three principal strategies and their 
ancillaries; these encom passed political, military' and econom ic spheres -  and included 
such principals as the annexation o f  neighboring polities, a broad and integrated m ilitary 
infrastructure and econom ic policies."69
w Jam es R Neal. Defining power in the Mercian supremacy: an examination o f  the 
dynamics o fpow er in the Kingdom o f  the Borderers. [S.l.]: Proquest.. Umi D issertation, 2011): 1.
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Even N ye acknow ledges that soft pow er’s definition may be new, but the concept 
it defines, the very condition it seeks to articulate, is not new . Nye notes that ""the 
behavior it (soft power) denotes is as old as hum an history. It is im plicit in Lao-Tzu's 
com m ent that a leader is best not when people obey his com mands, but when they barely 
know he exists. In eighteenth-century Europe, the spread o f  French language and culture 
enhanced French pow er."70
Nye recently reiterated this belief that soft pow er is has often been used in 
conjunction w ith, and often in the place o f  m ilitary conquest. Nye asserts that as an 
exam ple o f  how' countries leverage cultural (in this case, the French language) assets to 
supplem ent m ilitary capabilities, France began to establish the Alliance Fran9ais 
Institutes in foreign countries in the 1880’s shortly after France lost the Franco-Prussian 
war. Germ any, according to Nye, followed suit w ith the establishm ent o f  the G oethe 
Institute, the survivor to Deutsche Akadem ie, a W eim ar Republic institu tion.7’
It is im portant to restate that w+iile most scholarship on the history o f  soft pow er 
and mutual attraction contends that it is positive, the lim itations o f soft p o w ers  prom ise 
and ability has been noted by its very proponent o f  soft power. Nye observes the criticism 
that has been leveled against soft power, that "arm ies weren't stopped by even the deepest 
cultural affinity.” ' 2
70 Joseph S Nye. The future ofpower. (New Y ork : Public Affairs, 2 0 1 1): 81.
;l Joseph S. Nye. Remarks to the G raduate Program  in International S tudies Students and 
Faculty. In the Presidential Lecture Series, O ld Dominion University (2(fh Anniversary o f  the 
G PISprogram ), 2 3 [tl April, 2 0 i 3.
72 Ibid.
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Contemporary scholarship on soft power
N ye, defining soft pow er in contem porary international relations, w rites that "the type o f 
resources associated w ith soft power often include intangible factors such as institutions, 
ideas, values, culture and the perceived legitim acy o f  policies." Nye points to the dual 
application and interchangeability o f  the resources available to one pow er to the opposite 
power; for exam ple, "the US N avy’s help in providing relief to Indonesia after the 2004 
East Asian Tsunam i had a strong effect on increasing Indonesians' attraction to the
7 0
United States” w hile the US N avy's 2007 m aritim e strategy referred to  “m aritim e 
forces em ployed to build confidence and trust am ong nations."74
N ye differentiated between “hard pow er” and other aspects of pow er. He 
articulated this difference as "comm and pow er"— hard pow er— with its "tangible 
resources like military and econom ic strength."75 He defined soft pow er as "co-optive 
power", or being “getting others to want what you w ant”; '6 its main characteristics 
include "culture, ideology and institutions."
Li defines soft power as a function o f  its application, arguing that "soft pow er 
does not exist in the nature o f  certain resources o f  power, but rather it has to be nurtured 
through a soft use o f  power." 7 This definition tends tow ards the application, not the 
defining constituent elements o f  power, although Li acknowledges the m ore N ye’s more
73 Ibid.. 29.
74 Ibid.
5 A Jam es Fuller and Lawrence Sondhaus. America, war and power: defining the state.
1775-2005. (N ew  York: Routledge, 2007): 202.
76 Ibid.
11 M ingjiang Li. Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy-' in International Politics. 
(Lanham : Lexington Books, 2009): 3.
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contemporary conceptualization o f  soft power, w riting that "soft pow er is dem onstrated 
in attraction, persuasion, appeal, and co-optation."78
Fuller and Sondhaus reflect on M atthew  Fraser’s assertion that “A m erican hard 
pow er is necessary' to maintain global stability; Am erican soft power— m ovies, pop 
music, fast food, fashions, theme parks— spreads, validates and reinforces com m on 
norms, values, beliefs and lifestyles. Hard pow er threatens; soft pow'er seduces. Hard
79pow er dissuades, soft pow er persuades." Sondhaus sum marizes soft pow er as “all 
aspects o f  pow er beyond military and econom ic m easures."80 Peter van H am ’s definition 
o f  “social power" m inors the constituent elem ents o f  "soft pow er”, he w rites that "social 
power (is) based on non-coercive m echanism s, structures and processes."81 Given these 
conceptions, citizen diplom acy tends more tow ards the non-m ilitary, non-forceful and 
often non-traditional definition o f  pow er and influence.
H a rd  p o  wer
Hard pow er can be broadly defined as actor A getting actor B to do w hat actor A wants 
by leveraging econom ic and m ilitary capabilities, and at an accepcost to an actor that 
would otherw ise be disinclined to act. Specifically, Van Ham  defines "hard pow er based 
on coercive m easures -  be they econom ic or m ilitary in nature."82 Further, he w rites that
78 Ibid.
'y Fuller and Sondhaus. America, war and power (2007): 209-210.
80 Ibid. 202.
81 Peter Van Ham. Social Power in International Politics. (NY: R outledge, 2010): 5.
82 Ibid
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"military pow er is visible and mediagenic (battleships are moved, and shots fired, 
oftentim es live on TV )."8j
This definition is likewise articulated by Nye, who argues that "m ilitary pow er 
and econom ic pow er are both exam ples o f ‘hard’ com m and power that can be used to get 
others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats 
(s ticks)/’84 The principal proponent o f  soft pow er differentiated hard pow er from soft 
powder by suggesting a spectrum  o f  pow'er, from  hard or com mand pow er to co-option / 
attraction / soft pow-er. Nye writes that "the types o f  resources associated with hard power 
include tangibles such as force and m oney."83
M earsheim er observes generally that "pow er is based on the particular material 
capabilities that a state possesses"86 and is derived from  latent sources— socio-econom ic 
ingredients that help build the m ilitary power and the actual military that is built through 
the socio-econom ic ingredients such as population, wealth, size, money, technology, 
skil led personnel. M earsheim er takes the view that "hard pow er is the "function o f  a 
state's m ilitary forces and how they compare w ith the m ilitary forces o f  rival states" 
constitutes effective pow er.8'
A lthough scholars have attem pted to differentiate between hard pow er and soft 
power, Koenig-Archibugi and Held view' pow er as a continuous spectrum, m uch like
83 Ibid.
84 Joseph S. Nye. “ Hard Pow er and Soft Pow er." in A kbar Ahmed and Brian Forst, F,ds. 
After terror: promoting dialogue among civilizations. (M alden, MA: Polity Press, 2005): 166.
85 Joseph S Nye. The fu ture o f  power. (N ew  York: Public Affairs, 201 1): 28.
86 John M earsheim er . The tragedy o f  Great Power politics. (NY: N orton, 2001): 55.
87 Ibid.
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N y e ’s c o n c e p t o f  p o w er. T h ey  a rg u e  th a t, "h ard  p o w e r a n d  so ft p o w e r a re  tw o  s id es  o f
O Q
th e  sam e c o in .” T h ey  fu r th e r  w rite  th a t  " th e re  is no  so ft p o w e r w ith o u t h a rd  p o w er. B ut 
th e re  is a lso  no  h ard  powder w ith o u t so ft p o w e r."  L i w rite s  that "h a rd  p o w e r  is e v id e n t in 
th e  p ra c tic e s  o f  th rea t, co e rc io n , s a n c tio n , p a y m e n t and  in d u c e m e n t." 90 L i, h o w e v e r , ad d s 
th a t  "h a rd  p o w e r  is n o t a lw a y s  u ses  fo r c o e rc io n , th rea t, in tim id a tio n , a n d  in d u c e m e n t. 
H a rd  p o w e r c a n  a lso  p ro d u c e  a ttra c tio n , a p p e a l, an d  am ity  in  ce rta in  c irc u m s ta n c e s ." 91 
T h e  c o n c e p t o f  p o w e r -  h a rd  an d  so ft -  w ill be  d eb a te d  lo n g  past th e  s c h o la rsh ip  h e re ; 
h o w e v er, it is im p o rtan t to  d iffe ren tia te  b e tw een  h a rd  an d  so f t  p o w er. T h is  d is se r ta tio n  
co n c e rn s  i ts e l f  w ith  the  so ft p o w e r a sp e c t o f  p o w er.
Overview of the dissertation
T h is  d isse rta tio n  is p re sen ted  in  s ix  ch a p te rs , w h ich  are  d iv id e d  as fo llo w s: in  c h a p te r  1, 
an  in tro d u c tio n  to  th e  re sea rch  is p re se n te d . T h e  d e f in itio n  o f  key te rm s , fo r  e x a m p le  
c itiz en  d ip lo m a cy , so ft p o w er m id h ard  p o w er, a re  o u tlin e d , in  c h a p te r  2. th e  re sea rc h  
o u tlin e s  th e  th eo re tic a l f ram ew o rk  in  w h ic h  the  re sea rc h  is  g ro u n d ed . T h e  th e o re tic a l 
fram ew o rk  o u tlin e s  th e  m a jo r th e o rie s  th a t  ex p la in  fo re ig n  p o licy  m a k in g , a n d  th u s  
su p p o rt th e  p lace m en t o f  c itiz en  d ip lo m a ts  in  fo re ig n  co u n tr ie s  as p a r t  o f  e sp e c ia lly  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s 5 so ft p o w e r ap p ro ach  to  fo re ig n  p o licy . T h e  th eo rie s  d is c u s s e d  in th is
88 David Held and M athias K oenig-A rchibugi. American Power in the 2 V ‘ Century. 
(Cam bridge, MA: Polity, 2004): 179.
89 Ibid.
Li. Soft Power, 3.
91 Ibid. 4.
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chapter include domestic audience costs (approach), elite theory, citizen participation, 
soft power approaches and the foreign policy analysis approach.
For each approach, the research seeks to answ er the question, “does the approach 
hypothesize that citizen diplom acy will affect a  target country’s foreign policy?” Chapter 
2 concludes w ith an overview  o f  the critical gaps in literature. Chapter 3 develops twelve 
test hypotheses, loosely grouped based on the four m odels that the quantitative research 
design uses. These four groups are: the om nibus model (all variables), the bilateral 
attraction factors (factors between the US and the recipient country), the host country 
variables (variables or attributes found specifically w ithin the recipient country) and 
finally, the temporal and regional effects.
Chapter 4 outlines the m ethodology used to evaluate the efficacy o f  citizen 
diplomacy. It discusses the difference between -  and justifies -  the use o f  both qualitative 
and quantitative statistical methods. It also discusses the rational for choosing a rnixed- 
m ethods approach. It discusses each o f  the qualitative and quantitative sections o f  the 
study, the study variables, variable coding and the sources o f  data.
The chapter also specifies data treatm ent procedures, including m issing data and 
data for countries that did not exist until, for exam ple, 1991 when the Soviet Union broke 
up and the Com m onwealth o f  Independent States (CIS) cam e into being, or the breakup 
o f  Y ugoslavia into several independent republics. It outlines the operationalization o f  
variables, presents the groups o f  variables and explains study sample. It d iscusses 
statistical issues including collinearity, heteroscedasticity and their treatm ent.
C hapter 5 o f  the research tests the quantitative hypotheses based on the four 
m odels and also based on the two prim ary sources o f  data. It then discusses the findings
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from the statistical regressions. It discusses w hether the findings support the prim ary 
hypothesis that citizen diplom acy positively correlates with foreign policy behavior o f  the 
country in which they serve, tow ards the US as show n through congruent voting at the 
United Nations General A ssem bly. Chapter 6 exam ines the perceived qualitative im pacts 
that citizen diplom acy has on the recipient countries by studying elites ' statem ents and 
evidence o f  the efficacy o f  citizen diplom acy as reported by the recipient country.
The qualitative section o f  the dissertation develops three m odels: issue linkages 
model, the interpersonal model and the foreign policy approach m odel, based on case 
studies o f  where citizen diplom acy has had outcom es m easurable through non-qualitative 
methods. In each o f  the m odels, a case study is discussed. The cases are Ethiopia (issue 
linkages m odel), Peru (interpersonal model) and Tanzania (foreign policy m odel). The 
chapter's findings supplem ent those o f  the quantitative statistical regressions in 
determ ining that citizen diplom acy is positively correlated w ith congruent voting and 
therefore, influences foreign policy behavior tow ards the US.
Chapter 7, the conclusion and discussion chapter, first reviews and then 
sum m arizes the findings. It discusses the im plications o f  the findings for policy and 
scholarship, highlights the contributions o f  the dissertation to the literature on soft power, 
citizen diplom acy and the foreign policy fields. It then suggests potential applications o f 
the findings, including citizen d iplom acy 's provision o f  a plausible path to the future o f  
soft pow er find mutual attraction, through the influence o f  citizen diplom ats.
The chapter provides caveats to the risk o f  generalizing the utility o f  citizen 
diplom acy, and argues that other factors can account for the foreign policy behavior o f  
foreign states towards the US. It also suggests directions for future research and in-depth
studies o f  how  citizen diplom acy affects the foreign policy views o f  target com m unities, 
and the transference o f hypothesized effects through citizen-elite in teractions and onto 
the inter-governm ental bilateral interactions.
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CH APTER II
THEORETICA L BACK G RO UN D  AND CONCEPTUAL FRA M EW O RK  
Introduction and chapter organization
This chapter provides a fram ework for evaluating the processes and key approaches to 
foreign policy making. By understanding these approaches and processes, the study sets 
the param eters for evaluating how international volunteering can affect foreign policy 
preferences in the volunteer recipient countries and cause (re)alignm ent with the 
volunteer-sending country at the international level. The im portant question here is: 
(how) does citizen diplom acy affect the foreign policy preferences o f  the host countries 
and cause them  to align with those o f  the sending country?
The chapter discusses four foreign policy making theoretical fram ew orks: the 
dom estic audience approach, elite theory, the citizen participation approaches and 
em erging approaches such as the foreign policy approach. The chapter also discusses the 
sources o f  negative and positive incentives for countries’ and elites’ foreign policy 
choices given different political systems. It focuses on citizen diplom ats, who work for 
and on behalf o f  the state as they fulfill their own altruistic goals.
Next, the chapter situates these argum ents w ithin the soft powder literature. It 
argues that citizen participation -  and to some extent dom estic audiences' involvem ent -  
in foreign affairs illustrates the im portance o f  soft pow er as a tool for statecraft. The 
chapter then exam ines the concepts o f  volunteering, synthesizing international 
vol unteering as a foreign policy function in the tradition o f  soft power. The chapter 
concludes by identifying the literature gaps and sets the stage for the m ethodology
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chapter, w hich will discuss how  to measure the effect o f citizen diplom acy on state 
behavior, as specified in chapter 1 and theoretically located in chapter 2.
Foreign policy making processes
The process o f  foreign policy making is little understood by voting publics, citizens, and 
individuals outside the elite political class. It is often unresolved who. in a country's 
political structures, influences foreign policy m ost and to w hat degree. O ne difference is 
found in dem ocratic countries where citizens panicipate in foreign policy m aking through 
the selection o f  their representatives to legislative bodies, which then have either direct 
roles in, or oversight over foreign policy. In dem ocratic systems o f  governm ent, the 
persons/institutions in authority determ ine the character o f  foreign policy , often with the 
oversight and potential consequences from the citizens on whose behalf they act.
Although conventional international relations theories place a prem ium  on how 
the system influences how states act especially tow ards others, governm ents’ internal 
structure shape states interests. Domestic audiences hold regim es accountable and are 
therefore an important consideration in foreign policy making. After internally 
form ulating their interests and preferences, the articulation o f  these interests and 
preferences to the outside w orld occurs through states’ foreign policy. Foreign policy 
“signaling” addresses external audiences, articulating the state’s interests. G eorge affirms 
this, arguing that "the foreign policy o f  a nation addresses itse lf not to the external world, 
as is com m only stated, but rather to ‘the im age o f the external w orld’ that is in the minds 
o f those who make foreign policy ."1
' A lexander George. 'The "Operational Code": A Neglected A pproach to the Study o f  
Political Leaders and Decision M aking.' International Studies Quarterly, 13, N o. 2 (6/1969): 191.
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Foreign policy reflects a country's strategic interests and generally articulates to 
foreign publics the originating country 's core values. A practical exam ple o f  this 
reflection— Trum an's doctrine regarding aid to G reece and Turkey w ith the goal o f  
constraining the spread o f  com m unism — was the beginning o f  the 'con ta inm ent policy’.
It reflected not only a strategic decision to advance US economic, security and socio­
cultural interest, but also Am erican values o f  individual freedom s, dem ocratic 
governance and the advancem ent o f  a capitalist econom ic system. These w ere values the 
US had fought to preserv e in Europe during W orld W ar II. Alm ost h a lf a century later. 
President G eorge H. W. Bush's statem ent that "this aggression shall not stand"2 with 
reference to the 1990 Iraqi invasion o f  K uw ait3 reflected a similar exposition o f  values.
US fo re ign  policy and the national interest
Foreign policy is a function o f  expression towards other countries o f  those issues that
define a country, a people, and reflects the interests that a particular country has, often
thought o f  as the national interest. D efining the national interest is an arduous task: no
one issue by itself defines the national interest. The Comm ission on A m erica's National
Interests outlines five com ponents o f  US national interests:
Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat o f  nuclear, biological, and chem ical w eapons 
attacks on the United States or its military forces abroad; ensure US allies' 
survival and their active cooperation w ith the US in shaping an international 
system in which we can thrive; prevent the em ergence o f hostile m ajor pow ers or 
failed states on US borders; ensure the viability and stability o f  m ajor global 
systems (trade, financial m arkets, supplies o f  energy, and the environm ent); and 
establish productive relations, consistent with Am erican national interests, with
“ PBS. "O pposing Iraqi A ggression" (W eb).
3 Ibid.
4
nations that could becom e strategic adversaries, C hina and Russia.
Krasner provides a less specific definition o f  the national interest, describing it as a set 
o f  roles and institutions having peculiar drives, com pulsions and aim s o f  their ow n that 
are separate and distinct from the interests o f any particular societal group...associated 
with either general material objectives or w ith am bitious ideological goals related to 
beliefs about how  societies should be ordered.'0 The national interest can also be defined 
as "the preferences o f  American central decision-m akers" and they m ust be "related to 
genera] societal goals, persist over tim e and have a consistent ranking o f  im portance."6 
According to Trubow itz, it can be defined by "those societal interests who have the 
power to work w ithin the political system (i.e., m aneuver in federal institutions and the 
party system  to build wanning coalitions) to translate their preferences into policy .”
Scholars have frequently attem pted to define the national interest exclusive o f  in­
state dynam ics such as systems o f  governance, o r sources o f  “interests'5. K rasner 
disagrees w ith this view, arguing that "the fundamental problem for political analysis <? 
to identify the underlying social structure and the political m echanism s through which 
particular group determ ine the governm ents behav ior...the  state does not have objectives 
that cannot ultimately be understood in term s o f  societal wants and needs."8
4 The C om m ission on A m erica’s N ational Interests. “ Am ericas N ational Interests ” ( hil 
2000). 5.
5 Stephen D. Krasner. Defending the National Interest: Raw materials, investments and  
US foreign policy. (NJ: Princeton U niversity Press, 1978): 10.
6 Ibid.
Peter rrubow itz . Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American 
Foreign policy. (IL: U niversity o f  C hicago Press, 1998): 4.
8 Krasner, Defending the National Interest, pp. 5.
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The definition o f  the US national interest also has continuously changed to reflect 
changes in US dom estic interests, US interactions with the rest o f the w orld and in world 
order. Containing the spread o f  com m unism  is no longer the most pertinent objective; the 
prim ary objective was dem ocratization and the spread o f  freedom especially to new ly 
free countries. This shift was articulated by the-then Secretary o f State C ondoleezza Rice 
stating that "we recognize that dem ocratic state building is now an urgent com ponent of 
our national interest. And in the broader M iddle East, we recognize that freedom  and 
dem ocracy are the only ideas that can, over tim e, lead to ju s t and lasting stability, 
especially in A fghanistan and Iraq."9 This view has been similarly articulated equally by 
D em ocratic and Republican adm inistrations; "foreign policy...w ill proceed from  the firm 
ground o f the national interest, not from the interests o f  an illusory international 
com munity. America can exercise power without arrogance and pursue its interests -  in 
concert w ith those who share its core values -  the world becom es m ore prosperous, 
dem ocratic and peaceful.” 10
Evidently, the national interest o f  the United States has evolved given changing 
geopolitical realities. W hen isolationism  and non-involvem ent in foreign w ars was 
beneficial and in the US national interest, the US went so far as outlaw ing w ar through 
the Kellogg-Briand Act. When non-cooperation with others was in the interests o f  the 
US, it was exploited to the fullest, for exam ple through the Connally A m endm ent which 
conditions US cooperation with the International Court o f  Justice and sim ultaneously 
asserts sovereignty for the United States. The am endm ent provides that "the United
9 Condoleezza Rice. "Rethinking the N ational Interest: American Realism  for a New 
W orld." Foreign Affairs, July/A ugust 2008.
10 C ondoleezza Rice. "Prom oting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs , 79. No. 1 (Jan. - 
Feb., 2000): 62.
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States excludes from its acceptance o f  the com pulsory jurisdiction o f  the Court 'd isputes 
with regard to matters that are essentially within the jurisdiction o f  the U nited States o f 
A m erica, as determ ined by the United States o f  A m erica.” 511
G radual and far-reaching changes have occurred and affected geopolitical realities 
in the w orld since the US began assum ing co-leadership o f  the w orld with the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War and as a unipolar pow er in the modem , post-C old W ar era.
As illustrated by the discussion above, as the Com m ission on A m erica 's N ational Interest 
has determ ined and from the policy perspectives advanced by the adm inistration, the US 
approaches its National Interest pragm atically, using “traditional" and “non-traditional” 
tools o f  statecraft to meet its national interest goals articulated through its foreign policy.
The traditional tools o f  statecraft include military capabilities, form al diplom acy 
and through economic means. They include bilateral and m ultilateral diplom acy, through 
accreditation o f  am bassadors to foreign countries and participation in international 
institutions, participation in bilateral and multilateral agreements, such as NPT, START. 
SALT and m ore than 10,000 other treaties. " The US utilizes econom ic strategies, such as 
trade, w ith m em bership and leadership in global and regional trade organizations such as 
N A FTA , W TO and extending preferential trade agreem ents such as AGOA.
A nother traditional tool o f  statecraft that the US has successfully leveraged is 
m em bership in international organizations. Its participation and influence extends to the 
physical location o f  the United N ations, m em bership and funding o f  its program s and
11 Louis Henkin. "The C onnally Reservation Revisited and, Hopefully. C ontained." The 
American Journal o f  International Law. 65, No. 2 (Apr., 1971): 374.
12 United States D epartm ent o f  State. "Treaties in Force A List o f  Treaties and O ther 
International A greem ents o f the United States in Force on January I, 2011." (W eb). 
http://w w \v.state.gov/docum ents/organization /169274 .pdf Accessed 11/07/2012.
funds, financial contribution to these organization and provision o f  loans, bilateral and 
m ultilateral aid through national and m ultilateral institutions such as U SA ID , U ND P, 
W orld Bank, IMF, IBRD, IDA and others. US m em bership and leadership in security 
alliances and security com m unities such as N A TO , A N ZUS, APEC, am ong others, 
buttress a robust, unrivaled m ilitary with global reach.
The non-traditional tools o f  statecraft have been recast as soft pow er. Soft pow er 
encom passes those aspects o f country A that make country B align its interests with those 
o f  A through attraction, rather than through coercion. These soft pow er variables include 
culture, ideology and institutions.13 W ithin culture, ideology and institutions are concepts 
such as dem ocracy, individual freedoms, elections, sports, entertainm ent, film s, fashion, 
civil society and participation in governm ent. The attraction largely occurs outside o f  
traditionally established governm ent structures: through non-profit organizations, the 
media and cultural vignettes such as books, m ovies, sports activities, exchange, tourism , 
international volunteering and other person-to-person contacts.
W hile they are only a part o f  the whole soft pow er spectrum, person-to-person 
contacts can transm it aspects o f  soft power such as ideas about dem ocracy, beliefs, 
religion, cultural practices, sports, and starting and participating in different non-profit 
organizations from the volunteers originating from country A to the recipients in country 
B. This is one o f  the assum ptions that the Peace Corps, a governm ent program  and 
agency, m akes by listing “helping promote a better understanding o f  A m ericans on the 
part o f  the peoples served” 14 as its second goal. There is an implied correlation between
13 Sondhaus and Fuller. America, War and Power (2007): 202.
14US Peace Corps. “ M ission” , http://wwvv.peacecorps.gov/about7m ission/ (W eb). 
A ccessed 11/07/2012.
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person-to-person contacts and the product o f  these interactions being som ehow  related to 
how  foreign publics' view  the U nited States and to its foreign policy.
There are a num ber o f  assum ptions that this study makes. First, that governm ent 
supported international volunteering is significantly different from individual 
volunteering, can be characterized as citizen diplom acy, and serves som e function for the 
governm ent or extracts some benefit to its benefit. Secondly, international volunteering, 
the person-to-person contacts, have the capacity to transm it soft pow er ideas, such as 
ideology, that make the US attractive.
Thirdly, that while the US governm ent’s placem ent o f  international volunteers 
m ay be altruistic, there is an obvious foreign policy function to state-supported 
international volunteering. Fourth, that there is a m echanism  by which the transm ission o f  
soft power ideas to the recipients affects the way the US is perceived by that country mid 
that perception is presum ably expressed at the national leadership level as support for the 
United States and its policies.
Finally, it assumes that while there are many disparate expressions o f  mutual 
attraction including bilateral and multilateral relationships, one way to m easure the 
mutual attraction im parted by citizen diplom ats is w hether the outcom es o f  citizen 
diplomacy can be discerned and m easured as an expression o f  support for US foreign 
policy in international institutions. This approach classifies state-supported international 
volunteering as citizen diplomacy, and thereby investigates its effect and thus the 
effectiveness o f  soft pow er as a foreign policy approach.
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Theoretical frameworks
The m ajor theoretical frameworks that this dissertation uses are the dom estic audiences, 
elite theory, citizen participation approaches and the em erging foreign policy approaches. 
Theoretical fram eworks are those approaches, theories or w ell-grounded generalizations 
that allow  a researcher to consider phenom enon and to best explain w hy the problem  
exists; they serve as a basis for conducting research.13 A m ong other functions, theoretical 
fram ew orks allow  a research to see clearly the variables o f  the study, that is, those 
consequential events that m ight explain the phenom enon under study, provide the 
researcher with a  general framework for data analysis and helps to lay the groundw ork 
and justification for the use o f  descriptive and experimental methods.
T he paradox o f approaches to the viability o f  citizen diplom acy is well articulated 
by Converse, who writes that there is little consistency am ong the pub lic’s foreign policy 
attitudes.16 Citizen diplomats in the mold o f  the US Peace Corps V olunteers are purported 
to serve US foreign policy interests, especially through promotion o f  a positive view  o f  
A m erica(ns) on the part o f  the com m unities served. Yet, Peace Corps V olunteers have 
the most contact w ith individuals who are hypothesized to have the least influence or 
know ledge o f  foreign policy issues -  the m asses -  and w hose attitudes exhibit a lack o f  
consistency or knowledge about im portant foreign policy issues. C onversely, PCVs have 
relatively little contact w ith the elites who have the greatest sway on foreign policy.
Some approaches, including elite theory and citizen approaches suggest, then, that (a) 
citizen diplom ats should have little effect on a host country’s foreign policy; and (b) the
15 V incent A. Anfara. Jr. and Norm a T. M ertz. Theoretical Frameworks in Qualitative 
Research. (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2006): xxviii.
16 Philip E. Converse. “The nature o f  b e lie f system s in m ass publics (1964): A  C ritical 
R eview .” Journal o f  Politics and Society. 18, (2006): 1-3.
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Peace Corps program  is predicated on an understanding o f  foreign policy-m aking that is 
at best naive, and at worst theoretically unsound.
This research explores four major theoretical approaches to the study o f  citizen 
diplom acy. These are the dom estic audience costs approach, which argues for rew ards 
and punishm ent for foreign policy behavior on the principal by the dom estic audiences; 
elite theory, arguing that elites, rather than citizens, m anage the affairs o f  a country, 
including foreign policy; and citizen participation, which suggests that citizens are 
actively involved in the form ulation o f  policies, including foreign policy. It also looks at 
the im pact o f  em erging approaches, such as foreign policy approaches, and finally 
exam ines what ‘soft pow er’ approaches contend is an em erging, viable approach to 
foreign policy that com plem ents the traditional ‘hard pow er’ approach.
D om estic  aud iences a n d  the ir  costs
Domestic audiences are considered to be the sources o f  a governm ent's authority  over its 
citizens. D om estic audiences can im pose ‘costs’, that is, take actions in support or 
punishm ent o f a leader or governm ent for selected courses o f  actions dom estically  and in 
international affairs. Fearon hypothesizes that in m ost countries’ political system s there 
are potential consequences to leaders for selecting courses o f  action they negotiate with 
regard to contending positions in international interactions. Interactions such as citizen 
diplom acy can be perilous at a domestic audience level, especially if  a country is 
grappling with fiscal crises or terrorism  such as hostage-taking.
I f  leaders select foreign policy approaches, for exam ple supporting im m igration, 
free trade or disarm am ent and those approaches are contrary to their pub lics’ perceived
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best interests, there is potential for ‘punishm ent’ through governm ent selection 
m echanism s. O ther expressions o f  this 'pun ishm ent’ include public protests such as 
burning o f  foreign flags and extrem e actions such as the Iranian hostage crisis o f  1979. 
Fearon writes that “there is the dom estic and international price for conceding the issues 
at stake, which is the sam e regardless o f  when concessions are made or after how  much 
escalation. Second, there are w hatever additional costs are generated in the course o f  the 
crisis itse lf."17
M ost forms o f  governm ent have some dom estic constituency to which they owe 
some or all o f  their legitimacy. Often such allegiance depends on the constitution o f  the 
political system giving rise to the form o f  governm ent and is especially valid in 
dem ocracies. The choices governm ents make depend on the influence the dom estic 
audience has in the selection, deselection, incentivization and punishm ent o f  leaders. 
Dem ocracies, the "rule by the people" generate the highest domestic audience costs ,18 
peaceful conflict resolution19, alliance reliability20, econom ic sanctions21, trade agreem ent
17 Jam es D. Fearon. “ Dom estic Political Audiences and the Escalation o fln tem a tio n a l 
D isputes” . The American Political Science Review, 88, No. 3 (Sep., 1994): 579.
18 Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. W eingast. "The D em ocratic A dvantage: Institutional 
Foundations o f  Financial Power in International Com petition." International Organization, 57, 1 
(W inter, 2003): 3-4.
19 Charles Lipson. Reliable partners: How democracies have made a separate peace. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity Press, 2003).
2uKurt Taylor Gaubatz. “ Dem ocratic States and C om m itm ent in International R elations.” 
International Organization 50, 1 (1996): 109.
21 Han Dorussen and Jongryn Mo. "Ending Econom ic Sanctions: A udience C osts and 
R ent-Seeking as C om m itm ent Strategies." Journal o f  Conflict Resolution, 45 (2001): 395.
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com pliance22, and international cooperation.23 D em ocracies are o f  different shades and 
organization, w ith differing degrees o f  costs im posed by audiences.
Putnam essentially makes this argum ent in evaluating the 1978 Bonn Sum m it and 
the varied concessions that participants eventually extracted given their audience costs. 
The concessions, while not necessarily optimal for negotiators, their constituents and the 
opposite negotiating actors, were the best in the circum stances: “key governm ents at 
Bonn adopted policies different from  those that they would have pursued in the absence 
o f  international negotiations -  agreem ent was possible only because a pow erful m inority 
within each governm ent actually favored on dom estic grounds the policy being 
dem anded internationally.”24
The key consideration in the decisions that leaders make is articulated by 
Slantehev. Slantchev argues that “ if  the principal [citizens] could design a ‘w age 
contract’ for the foreign policy agent [leader], the principal would w ant to com m it to 
punishing the agent for escalating a crisis and then backing down -  principals who 
conduct foreign policy them selves m ay not be able credibly to com m it to self-im posed 
punishm ent (such as leaving power) for backing down in a crisis.”2:> This explanation 
validates Putnam ’s appraisal o f  the Bonn Sum m it o f  1978, providing one o f  the strongest
22 Edward D. M ansfield, Helen V. M ilner and B. Peter Rosendorff. "W hy D em ocracies 
C ooperate More: Electoral Control and International T rade Agreem ents." International 
Organization, 56, No. 3 (2002): 479.
Brett Ashley Leeds. "Dom estic Political Institutions, Credible C om m itm ents, and 
International Cooperation." American Journal o f  Political Science, 43, 4 (O ct., 1999): 979.
~4 Robert Putnam. '‘D iplom acy and dom estic politics: the logic of tw o-level gam es.” 
International Organization (1988): 428.
25 Branislav Slantchev. “ Politicians, the M edia, and Domestic A udience C osts.” 
International Studies Quarterly, 50, No. 2. (June 2006): 448.
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argum ents for the contem plation that governm ents value their citizens5 perceptions and 
evaluation o f  their foreign policy choices.
The previous argum ent can be reversed and applied to domestic audience costs. In 
a dem ocracy, the “principals” can theoretically punish their leader for taking a position 
contrary to their perceived best interests unlike in non-dem ocratic countries. I f  citizens 
have a particular preference for their leader’s com m itm ent to  a certain course o f  action 
and the leader fails to m eet that com m itm ent, costs will be extracted by the electorate at 
the next opportunity (elections). The audience costs for international actions are 
generated by different governance systems. For exam ple, in dem ocracies, w hich select 
their leaders through periodic elections, the incentive and punishm ents will differ from  
the costs to technocratic systems - rule by scientists and intellectuals, or from theocratic 
systems, w hich are based on religious law. So too, will they differ from those in a 
m onarchy / aristocracy (rule by royalty I kings /  queens / princes), as they w ill differ 
am ongst m ilitary governm ents, whose dom estic audience m ay be the soldiers, or to 
kleptocratic rulers who may incur no consequences at all.
In other systems o f  governm ent such as com m unism , the form ulation o f  foreign 
policy m ay is often m anaged by party apparatchik, or councils, not answ erable to the 
citizens, but to central party organs and to militaries. The fundam ental elem ent in all 
these system s, as Dalton points out, is that they “engaged the public in the political 
process.” Except for com m unist systems, engagem ent “prim arily served as a m eans to 
socialize and mobilize the populace. Even in authoritarian regimes, the citizenry has 
wants and needs that they hope the governm ent will address.”26 W here foreign policy
26 Russell J. Dalton. "Citizen A ttitudes and Political Behavior." Comparative Political 
Studies (2000): 927.
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options are not optim um  in any one governm ent’s favor, or where interdependence across 
any num ber o f  fields necessitates some form o f collective rather than unilateral action, 
international regim es (agreem ents, negotiations) are necessary, and the audience costs 
that will potentially be generated influence the position taken in the bargain.
D om estic audiences and citizen diplom acy
D om estic audiences are invested in the governm ent apparatus that im plem ent foreign 
policy by supporting different program s and initiatives, for example increased 
im m igration or opening up to trade. Citizen diplomacy, as previously discussed, 
constitutes o f  a ‘“soft-pow er strategy” and an "ideational approach to foreign policy", 
where ideas and impacts can be form ulated and "sustained through institutionalization" 
for further transm ission.27 The successful institutionalization o f ideas requires continuity 
and a perception by the public that they are effective.
In dem ocracies, dom estic audiences shape state foreign policy preferences 
through election o f  representatives, who then form governm ents. G overnm ents form ulate 
and im plem ent foreign policy am ong other aspects o f  governance such as service on 
im portant budgetary allocation com m ittees. Elected representatives through com m ittees 
and the budgetary process determ ine program funding; in the example o f  the US. the 
Peace Corps, the prem ier vehicle for articulation o f  citizen diplom acy has through its 
existence received bipartisan support and funding from both major political parties.
D om estic audiences act in concert in forms o f  lobbies, testify before com m ittees 
and legislators or exert influence through free press. Dom estic audience support o f citizen
27 Daniel Drezner. "Ideas, B ureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting o f  Foreign Policy." 
American Journal o f  Political Science, 44, No. 4 (Oct., 2000): 735.
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diplom acy is therefore m easurable and in the case o f  the Peace Corps, sustained. Through 
their actions, public outreach program s, achievem ents and experiences o f  returned citizen 
diplom ats, program s that prom ote citizen diplom acy provide impetus for the bureaucracy 
that prom otes their placem ent to further its goals as an institutional survival m echanism , 
and as a foreign policy option. The interactive nature of this relationship is articulated by 
D rezner who writes that “for it is then that an idea, how ever morally pow erful and 
how ever authentically grounded in the national political epistem ology. encounters the 
instrum ents, the forces, and the fallible (or obstreperous) human beings w ho im plem ent
~>o
(or thw art) foreign policy program s.’'"
In the recipient countries, there is often heightened interest in citizen diplom ats, 
since the recipients stand to gain from citizen diplom at-supported initiatives and 
developm ent programs. Since citizen diplom ats conceivably produce positive outcom es 
in the com m unities they serve, there is ongoing support for their continued placem ent. It 
is plausible too, that the recipients would lobby to have m ore citizen diplom ats placed 
and either rew ard the governm ent for facilitating their placement, or punish it for the 
withdrawal o f  citizen diplomats.
The domestic audience paradigm  by itself does not explain how  or w hether citizen 
diplom ats influence foreign publics tow ards a positive view  o f  the US and thereby cause 
the recipient nations to vote congruent w ith the US in international organizations.
Elite theory
Scholarship has identified a political, econom ic and intellectual class that controls the 
critical econom ic, governance and foreign policy functions o f  a country. In considering
28 Ibid., 733.
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elite theory as an explanan for foreign policy making, this research identifies contrary 
incentives for elites for requesting, placing and supporting citizen diplom ats. C itizen 
diplom ats provide positive benefits for elites, in the form o f  a good reputation where their 
volunteer work flourishes. There are also positive, tangible developm ent benefits for the 
recipient com m unities for cooperating with citizen diplom ats, which m ay free 
governm ent resources and personnel to be deployed to other areas o f  the country.
There are potentially negative benefits associated w ith citizen diplom acy. If  
citizen diplom ats are engaged in civic education, capacity-building, and resource 
m anagem ent their success may challenge prevailing non-dem ocratic regim e governance. 
Their success in com m unity m obilization, civic education and dem ocratization 
potentially equips citizens with civic-m indedness, teaches skills such as com m unity 
organizing, rights agitation, thereby underm ining governm ent influence and potentially 
raises credible opposition to governance. From this perspective, the elite theory approach 
to foreign policy making would suggest that citizen diplom ats ought to have negligible 
influence due to the contrary incentives.
The literature on elites controlling functions o f  societies is w ell docum ented. 
K nocke argues that "debate about state structures and processes fundam entally revolves 
around the existence o f  a cohesive ruling class, which effectively dom inates all the m ajor
2 o
decisions made by governm ent officials." Functionally, these elites are located 
positionally (placem ent in the system), decisionally (participation in m aking or 
influencing decisions), reputationally (believed to be know ledgeable and have actual or 
potential power) and relationallv (im portance o f  relationships maintained with other
David Knocke. "N etworks o f  Elite Structure and D ecision M aking". In Stanley 
W asserm an and Joseph G alaskiewicz, Eds. Advances in social network analysis: research in the 
social and behavioral sciences. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications (1994): 275.
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actors).30 All these variables com bine to give elites "influence" over a po lity ’s critical 
systems and governm ental functions.
Cypher writes that "influence occurs when one actor provides inform ation to 
another with the intention o f  altering the latter's actions" which leads to "actors who are 
well connected to other inform ed actors gain[ing] pow er through their positional ability 
to tap into larger stores o f  useful political inform ation."31 Logically, actors neither 
connected to the central network nor w ith ties to the influential persons, are "in 
uniform ed, hence un-influential locations"' but providing inform ation has the potential 
to increase levels o f  inform ation throughout the system.
Often, individuals in positions o f  influence exert dom ination not only o f  the 
subjects and other non-influential network actors, but also o f  collecti ve preferences, since 
any negative consequences can be easily m itigated through the influence netw orks. Such 
influence is seen through, for exam ple, "the efforts o f  US and M exican governm ents and 
large corporations on either side o f  the border to "sell" a fictitious version o f  M exico to 
the US Public”33 in order to  increase cross-border trade and gain support for the N orth 
Am erican Free Trade A rea (NAFTA), whose benefits accrue more to  the elite class.
Some scholars have disputed the nature o f  the influence o f "elites" w ho articulate 
policy through m ass com m unication and m edia tools available to them  such as radio, TV 
and newspapers. They argue that globalization has diluted the control o f  the 'national
30 Ibid., 273.
3lJam es M. Cypher. “ Ideology o f  Econom ic Science in the Selling o f  N A FT A : The 





agenda' and diffused it to individuals. Yet, "evidence suggests that a grow ing proportion 
o f  the public is less inclined to consum e ‘political new s’. National new spapers and 
broadcasting networks have seen a steady decline in their audience figures over recent 
decades."34 This im plies that the decisions that affect the welfare o f  the state are left to 
certain groups o f  people who have an abiding interest in insuring certain outcom es, and 
the disinterest am ong the public m akes it easier to shape a nation’s preferences and 
present them  to the ‘o ther’ as collective preferences, that is, foreign policy.
D uring election cycles presidential (foreign) policy debates som etim es reduce 
im portant policy questions to either/or positions, depriving stakeholder citizens o f  the 
facility to engage in robust debate on foreign policy questions. For exam ple. Davis 
(2003) argues that press coverage even for elites is often relegated not to policy 
discussions, but to the defense o f  positions taken. "I had ten years in W hitehall, and 70 
percent o f  press relations there was keeping stu ff out o f  the papers.”35 The probability o f 
com m unicating unintended messages is enhanced, despite the probability that the public 
do not have sufficient inform ation on foreign policy positions. The net effect o f  the 
dearth o f policy discussions is the continued dom inance by the elites o f  resources that 
manage public expectations and therefore, foreign policy.
Even as they “m ake” foreign policy, e lites’ perception of the world is intrinsic to 
the foreign policy strategies they select, in part affirm ing the hum an-sciences approach to 
foreign-policy analysis. For exam ple, Dotter writes that
high-level policy-m akers may not always be consciously aw are o f  the
fundam ental psychological underpinnings o f  their attitudes, beliefs, opinions,
A A aron Davis,” W hither M ass M edia and Pow er? Evidence for a Critical E lite Theory 
A lternative.” Media , Culture & Society, 25, No. 66 (2003): 672.
35 Ibid., 678.
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values, perceptions, and behavior, especially how  these m ay affect a particular 
decision or policy initiative. High-level policy-m akers and others w ho may 
influence policy are not always entirely candid about their roles, especially in 
retrospective writings about possible m isperceptions or m istake.36
Given the vague and incom plete inform ation on the sources o f  the elites ' sum  o f  beliefs,
attitudes and values, which drive them to act on behalf o f  their constituents and states, or
the biographical m isrepresentation o f  the m otivations that drive them  to pursue certain
foreign policy outcom es that affect business, culture or politics, we can theorize that as
rational actors, elites act in what they believe to be the best interests of the self, their
interests and those o f  the state, to m axim ize their utility under Nash equilibrium
conditions and lim ited information. This does not always lead them to select the best
foreign policy options or produce optim um  outcom es for the national constituency.
Elite theory and  citizen diplom acy
It can be argued that citizen diplom acy is not an im portant consideration in the selection 
o f foreign policy o f a country, especially by elites, given the contrary and often marginal 
incentives. However, exploratory citizen diplomacy qualitative research dem onstrates 
that elites care about its im pact and use citizen diplom acy to promote their role in 
international cooperation.
The social systems perspective suggests that elites are the ow ners o f  the m eans o f 
production, determine the direction o f  a country 's critical sectors such including foreign
36 Lee E. Dotter. "The Seventy-Five Years' War, 1914-1989: Some O bservations on the 
Psychology o f  Am erican Foreign Policy-M aking during the 20lh Century." Political Psychology, 
12, No. 3 (Sep., 1991): 557.
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policy and t r a d e /7 Yet, good bilateral relations w ith the US imply that the country 
benefits from trade opportunities; as owners o f  m eans o f production, elites benefit 
directly. Elites may undertake other pro-US actions, such as providing better investm ent 
clim ate, im proving relations with the US, cooperation in US foreign policy for exam ple 
in the w ar against terror, or entering into other beneficial arrangem ents such as defense 
alliances, which may be o f  greater foreign policy value than citizen diplom acy.
Elites often engage in acts o f  public ‘participation’ directed at the local 
constituencies; these include philanthropic giving such as at fundraisers, local 
developm ent projects, scholarships, social and econom ic developm ent and other public 
causes. Because citizen diplom acy can be portrayed as positive bilateral relations and as 
public largesse from officials to the recipient com m unities, it is difficult for elites to 
dism iss its utility. Public officials how ever can appeal to national sentim ent to justify  the 
exclusion o f  citizen diplom ats from a country by alleging ‘foreign consp iracies.’
Exam ples o f  such exclusion include President Robert M ugabe’s anti-colonial argum ents, 
or V enezuela governm ent's anti-A m erican rhetoric. On a global scale, the anti-ICC 
protests in African countries, or anti-A m erican sentim ent in the M iddle E ast indicate.
Contrarily. elites are interested in the success o f  citizen diplom acy, since as 
com m unity and national leaders, they can take the credit for social and econom ic 
developm ent resulting from citizen diplomacy. The added benefit is the im provem ent o f  
bilateral relations especially where citizen diplom acy is likely to be view ed as a positive 
contribution by the recipient publics. For elites who must occasionally seek the consent
' '  M ark Evans and Jonathan Davies. "U nderstanding Policy Transfer: A M ulti-Level, 
M ulti-D isciplinary Perspective." Public Administration, 77, 2, (1999): 370. See also, Johan 
G altung "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function o f  Social Position." Journal o f  Peace Research , 1, 
3-4 (Septem ber 1964): 206.
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o f the governed through elections, citizen diplom acy is com patible w ith the values o f
elite theory. On the other hand, for polities where selection o f  the leadership does not
involve elections or some citizen expression o f  preferences, citizen diplom acy is not
necessarily expected to influence elites’ behavior tow ards citizens or the US except
where an overriding interest to do so is identifiable.
O ne o f the m ost concrete indicators o f  the im pact o f  citizen diplom acy on elites is
captured through the reports that accrue from different leaders of governm ent functions at
state, national, regional and local municipalities. For exam ple, the im m ediate form er
president o f  M adagascar. M arc Ravalom anana suggested that;
W e need Peace Corps now more than ever. W e do need developm ent and there 
are resources for that, but principally we need to learn how to think differently 
and the Peace Corps is the only group that helps w ith that. W e need to see 
opportunities, not challenges. We need to find solutions, not problem s. And for 
this we need more Peace Corps V o lu n te e rs /8
In China, the following w as reported: ‘‘Peace Corps Volunteers have m ade rem arkable
contributions to the English education developm ent in Chongqing m unicipality. I ’ve been
proudly telling people that Volunteers are great!”39
The im pact o f  the citizen diplom ats was m ore pronounced, even reported in the
same definitional, outcom e and operational term s under w hich it was started. A lthough
elites do not alw ays consider the im plications o f accepting citizen diplom ats as inclusive
o f foreign policy, they do highlight the benefits o f  accepting and w orking w ith citizen
diplom ats such as the Peace Corps. There are instances where the governm ent identifies
these negative foreign policy / influence outcom es and proceeds to act on them . In 1971.
38 The H onorable M arc Ravalom anana, President o f  the Republic o f  M adagascar (quoted 
in Peace Corps C ongressional Budget Justification (2007): 154.
39 Fu M inghua, Standing Deputy D irector o f  International C ooperation, D epartm ent o f  
C hongqing M unicipal Education Com m ission, China/ (C B J, 2009): 96.
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the Peace Corps was required to depart Bolivia “because o f  rising anti-US sentim ent 
stim ulated in part by the release o f  a popular 1969 movie, B lood o f  the Condor. Because 
som e m em bers o f  Bolivian society saw  the Corps as an infringem ent on their country's 
sovereignty, and Bolivian President Juan Jose Torres agreed.”40
The presidents and public officials -  the elites -  m ay indeed be playing to the 
public gallery, but because they are agents o f  their governm ents who articulate 
(especially foreign) policy positions w hich are dom estically and internationally 
representative, it is evident that citizen diplom ats -  in this case the US Peace Corps 
V olunteers -  have tangible, albeit non-foreign-policy-intended outcom es in the countries 
and com m unities that they serve.
Citizen participation
Domestic audience costs especially in dem ocracies have received w ide consideration in 
political science literature. It is im portant to review  how they affect foreign policy 
processes. The “domestic audience” paradigm  stem s prim arily from dem ocratic 
countries: dem ocracy is the rule by the people. In order for "the people" to rule, Dahl set 
out extensive criterion for dem ocracy with three necessary but insufficient conditions, 
including the provisions that, "citizens m ust be able to formulate their preferences, 
signify those preferences to fellow citizens and government through individual and 
collective action and have their preferences weighed [considered] equally  in the conduct
40 Jam es F. Siekm eier. "A Sacrificial Llama? The Expulsion o f the Peace C orps from 
B olivia in 1 9 7 1 Pacific Historical Review, 69, No. 1 (Feb., 2000): 66.
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o f governm ent w ithout discrim ination.”41 Citizen participatory approaches are som ew hat 
akin to the dom estic audience approaches.
The electorate can be assum ed to understand pertinent issues, including foreign 
policy issues. Any lack o f  interest is most certainly not functional, e.g. illiteracy or lack 
o f  m edia perm eation. One o f  the m ost com m only operationalized requirem ents for the 
successful conduct o f  dem ocracy is the availability o f  different sources o f  inform ation 
and generally, these countries dem onstrate high H um an Developm ent Indicators (HDI). 
Education and literacy is one o f  the constituents o f  the HDI index.
It is not always the case however, that citizens have the right, necessary or 
sufficient inform ation to make rational choices. A priori, the expectation that citizens 
have access to inform ation and care about the issues supports D alton’s argum ent that 
"through the initial selection o f  candidates and the choice between parties at elections, the 
public can select political leaders who represent their opinions. Citizens can also contact
public officials, write letters to the m edia and engage in sim ilar forms o f  political
• • • „<pparticipation. ~
Dalton suggests that ideally, "for voters to m ake meaningful decisions, they must 
understand the options that the polity faces a sufficient knowledge o f  the w orking 
political system  they intend to influence."43 However, increasing num bers o f  studies have 
found that
41 Dahl, Robert A. Poivarchy: participation and opposition. (Yale: Y ale U niversity  Press, 
1971): 2.
42 Russell Dalton, a). '"Political Parties and Political Representation: Party Supporters and 
Party' Elites in N ine N ations.” Comparative Political Studies. 18 (1985): 268.
4j Russell Dalton, b). "Citizen A ttitudes and Political Behavior." Comparative Political 
Studies, 33, (2000): 920.
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for m ost citizens, political interest and involvem ent barely seem ed to extend 
beyond casting an occasional vote in national elections. Furtherm ore, citizens 
apparently brought very little understanding to their participation in politics. It 
was not clear that voting decisions were based on rational evaluations o f  
candidates, parties, and their issue positions.44
Indeed, D alton suggests that individuals structure inform ation and becom e
know ledgeable in 'issues o t interest' ' to assist them  make their decisions, characterizing
voting behavior in dem ocracies as "the story o f  the three blind men and the elephant".
Other scholars’ findings support D alton’s research on citizen participation
especially on issue-based electoral voting. Zhang sum m arizes "Alm ond’s M ood Theory",
writing that “Foreign policy attitudes am ong m ost A m ericans lack intellectual structure
and factual content. U nder normal circum stances the American public has tended to be
indifferent to questions o f  foreign policy because o f  their rem oteness from every day
interests and activities.”46
Chuanjie surmises that the stability o f  foreign policy over tim e is lim ited, and that
foreign policy attitudes am ong the citizens “ lack both a ‘static constraint’ and a ‘dynam ic
constraint.’”47 Isemia, Juhasz and Rattinger concur, finding in their study aggregating the
stability o f  the public m ood towards foreign policy issues in the OECD countries France.
Germany post-W orld W ar II to be as sand sim ilar to those o f  the US publics.48 Num erous
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Zhang Chuanjie. "Affective US Image Predicts Chinese Citizens’ Attitudes toward 
United States." The Chinese Journal o f  International Politics, 3 (2010): 293.
47 Ibid., 294.
48 Pierangelo Isemia, Zoltan Juhasz and Hans Rattinger. "Foreign Policy and the Rational 
Public in Comparative Perspective." Journal o f  Conflict Resolution, 46 (2002): 201.
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other scholars have supported this finding o f  stability in foreign policy attitudes over 
time, w hether citizens are fully inform ed or not.49 A ttitudes and inform ation are often 
based on incom plete inform ation and som etim es the foreign policy view s arising from  
such incom plete information are not logical. Scholars generally suggest a w ide expanse 
o f  the role o f  the public in determining US involvem ent in other countries affairs 
(diplom acy and foreign policy).
On one hand, scholars suggest that the general American public is either ill- 
inform ed has little intellectual basis for the form ulation o f  diplom atic and foreign policy 
positions, or that their mood is 'fickle' and cannot be used to determine US foreign policy 
options due to changes in positions given their perceived importance. O n the other hand, 
some scholars hold the view that the pub lic 's  m ood is ‘stab le ', and that there is rationality 
in US Foreign Policy. Klarevas for exam ple writes that "a study o f  A m ericans' attention 
to post-Cold W ar crises concluded that no event brings greater public attention to 
Am erican foreign policy than the com m itm ent o f  military force." '0 On aggregate, there 
appears to be dissenting views over w hether citizens are sufficiently equipped to 
understand, and determine, the direction that their foreign policy choices should take.
Citizen participation and  citizen diplomacy
Citizen participation implies a greater level o f  political participation by the public in 
political activities. M acedo et a l record 'traditional' indicators o f political participation" 
such as "voter turnout, w riting letters to the editor, participating in rallies, dem onstrations
49 See, for example, Aachen, 1975: Hurw itz & Pefiev, 1987; 1988; M aggiotto  and 
W ittkopf, 1981 and W ittkopf, 1990.
50 Louis K larevas, "The "Essential Domino" o f  M ilitary Operations: A m erican Public 
Opinion and the use o f  Force", International Studies Perspectives 3, (2002): 417-20.
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and volunteering in cam paigns" as having fallen by about fifty percent betw een 1970's 
and 1990's.51 This view is supported by Putnam, w ho contends that in the case o f  the US, 
for instance, symptom atic o f  A m ericans' participation in civic affairs, "net participation 
by Am ericans, both in religious services and in church-related groups, has declined 
m odestly, by perhaps a sixth, since the 1960s."52
O n the other hand, some statistics suggest that volunteering am ong the Am erican 
public is steadily increasing. For exam ple, in 2011 the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 
a “0.5 percentage point increase to 26.8 percent for the year ending in Septem ber 2011”. 
The Bureau further reports that, “about 64.3 m illion people volunteered through or for an 
organization at least once between Septem ber 2010 and Septem ber 2011. The increase in 
the volunteer rate in 2011 followed a decline o f equal size in 2 0 10.”53
If  citizens volunteer at hom e for organizations such as churches, for charity events 
and related activities are they more likely to volunteer and support volunteering and 
philanthropic activities abroad? Debates in the US political and social circles seem to 
either point to or recom m end an increased role for philanthropy as a private undertaking 
(churches, individuals) in aiding foreign states in tim es o f  disaster, even am ongst 
Republicans who traditionally appear less likely to support foreign aid. It is plausible that 
citizen diplom acy finds greater support am ong civic-m inded individuals. I f  individuals 
support civic engagem ent at their local com m unities, they are more likely to support the
51 M acedo, et al. “Democracy at risk: how political choices underm ine citizen 
participation, and w hat we can do about it.“ W ashington, DC: The Brookings Institution (2005): 1.
32 Robert Putnam. "Bow ling A lone: A m erica's D eclining Social C apital." Journal o f  
Democracy, 6:1, (Jan 1995): 69.
53 Bureau o f  Labor Statistics. "Econom ic N ews Release - V olunteering in the United 
States, 2011". http://wwvv.bls.gov/news.release/volun.nrO.htm . Feb. 2 2 ,2 0 1 2  (W eb). A ccessed 
3/8/2012.
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concept and funding for citizen diplom acy abroad and to participate in citizen diplom acy 
program s. Therefore, citizen diplom acy is com patible with citizen participation and is 
one o f  the key com ponents o f  citizen participation.
Emerging fo re ig n  po licy approaches
A pproaches that explain the m aking o f  foreign policy, and its key variables -  w hether i t’s 
the leaders, the publics, the elites, history' and contem porary geopolitical conditions -  are 
gaining scholarly importance. O ne o f  the growing paradigm s that help explain foreign 
policy m aking is the Foreign Policy A nalysis (FPA) approach. A ccording to  Hudson, “ the 
explanans o f  FPA are those factors that influence foreign policy decision m aking and 
foreign policy decision makers. Thus, tw o o f the hallm arks o f  FPA scholarship are that it 
views the explanation o f foreign policy decision making as multifactorial, w ith the 
desideratum  o f exam ining variables from more than one level o f analysis (m ultilevel).”54 
To explain decision-m aking in foreign policy, analysts rely on "insights from 
psychology, sociology, organizational behavior, anthropology, econom ics, and so forth" 
but critical to the analysis is the "human decision-m aker”.53 More succinctly, the 
em ergent FPA approach is prem ised on the assum ption that human beings, acting 
individually or in collectivities, are the source o f  m uch behavior and m ost change in 
international politics.36
54 V alerie M. Hudson. “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory-' and the Ground 
o f  International Relations.” Foreign Policy Analysis, 1, 1 (Feb, 2005): 2.
55 Ibid.
56 Valerie M. Hudson and C hristopher S. Vore. “ Foreign Policy A nalysis Yesterday, 
Today, and Tom orrow .” Mershon International Studies Review, 39, 2 (Oct.. 1995): 210.
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This stands in stark contrast with the general assum ptions that international 
relations, which drive foreign policy, are based on the invariant preferences o f  states. 
Hudson and Vore assert that "the decision-m aking approach o f  FPA breaks apart the 
m onolithic view o f  nation-states as unitary actors”57 and looks at the individuals, units 
and interests that make up the state. This approach better integrates the m acro-level state 
approach, and the more m odest potential explanatory variables such as governm ent 
system s, ideology, and political system s such as dem ocracy, autocracy, or com m unism .
Conversely, this presents a dilem m a from the cold-w ar era international relations' 
perspective: how do statesmen, assum ed to be in full control o f  the activities o f  
governm ent w ithin their polities, articulate their (or their citizens') preferences abroad to 
their and their constituents’ benefit, given the anarchic condition o f  the international 
system ? By assum ing that state-level actors do not base their decisions on rationality -  
rather, they depend on the hum an sciences such as psychology to understand the actors'
-  o
m otivations and decision-m aking p ro cesses/ International volunteering and citizen 
diplom acy can be articulated through this lens.
So ft p o w e r  approach  to fo re ig n  p o lic y
The difference in influence between nations is often expressed -  and m easured -  through 
the concept o f  "pow er” . As such, pow er is an indispensable currency in international 
relations. Political scientists generally agree that states alm ost in v a ria b ly  strive for 




control others, to  get others to do w hat they otherw ise would not."59 due to the possession 
o f  attributes that make it possible to com pel /  encourage others - attributes such as 
population, territory', natural resources, econom ic size, m ilitary forces, and political 
stability.60 Traditionally and post-W orld W ar II, state capabilities w ere calculated not 
only in term s o f  the ability to coerce others but based on m ilitary resources, alliances and 
econom ic resources at a coun try 's disposal. With the changing geo-political realities o f  
the post-Cold W ar era, the notion o f  pow er has m orphed -  it is no longer enough to 
describe pow er solely based on econom ic or m ilitary capabilities.
In 1990, recognizing the global changes in the way power w as perceived and the 
ongoing transitions o f  the form and exercise o f  pow er, Nye first discussed “mutual 
attraction” or “ fostering an  alignm ent o f  other countries’ preferences w ith o ne’s ow n” as 
central to the definition o f  soft power. N ye explained that “the definition o f  pow er is 
losing its em phasis on m ilitary force and conquest that m arked earlier eras. The factors o f 
technology, education, and econom ic grow th are becom ing more significant in 
international power, while geography, population, and raw m aterials are becom ing 
som ew hat less im portant.”61
The apparent shift from em phasis on the traditional indicators o f  pow er, and -  or 
-  the inclusion o f  other factors such as technology, education and econom ic grow th 
im plied a different approach to aligning one 's  priorities. It implied that rather than 
sending soldiers into a battlefield, the battle wmuid entail winning hearts and minds
39 Nye, Soft Power, (1990): 154.
60 See Paul Kennedy, Rise o f  Great Powers (1987) and Kenneth W altz, Theory o f  
International Politics (1979).
61 Nye, 1990: 154.
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through person-to-person exchanges, culture, sports and ideology. C itizen diplom acy 
exem plifies the duality o f  this shift: it relies on individuals, albeit w ith the backing o f  the 
governm ent, and involves person-to-person contacts, often working in social and 
econom ic developm ent program.
N ye laid the foundation for articulating the evolution o f a new, adaptive currency 
o f  international relations. He argued that "[T jh is second aspect of pow er -  w hich occurs 
w hen one country gets other countries to w ant what it w ants -  m ight be called co-optive 
or soft pow er in contrast with the hard or com m and power o f  ordering others to  do w hat 
it wants.”62 As previously discussed, Nye further defined 'co-optive pow er', as the “ability 
o f  a  country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define 
their interests in ways consistent w ith its own. This co-optive power tends to arise from 
such resources as cultural and ideological attraction as well as rules and institutions o f  
international regim es.”63
The exercise o f  power transcends m ilitary and econom ic dim ensions; it includes 
participation in global affairs, involvem ent o f  and projection o f  influence through and 
towards other non-traditional actors such as states, m ulti-national corporations, regim es, 
institutions, ideologies and strategies. Soft pow er encom passes traditional and non- 
traditional types o f  power including econom ic capabilities (for exam ple, through foreign 
aid), technological (for instance, through travel and com m unication), ideological 
(dem ocracy) and transm ission o f  cultural values and artifacts.
N ye identified three prim ary sources that generate soft power: culture, political 




and production and m ilitary superiority. These traditional factors, w hile not entirely 
disfavoring population, territory and other factors characteristic to traditional m ercantilist 
production and thus the basis o f  traditional state pow er have in and o f  them selves become 
necessary but not sufficient. M cClory notes this and in his conception o f  soft power, 
increases the num ber o f  soft power com ponents to include "governm ent, diplom acy, 
culture, education and business innovation."64
W ith the collapse o f  the Soviet Union, the increase in number o f  free polities, 
increase in globalization and com m unication, and the proliferation o f  state and non-state 
actors, pow er no longer lies exclusively in the sizes o f  arm ed forces. N ye suggests that 
"proof o f  pow er lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behavior o f  states."6'"1 
Thus, the need for a different conceptual fram ework o f  what matters and how  to achieve 
it becom es necessary. A fter 3 945, the ability o f  probability o f  achieving change through 
institutional m echanism s increased w hereas prior to that, the power o f institutions w as 
not viable; this denoted transition to a different conceptual framework
M cClory concurs, acknow ledging that “w hile m ilitary force rem ains the ultim ate 
form o f  power in a self-help system, the use o f  force has becom e m ore costly for modern 
great pow ers than it w as in earlier centuries. O ther instrum ents such as com m unications, 
organizational and institutional skills, and m anipulation o f  interdependence have becom e 
im portant.”66 W hile this soft pow er definition is newer, the practice has been ongoing 
since the end o f  the Second W orld War. Nye notes that US statesmen were cognizant o f
64 Jonathan M cClory. “The New Persuaders: An international ranking o f  soft pow er.” 
Institute for G overnm ent. http:(7w w w .instituteforgovem m ent.org.uk/publica tions/51/the-new - 
persuaders-ii. 3. (N d,) (W eb.) Accessed 2/1/2012.
65 Nye (1990): 155.
66 N ye (1990): 158-159.
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this phenom enon as a foreign policy tool: "soft pow er cam e in the M arshall Plan -  we did 
the same thing in Japan,"67
The theoretical concept o f  soft pow er has found its w ay into the political life o f  
not only the US. but other regional and rising powers. Canada and the Scandinavian 
countries can get some (smaller) states to change their behavior on certain issues by- 
applying pressure, withholding financial aid, or calling for censure at international 
organizations. The US has continued to apply traditional tools of pow er and diplom acy, 
yet increasingly, recognizes the utility o f  soft pow er tools. W ithout concisely defining, or 
em pirically outlining its variables, forms, application, constraints, outcom es and 
effectiveness as m easured em pirically by m etrics other than public perception articulated 
through opinion polls, surveys and other instrum ents that are more likely to capture the 
period public 'mood', rather than the sustained effects o f  foreign policy decisions, 
exchanges between countries and sustained interactions, the application o f  soft pow er 
will remain unappreciated, understudied and a political catch-phrase.
As currently defined and applied to foreign policy scholarship and practice, and 
used in current political debates, soft pow er is not an entirely new concept: it has been in 
existence alm ost as long as the m odem  W eberian state. This research w ill show  that the 
current theoretical definition has not been sufficiently studied to be such a key strategic 
com ponent o f  US foreign policy. To date, there are no empirical studies that show the 
in/effectiveness o f  this “mutual attraction” . Indeed, often, nations that are recipients o f  
‘soft pow er’ instrum ents including foreign aid. citizen diplomats, technology, am ong 
others, consistently vote differently than the US in at the UN General A ssem bly.
67 Nye, Soft Power (2004): ix.
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C itizen d ip lom acy: theorized  ou tcom es
It is im portant to outline what this research aims to determine: citizen diplom ats, with the 
backing o f  their governm ent, serve in a num ber o f  foreign countries w ith several goals, 
including attem pting to create “mutual attraction" between the two states. The w ork o f  
citizen diplom ats is hypothesized to  lead to the foreign country aligning its preferences 
with the sending country. More narrowly, the U nited States, through the Peace Corps 
V olunteers, aim ed to “change foreign perceptions about the US”, “change A m ericans’ 
perception about the w orld”, and “provide trained m anpow er to people and countries that 
need it” . This research aims to test whether citizen diplom ats, through the values they 
impart to the recipient com m unities, do “change foreign perceptions about the U S” 
through mutual attraction.
To accom plish this theorized change, citizens interact in a personal capacity with 
the foreign publics; this research hypothesizes the plausible outcom es o f  citizen 
diplom acy as “political outcom es” and “socio-econom ic outcom es” . Political outcom es 
assume that interaction with the citizen diplom at increases the recipient com m unity’s 
political awareness (political participation) such as voting and public visibility, positive 
feedback from  the recipient com m unities to their leadership, thereby m aking public 
officials more likely to support the sending country in bilateral and m ultilateral forums.
This should be evident in global favorability polls or through international 
bilateral and multilateral actions. “Sociological outcom es” , on the o ther hand, are those 
‘personal connections’ such as ‘inspiration’, ‘adm iration’ and ‘m entorship’ that 
eventually lead an individual to pursue certain paths and options that m ay be limited 
without exposure to the citizen diplom at, due to spatial and geographical lim itations.
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P olitica l ou tcom es: fo re ig n  p o lic y
At its inception, the Peace Corps program was an explicitly foreign policy strategy with 
foreign policy outcomes, designed in part as an extension o f  the US containm ent policy -  
restricting Soviet influence everywhere by any m eans, and increasing the US presence in 
different -  especially newly independent -  countries in Africa, South East A sia and Latin 
America. It was proposed by John F. Kennedy, US Senator-elected-president, and 
received the highest levels o f support from  this elite group, surrounded by the core o f  
society. W hile the outreach work, perform ed by volunteers, would be prim arily socio­
econom ic and socio-political in nature, the national security and foreign policy goals 
were no less important. By countering or matching the Soviet U nion’s provision o f  
technical experts, the US would appeal to the world, train m anpower and im prove its 
standing especially am ong newly independent states.
The drivers for the political outcom es recognized higher level outcom es through 
international volunteering: not only would the volunteers counter Soviet expansion and in 
some cases, aggression, they w ould provide and teach technical skills to new ly 
independent countries, and influence the publics to want democracy. The cosm opolitan 
effects that vector into political outcom es o f  international volunteering assum e that by 
interacting and learning about cosm opolitanism  (o f the democratic kind), individuals are 
more likely to express them selves and agitate for personal liberties, w hich eventually 
opens countries up to democracy.
It is difficult to measure how  m uch more cosm opolitan an individual is, or how- 
m uch m ore aw^are they are about, for exam ple, hum an rights, or how that translates into 
voting or other dem ocratic participation especially in non-democratic system s. Similarly.
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the im plied expectation by the Peace Corps is that such cosm opolitanism , expressed 
individually, has no place in inter-state relations: it is only useful if  it translates into 
action that supports the sending country.
Political outcom es o f  citizen diplom acy are hypothesized to include change in 
public opinion. Here, reliable indicators that m easure public opinion and attitudes 
tow ards the US and the many facets o f  its global presence ought to dem onstrate that as a 
result o f  citizen diplom acy. Controlling for all other sources o f  pro-US effects, there is a 
significant difference in the way individuals perceive the US. an expectation that this 
perception will translate into selection o f  policy-m akers w ith a pro-US view , and 
therefore the country will vote more congruently w ith the US at international 
organizations. Overall, the expected political outcom es are therefore m ore direct, 
m easurable, especially w ith the direct effects more than the public opinion and the 
cosm opolitan effects o f  citizen diplomacy.
Soc io -econom ic  a n d  developm ent outcom es
Socio-econom ic and developm ent ( SED) outcom es suggest that the im pact o f  citizen 
diplom acy is prim arily about social and econom ic developm ent, and possib ly  only 
peripherally im portant to foreign policy. The im pact o f  citizen diplomacy is therefore 
confined to altruistic reasons, and the outcom es are sim ply social and econom ic, w ithout 
regard for relationships between the sending and receiving countries. SED outcom es are 
m ore difficult to m easure, and provide the basis for counter-argum ents to the m easurable 
im pact o f  citizen diplom acy proposed in this research.
82
The SED outcom es, were the volunteering sim ply altruistic, include -  and are 
denoted by -  increasing socio-econom ic developm ent, prom oting socio-cultural 
understanding and friendly relations between individuals and  developm ent outcom es 
such as im provem ent o f  com m unity health through construction o f  w ells, teaching 
business skills, agricultural skills, teaching English or running a health clinic. The belief 
that volunteering is an altruistic undertaking finds traction within the constructivist and 
fem inist theoretical approaches w'here individuals and their experiences are im portant. 
Despite the fact that the findings from these theoretical approaches difficult to aggregate 
and do not have to correlate with leaders’ form ulation o f foreign policy;68 the outcom es 
are not sufficiently specified or understood as a basis for foreign policy options.
There are obvious w eaknesses in believing that the sole objective o f  the Peace 
Corps -  and other citizen diplom acy initiatives -  is confined to socio-econom ic 
developm ent outcomes. A lthough the ultimate goal o f  the volunteering was to share 
A m erica’s altruism  with the world, the objective w as to attract the foreign countries 
towards the US. Therefore, there is a stronger foreign policy goal subsum ed w ithin the 
altruistic goal. The focus on foreign policy through altruism  has been a staple o f  US 
foreign policy, even though scholars have attem pted to restrict the study o f  foreign policy 
to non-altruistic strategies.
Deriding the shift in focus tow ards institutionalism  and bilateralism, M andelbaum  
for exam ple differentiates between foreign policy areas by defining a "powerful and
68 M ichael G. Roskin and N icholas O. Berry. 1R: The new world o f  international 
relations. 8* Ed. (NY : Pearson Education. Inc., 2010): 66-67.
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potentially dangerous m em bers o f  the international com munity category69 and an 
"international periphery." The latter, M andelbaum  argues, was the C linton 
A dm inistration 's initial foreign policy approach. M andelbaum  argues that the 
adm inistration, in focusing US foreign policy on humanitarian concerns w hile pursuing 
dem ocratic transitions was trying "in 1993 to m ake the cornerstone o f  A m erican foreign 
policy into a branch o f social work", w ithout success.'0
The difficulty o f pursuing social and econom ic outcom es as a  foreign policy end­
gam e is exem plified by the low levels o f  confidence in presidents and adm inistrations 
perceived to be weak foreign policy through pursuit o f non-traditional diplom acy. It is in 
a president’s interests to portray strength in foreign policy, perceived as a m ore m ilitary, 
than diplom atic approach to foreign policy. The conduct o f  traditional international 
relations rarely sees states utilize social-econom ic developm ent approaches as a 
m ethodical foreign policy strategy.
The pursuit o f  more traditional form s o f  foreign policy does not necessarily 
preclude diplom acy and non-m ilitary options such as foreign aid; how ever, these are not 
the prim ary vehicles for foreign policy. No state can reasonably expect to conduct foreign 
policy, or em ploy a foreign policy strategy that expends the m anpower o f  over 200,000 
citizen diplom ats and $20 billion in direct costs, in the hope that random  volunteers 
interact w ith citizen diplomats, view  the US positively, som e day run for political office 
and then practice or influence pro-US behavior in the country’s foreign policy options.
69 M ichael M andelbaum. "Foreign Policy as Social W ork." Foreign Affairs, 75, No. 1 
(Ja n .-F e b ., 1996): 17.
70 Ibid: 18.
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Gaps in the literature
From the foregoing discussions, a num ber o f  issues are clearly identifiable. One o f  the 
strategic foreign policy options that the US has utilized since 1960 to increase its 
attractiveness to other nations, has been the use o f  citizen diplomats. Fifty years after the 
Peace C orps was founded, there have been few em pirical studies to determ ine w hether 
the more than 200,000 volunteers have substantially changed the w orld ’s perception o f  
America, as one o f  the objectives o f  Peace Corps holds. The Affinity o f  N ations Index 
and the State D epartm ent statistics w ill show, there is a positive correlation between the 
placem ent o f  citizen diplomats in a foreign country and indicators o f  positive perception 
o f  the US and its foreign policy as m easured through congruent voting with the US at the 
UN G eneral Assembly.
A t the sam e time, citizen diplom acy has been ongoing for the past fifty years. 
Successive Am erican presidents have suggested increasing the numbers o f  citizen 
diplomats. C itizen diplom acy is increasingly finding traction as an alternative, less 
militarized and inexpensive path to diplom acy. Citizen diplomacy has altruistic 
m otivations on the part o f  the citizen diplom at, but a  citizen diplomat cannot purport to 
escape the perception, w hether accurate or not, o f  acting in some capacity on behalf o f  
the sending government.
A synthesis o f  citizen participation and elite theories suggest that it m ight be m ore 
feasible to target actions to influence foreign policy at elites who can influence the 
direction o f  key organs o f  state, including governm ent and the making o f  foreign policy. 
One o f the major criticism s leveled against citizen diplom acy stems from  dom estic 
audience costs and citizen participation approaches: communities, groups and individuals
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targeted by the citizen diplom ats are not sufficiently politically enfranchised to influence 
domestic and foreign policy issues. Because o f  the low  levels o f  participation and 
influence on governm ent and therefore foreign policy, citizen diplom acy is therefore the 
application o f  the right strategy to the w rong target.
There is a glaring absence o f  inquiry w hether international volunteering, citizen 
diplom acy and foreign-country placem ent by state-supported enterprises, w ith foreign 
policy objectives impacts the foreign policy behavior o f  the recipient country as 
m easured through the extent to which a country votes congruently w ith the US at the UN 
General Assem bly. Additionally, studies have seldom exam ined how foreign policy 
influence is construed in citizen diplomacy.
It can be assumed that the values that citizen diplom ats transm it national, rather 
than partisan values. In exposing another gap in scholarship, no studies have studies the 
differences in political ideologies am ong citizen diplom ats and w hether these have an 
im pact on country voting behavior. N either have there been studies on w hether the 
foreign publics becom e more politically active after hosting citizen diplom ats, w hether 
they vote and express their preference’s more often and w hether these reflect in the 
representatives elected, who then vote in congruence with the US at the UN G eneral 
Assembly. No studies have studied the level o f  elite involvement in citizen diplom acy, 
and w hether such involvement is critical to influencing congruent voting patterns with the 
US at the UN General Assembly.
Given that the congruent voting w ith the US at the UN General A ssem bly, 
aggregated across time, all votes and all UN members, has historically hovered around 
twenty nine percent, it appears that there is a gap between the perception that citizen
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diplom acy brings the two peoples or nations together, or that the perception if  any, is not 
reflected in the international preferences o f  the national authority and elites. It m ay also 
be the case that citizen diplom acy has no foreign policy functions, or that the target 
audience is politically uninvolved in selecting leaders, or that there is not transm ission 
m echanism  from the citizen diplom acy recipient com m unities to their national 
authorities. However, controlling for other variables, it is important to determ ine what, if 
any, the effect o f  citizen diplom ats on foreign policy is.
A lm ost uniform ly, scholars studying theories, motivations, patterns and outcom es 
o f  citizen diplom acy casually m ention issues o f  peace, international cooperation and 
foreign policy w ithout articulating how these concepts are operationalized, im plem ented 
and affected through the volunteer training, placem ent or interaction w ith the host 
com m unity or organization. Few studies have highlighted the im portance o f  these 
transnational links as a conscious governm ent-sponsored foreign policy.
Theoretical approaches, such as A lm ond’s M ood Theory, the Elite Theory, 
dom estic audience and citizen political participation approaches lead us to hypothesize 
that citizens have little inform ation and involvem ent in foreign affairs and political 
matters in general. Therefore, elite make a country’s foreign policy choices, yet even as 
they are uninvolved in foreign policy making, citizen diplomacy continues to attract 
funding and support even while support and funding o f  international institutions such as 
the UN and foreign aid continue to suffer cuts.
Prior studies show that countries voting at the UN reflect more o f  an alignm ent 
with regional blocs, rather than w ith their greatest benefactors in term s o f  aid, cultural 
exchanges or security guarantees. G iven this reality, the question rem ains, o f  w hy the US
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continues to support citizen diplom atic exchanges with countries that do not vote in 
congruence with the US at the UN General A ssem bly. These are som e o f  the questions 
that this dissertation will be seeking to answer. The dissertation hopes to  contribute to the 
citizen diplom acy and foreign policy literature by seeking to  uncover the correlation 
between citizen diplom acy and the recipient foreign state behavior tow ards the US.
C onclusion
This chapter began by looking at how  the US interacts w ith the world as expressed 
through its foreign policy. The chapter then exam ined the process o f  foreign policy 
making, concluding that especially in the US, the governm ent, the executive, specific 
agencies and governm ent departm ents, the citizens. Congress and elites play an im portant 
role in the form ulation o f  foreign policy. D ifferent stakeholders influence -  or 
subsequently punish -  the governm ent for m aking certain foreign policy decisions. This 
position contrasts some prevailing scholarly views that the public is uninform ed or 
uninterested in foreign policy, and public m ood regarding foreign policy is often fickle.
Specifically, the chapter studied role o f  domestic audiences, elites and citizen 
participation approaches, including the costs that citizens extract on dem ocratically 
elected governm ents for international foreign policy behavior. The chapter then discussed 
em erging approaches to foreign policy, including the Foreign Policy A nalysis and soft 
pow er approaches. Because the key com ponents o f  soft pow er include mutual attraction, 
it is im portant to set the terms o f  mutual attraction, which infer interaction with the 
recipient countries. Such interaction is accom plished through citizen diplom acy.
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The chapter then outlined the gaps in literature. In summary, despite the fact that 
governm ents -  from the UK. to Japan, to the United States and even international 
organizations such as the U nited N ations -  continue to provide funding, training and 
other logistics to support international volunteers, there has been little em pirical evidence 
that citizen diplom acy changes the w ay the sending countries are perceived by the 
recipient countries. There is also no prior evidence or studies that dem onstrate that this 
perception can. or has been m easured through congruence in foreign policy behavior.
The US Peace Corps volunteers program , a Cold W ar-era foreign policy strategy 
designed to contain Soviet expansion, has placed hundreds o f  thousands o f  volunteers 
around the world. There is no system atic, em pirical evidence that this citizen diplom acy 
has changed foreign perceptions o f  the US abroad. Positive perception is not useful 
unless it translates into foreign policy support -  congruent voting w ith the U nited States 
especially on im portant issues at the United N ations General Assembly. This is w hat the 
next chapter seeks to do: control for rival explanations o f  foreign policy behavior and 
investigate how other nations behave tow ards the US -  whether they support the US 
agenda as a result o f  citizen dip lom acy 's mutual attraction in m ultilateral forum s.
89
CH A PTER III 
H Y PO TH ESES
Introduction and chapter organization
This chapter derives several hypotheses on the relationship between citizen diplom acy 
and countries’ congruent voting w ith the IJS at the UN General Assem bly. The view  
proposed by this research is that citizen diplom acy influences recipient coun tries ' foreign 
policy as shown through congruence voting with the US at the UN General Assem bly. It 
is im portant to noie here that the research is testing for correlation, not causation, 
between citizen diplom acy and state behavior tow ards the US. Scholars have long 
articulated that correlation is not causation: I reassert this caveat here .' !
Even as correlation is differentiated from causation, there is skepticism  about 
relying on correlation to come to conclusions about different phenomena. M arc R acieot is 
quoted as saying, "you're trying too hard to find a correlation here. You don 't know these 
people, you don't know what they intended. You try to com pile statistics and correlate 
them 10 a result that am ounts to nothing more than speculation." '2 Still, A lbert Einstein 
once said that "the im portant thing is not to stop questioning."73 This research therefore
71 Barbara K. Rimer, ‘'Correlation is N ot C ausation .” American Journal o f Public Health, 
88, No. 5 1998: (832); Geer, D. E. "Correlation Is N ot C ausation." Security & Privacy, IEEE, 9, 
no. 2, (M arch-A pril 201 1): 93-94; Leonard M. Pott, "Correlation Is Not C ausation ." Academic 
Medicine, 83, N o. 12 (2008): 1127; Peter H. Dueseberg. "Human im m unodeficiency virus and 
acquired im m unodeficiency syndrom e: C orrelation but no t causation." Proceedings o f  the 
National Academy o f Sciences, 86(1989): 755-764; M arc Racicot.
h ttp ://w ww .brain yquote.eom/q uotes/authors/m /m arc racicot.htm l#R I6Qsq pY 0d4 V cm m W .9
2 Daniel E. Greer, Jr. "Correlation is N ot Causation." IEEE Security Privacy, 9, No. 2 
(M arch-A pril 2011): 93-94.
7-1 A lbert Einstein. Quoted by Brainy Quote. 
w w w .brainyquote.com /quotes/authors/a/albert einsfein.htm l (W eb). Accessed 12/5/2012.
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intends to find potential explanations o f  citizen-diplom at recipient states ' voting behavior 
at the U nited N ations General Assem bly. To determ ine w hat correlations exist, citizen 
diplom acy, foreign aid, m ilitary aid, foreign direct investm ent, m ilitary spending as a 
percentage o f  GDP and educational spending as percentage o f  GDP, im m igration into the 
U S, state fragility and regional and tem poral effects will be tested against countries’ 
congruent voting patterns with the US at the UN General Assembly.
This chapter is organized as follows: it begins by introducing the objective o f  
hypothesis form ulation, and outlines the variable selection reasoning. The chapter then 
outlines the classification o f  the three groups o f  variables, nam ely 1} factors o f  bilateral 
relationships 2) attributes o f  host countries that affect voting patterns and 3) control 
variables such as the temporal and regional variables. fit the subsequent chapter, a fourth 
category that groups all the variables together for the om nibus model is also included.
These hypotheses will be tested based on two sources o f data, that is, the Voeten 
and Strezhnev Dataverse data and Dreher, Strum and Vreeland K.OF Institute data. The 
chapter then provides a summary o f  the hypotheses tests and the independent variables 
expected to have an effect on the congruency o f  voting behavior o f states at the UN 
General Assem bly. The chapter concludes by sum m arizing the hypotheses and sets the 
stage for the actual estim ation o f  eight models derived from  the organizational factors.
Overview of the selected variables
Overall, this research seeks to test the efficacy o f  soft power as an em ergent, foreign 
policy strategy -  as opposed the traditional, hard-pow er strategies that relied on m ilitary 
capabilities (men, materiel and m ilitary alliances) and econom ic power (G DP per capita
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and to an extent trade). The strategies and tools o f  soft pow er are w ide and varied. Some 
o f them  include foreign aid. w hich has been previously studied and varied conclusions 
draw n along the spectrum  o f zero to m axim um  utility as a  foreign policy tool.
Research on the utility and function o f foreign aid as a foreign policy tool has 
produced m ixed findings. Some studies have found no relationship betw een foreign aid 
and state behavior tow ards the U S, and does not influence the foreign policy behavior o f
7*1
countries one w ay or the other. O ther scholars have found that foreign aid is a tool for 
"exerting influence on host country policies and program m es."75 C ontrary to  m ost 
findings, W ang finds that the im pact o f  foreign aid is "most likely to em erge in voting 
coincidence rates on im portant issues."76
This finding supplem ented Hayter's argum ent that “USAID docum ents that aid  is 
an instrum ent o f  United States foreign policy, and that as such, it is best suited to the 
prom otion o f  econom ic developm ent"77 and Rai's finding that for the Soviet Union, there 
was a non-existent relationship between foreign aid and General A ssem bly votes. Rai 
found a weak correlation between A m erican aid as a percentage o f  recipient's GDP and 
voting congruence in international organizations. He concluded that "total foreign aid 
works neither as an inducement nor as a reward or a punishm ent in the G eneral
74 K eglev and Hook. (1991): 78.
5 Teresa Hayter. Aid as imperialism. (Harm ondsw orth, Penguin. 1971): 88.
6 T. Y. Wang. "US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An A nalysis o f Im portan t Issues." 
International Studies Quarterly (1999): 199.
n Hayter. Aid as imperialism. (1971): 87.
92
Assem bly." A separate finding showed that in 1970-1975, "American aid w orked more 
effectively as an inducem ent than as a reward or a punishment. The Soviet aid works 
more effectively as a reward or a punishm ent than as an inducem ent."79
There are other aspects o f  soft pow er that affect the voting congruence o f  
countries. These include level o f  globalization (penetration o f  internet and m odem  
com m unications, TV, social m edia etc.) which increase aw areness betw een different 
areas o f  the world. M igration, and im m igration, has becom e not only a source o f  
individuals’ better welfare, but also o f  financial w ellbeing through rem ittances. In 
addition, as w estern countries' Human D evelopm ent Index (HDI) levels increased and 
the population levels stagnated, im m igrants began to migrate to these countries and take 
up high-level jo b s  such as doctors and nurses, thereby increasing the interaction o f 
western countries with m igrants from diverse countries.
Ideology -  dem ocratic capitalism  -  significantly eroded socialism  and 
com m unism  and increasingly becam e a  dom inant ideology. As the world becam e m ore 
globalized, levels o f  trade and interdependence increased, thereby increasing trade 
between countries and progressively diversified m anufacturing and service-iocation 
through offshoring and outsourcing. The fall o f  the Soviet Union m ade dem ocracy a new 
standard for countries aiming to receive favor am ongst the great powers, thereby 
increasing the soft pow er capabilities o f  countries w ith weaker m ilitary capabilities. And 
as the Soviet Union collapsed, state fragility and failure increased, and these became 
determ inants o f  how  countries interacted w ith each other.
78 Kul B. Rai. "Foreign Aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1967-1976."
Journal o f  Peace Research, 17 (1980): 272.
/9 Wang. "US Foreign Aid and UN Voting." (1999): 199.
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All these points o f  interaction constitute soft power, and are increasingly affecting 
how  countries are viewed and view them selves. The war against terror is often prosecuted 
under the m antra o f  “they d on 't like us/they don’t like our way of life-’; this im plies some 
know ledge o f  the “way o f  life” and a positive or negative perception o f  the particular way 
o f  life. It is these points o f  interactions, these m anifestations o f soft pow er that this 
research proposes to interrogate and determ ine how  such variables affect the behavior o f  
one state to another -  m ore specifically, how  soft pow er interactions affect state behavior 
tow ards the global hegem on, through voting at the United Nations. The next section will 
outline the general, followed by specific hypotheses on the effects o f  various variables on 
state behavior.
P rim ary assum ption  /  hypothesis
Overall, I expect that soft power variables originating from the US and favoring the 
bilateral relationship will positively influence states' to vote positively w ith the United 
States. I hypothesize that US behavior towards other countries is reciprocated as shown 
by foreign publics’ perception o f  the US and its foreign policy, of A m erican citizens and 
by congruent foreign state voting behavior w ith the US at the UN G eneral A ssem bly. 
Therefore, the overarching expectation (hypothesis) is that:
S ta tes that receive  c itizen  d ip lom ats w ill vote m ore in congruence w ith  the U S at the  
U nited  N ations G eneral A ssem bly  than slates that do  not receive  c itizen  d ip lom a ts
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In the subsequent chapter, I w ill run regression analyses for the correlations w ith citizen 
diplom acy as one o f  the variables in each regression model. In successive m odels, in 
addition to the citizen diplom acy variable, I will add the individual predictors o f  state 
behavior to determ ine what variables individually best explain states’ foreign policy. I 
w ill then test for m ultiple correlations -  the prediction o f state behavior from  m ultiple 
independent variables -  to determ ine what com bination o f  variables best explains 
countries' foreign policy behavior towards the US. In order to effectively test these 
hypotheses, 1 will begin by organizing all the test variables into three groups. These are 
the m easures o f  bilateral relationships, host country attributes and other factors that may 
affect countries’ voting patterns at the UN General Assem bly.
Hypotheses organization
The two dependent variables in this research are: all UN General A ssem bly votes and key 
UN General A ssem bly votes. If  citizen diplom acy positively correlates w ith  foreign 
policy behavior, the frequency o f voting with the US at the UN General A ssem bly will 
change given the variance o f  citizen diplom ats placed in recipient countries.
The four m ain groups o f  hypotheses organization factors are: all the variables, the 
bilateral relationships, host country attributes and control factors. The bilateral 
relationships are variables o f dyadic relationships between the US and the citizen 
diplom at-recipient country. They are factors that strengthen the relationship betw een the 
two countries and make cooperation in international forums as shown by congruent 
voting at the UN General Assem bly more likely. These factors include m ilitary aid, US 
foreign aid (net ODA). level o f  foreign direct investm ent and im m igration to the US.
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H ost country attributes can lead to mutual attraction between the US and foreign 
country-dyads and therefore correlate with congruent voting with the United States at the 
United N ations General Assem bly. They include m ilitary spending as a percentage o f  
GDP, educational spending as percentage o f  GDP, GDP per capita, level o f  state failure 
and state fragility, level o f  globalization and the level o f  dem ocracy. The relationships 
between these attributes and voting with the US at the UN General A ssem bly will be 
explained in this chapter. Control variables consist o f  geographical regions and the year.
Measures of bilateral relationships
Citizen diplom acy and  congruent voting at the U N G eneral Assem bly  
Elsewhere in this research, 1 argued that, w hether they take the form o f  altruistic 
volunteering or the form o f a foreign policy strategy, few  studies exist on the im pact o f  
international volunteers on the com m unities and countries they serve from the 
perspective o f  the com m unities served. However, the im pact o f these volunteer? or 
citizen diplom ats -  especially from the Peace Corps -  has been docum ented in over 50 
books, reports to Congress in the Congressional budget justifications, and by volunteers' 
participation in programs such as “ Speaker’s M atch”, prim arily from self-reporting.80
The validity o f  self-reported accom plishm ents by returned volunteers cannot be 
dism issed offhand, but it is im portant to recall studies that provide im petus for an 
alternative perspective on the volunteers’ accom plishm ents given post-volunteering 
conditions. For example, Hirshon. Eng, Brunknow  and Harxell report a study in which 
“approxim ately 25 percent o f volunteers wrho returned under regular circum stances
80 Peace Corps. “ Speakers M atch.” http:/A \\vw .peaceeorps.gov/w w s/speakersrnateh/ 
(W eb). Accessed 6-12-2012.
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experienced feelings o f depression" 81 am ong other known self-reporting problem s.82 
Given these and other problem s that citizen diplom ats experience, it is possible that their 
self-reported accom plishm ents are not w holly objective. A lso, since citizen diplom ats are 
intended to  affect the perception o f  the U nited States on the part o f  the countries, 
com m unities and peoples they serve, it is not expected that they would report failing.
It is possible that citizen diplom ats have no effect w hatsoever, m uch like som e 
scholars have asserted o f  foreign aid, on congruent voting w ith the US at the UN General 
Assem bly, or that the effect o f  citizen diplom acy on state congruent voting with the US 
cannot be m easured or isolated from other voting behavior explanans. H o w e v e r,! expect 
to find that citizen diplomats positively affect foreign countries perceptions o f  the US, 
which in turn is reflected in foreign states' congruent voting with the US at the UN 
General A ssem bly. From this expectation, I develop the general hypothesis that:
Haa: There is a positive correlation between citizen diplom at placement and  congruent 
voting with the US at the UN General Assem bly
M ilitary a id
Provision o f  m ilitary aid, much as m ilitary alliances likely do, is expected to cem ent the 
relationship between the US and the recipient country. Traditionally m uch o f  US military
81 See for example, Jon Mark H irshon. Thom as R. Eng, Katherine A. Brunkow , and 
N edra Hartxell. "Psychological and Readjustm ent Problem s Associated w ith Em ergency 
Evacuation o f  Peace Corps Volunteers. "Journal o f  Travel Medicine, 4, 3, (1997): 1.30: and Philip 
M. P odsakoff and Dennis W. Organ. "Self-R eports in Organizational Research: Problem s and 
Prospects.” Journal o f  Management, 12 no. 4 (W inter 1986): 531.
82 Lorraine M idanik. "The Validity o f  Self-Reported A lcohol C onsum ption and Alcohol 
Problem s: A Literature Review." British Journal o f  Addiction, 77, No. 4, (D ecem ber 1982): 359.
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assistance has gone to its allies or strategically placed countries and countries in w hich 
the US has an overw helm ing national security /  interest in. Such countries include, for 
exam ple. Egypt and Israel after the 1978 signing o f  the Cam p David accords. O ther 
countries receiving the highest am ounts o f  US m ilitary assistance in 2010 included 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Jordan. Somalia. Colom bia and Russia.8-’ The US m ilitary 
involvem ent in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan post-9 /11, for example dem onstrates the 
increased allocation o f  m ilitary assistance to that region, compared w ith the year 2000 
when Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Colom bia, Russia, Poland, M exico, Greece, Bahrain,
Thailand and Ecuador were the top recipients for US military' assistance.84
Historically, the US also provided m ilitary aid to autocratic governm ents such as 
Brazil in 1961, and to A rgentina and Peru in 1962. US m ilitary aid also supported 
successful and attem pted military coup d ’etats in Cuba, Guatemala, the D om inican 
Republic and Honduras.85 and accounted for over $500 m illion in m ilitary aid in the same 
period. M ilitary aid relative to increases in GNP per capita decreased during the 
1980’s.87 Poe and M eem ik also find that "leftist states can be considered o f  extrem e 
im portance to US strategic interests and rew arded with large aid packages as a result."88
83 USAID. "Detailed foreign assistance data." 
h ttp ://g b k .eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/deta iled.htinl (W eb). A ccessed 1/22/2013.
84 Ibid.
85 John Duncan Powell. "Military A ssistance and M ilitarism  in Latin A m erica." The 
Western Political Quarterly, 18, No. 2, Part 1 (Jun., 1965): 382.
86 M ichael J. Francis. "Military A id to  Latin Am erica in the US C ongress." Journal o f  
Inter-American Studies, 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1964): 389.
8' Steven C. Poe and Jam es M eernik. "US Military- Aid in the 1980s: A G lobal A nalysis." 
Journal o f Peace Research, 32 no. 4 (N ovem ber 1995): 406.
88 Ibid., 407.
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NATO states were given $360 m illion more than non-N A TO  countries, w hile Egypt and 
Israel received m ajority o f  US M ilitary aid as a result o f  the 1978 Cam p David Accords.
I expect that higher am ounts o f  military aid from the United States to the recipient 
country in the dyadic relationship will correlate w ith more congruent voting w ith the US 
at the UN General A ssem bly especially on key votes. W hile there m ay be other variables 
such as military' alliances not controlled for in this research, I nevertheless expect to find 
a positive correlation between US military' aid and voting w ith the U nited Stares at the 
United N ations G eneral Assem bly. The test hypothesis is:
H ai: M ilitary  a id  p o s itive ly  corre la tes w ith  h ig h er  congruen t voting w ith  the U S a t the  
U N  G enera l Assem bly.
In addition, I expect that countries receiving higher levels o f  US m ilitary aid will vote 
more in congruence with the US at the UN even on all UN General A ssem bly votes.
US fo re ig n  a id
Foreign aid is one o f  the clearest indicators o f  a country's attempt to affect the econom ic 
growth o f  another country. It can improve the bilateral relationship between the US and 
the recipient country. During the Cold War, econom ic assistance was a key m ethod o f  
insuring “attraction” for other countries to the Soviet or the US spheres o f  influence. The 
W ashington Consensus o f  the 1980s was a m eans o f  encouraging countries to m ove 
towards more dem ocratic and capitalistic societies by conditioning IM F and W orld Bank 
funding on dem ocratization and econom ic reform s. Y e t prior literature generally
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indicates that there is w eak or no correlation at ail between foreign aid and voting at the 
United N ations General Assem bly and that m ajority  o f  foreign aid is tied to political 
considerations and support for donors in bilateral and multilateral organizations.*9
Poe and M eem ik write that during the Cold W ar, the  US and the U SSR "used 
foreign aid to address international threats and opportunities to win or m aintain allies, to 
help countries fighting adversaries, and to encourage econom ic developm ent and thus, 
presum ably, political stability."90 I hypothesize therefore tha t there is no statistically 
significant correlation between foreign aid and congruent voting w ith the U S at the UN 
General A ssem bly. Therefore:
//«?.• H igher US fo re ig n  a id  a lloca tion  corre la tes w ith  h igher  congruent vo tin g  w ith  the  
U S a t the U N  G eneral A ssem b ly
F oreign D irect Investm ent
Foreign D irect Investm ent (FDI) is one o f  the ways that countries interact w ith each other 
econom ically and bilaterally; the m ost com m on form s o f these bilateral interactions are 
foreign aid and trade. There are differences in the way countries conceive o f  their 
financial and trade interactions in these bilateral relationships; trade favors stronger 
bilateralism  and responds to global market conditions. A lesina and D ollar allude to this
89 See, for example, Per Lundborg, "Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift 
Exchange." Economics A Politics, 10, (1998): 127-142; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Steven W. 
Hook. "US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: Did Reagan's Linkage Strategy Buy Deference or 
Defiance?" International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1991): 295-312 and Alberto Alesina, David 
Dollar. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal o f  Economic Growth, 5, No. 1 
(March 2000): 33-63, among others.
90 Steven C. Poe, and James Meemik. "US Military Aid in the 1980s: A Global 
Analysis." Journal o f  Peace Research, 32 no. 4 (November 1995): 399.
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difference, writing that "while foreign aid responds to political incentives, foreign direct 
investm ents are more sensitive to econom ic conditions in the receiving countries.”91
Interestingly, w hile foreign aid responds m ore directly to "politica l” openness 
(dem ocratization), FDI responds more to “econom ic” openness (im provem ent in policy 
m anagem ent, trade liberalization, better and protection o f  property rights).92 O ther 
perceived benefits -  for exam ple low er labor costs, favorable investm ent clim ates and 
proper infrastructure -  can help explain countries’ decisions to undertake foreign 
investm ents even in countries with different political systems. This m ay explain why US 
com panies, for example, continue to invest in. and do business with countries like China, 
Saudi Arabia, V enezuela and other countries with poor hum an rights despite this being at 
cross-purposes with US hum an-rights and dem ocratic ideals.
Foreign Direct investments are made in two directions: FDI into the USA from 
foreign countries, and FDI from the US to the recipient country. FDI in the US by foreign 
countries into the US is expected to correlate positively W'ith a positive perception o f  the 
US. However, this variable may correlate negatively with citizen diplom acy, since 
substantial FDI investm ent into the US indicates higher levels o f econom ic w ell-being by 
the investing country. A well-to-do country needs less assistance. I hypothesize that 
individuals and firms investing in the US perceive the US to have a favorable investm ent 
climate, increased potential for efficiencies and increased investm ent returns.
A caveat is in order. The hypothesized outcom es o f  the Foreign D irect Investm ent 
variable are pose a challenge to verification, given that investment into the US may take
’’ A lberto A lesina and David Dollar. W ho Gives Foreign A id to W hom  and W hv.>
Journal o f  Economic Growth, 5, No. 1 (2000): 34.
92 Ibid.
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the form o f  sovereign debt (e.g. investm ent by Chinese governm ent in US treasury 
bonds), rather than individuals' investm ents. For the purposes o f this research. I consider 
foreign direct investm ent in the more traditional sense o f land, labor, capital and firm s 
investing in a foreign country. An exam ple o f  these FDI investm ent processes is the 
mobile phone and com puter applications m anufacturing investm ents that the w ell-know n 
firm Apple, Inc., makes in China, including partnerships and subsidiaries such as 
Foxconn. Sovereign debt is therefore excluded from  this m easurem ent o f  FDI.
A ccording to the US Bureau o f  Econom ic A nalysis (BEA). there are num erous 
indicators that measure FDI into the US and abroad. For th is research, I used the D irect 
Investm ent & M ultinational Companies (MNCs) data  as an indicator o f  bilateral foreign 
direct investm ent. This data is further selected on "US direct investm ent abroad (outw ard 
direct investm ent ) -  ownership by a US investor o f  at least 10 percent o f  a foreign 
business" and the "Foreign direct investm ent in the United States (inw ard direct 
investment) -  ow nership by a foreign investor o f  at least 10 percent o f  a US business" 
indicators. “ Foreign D irect Investm ent Position in the United States on a H istorical-Cost 
Basis m easure'’ is the selection variable.93
FDI from Am erican com panies into foreign countries is expected to increase the 
positive intensity score o f  foreign publics' perception o f  the US. It is assum ed that foreign 
direct investm ent abroad creates jobs and therefore im proves peoples’ lives. The w orkers
93 O ther potential selection variables include: Financial Inflows W ithout C urrent-C ost 
A djustm ent, Equity Inflows, Reinvested Earnings W ithout Current-Cost A djustm ent. 
Intercom pany D ebt Inflows, D irect Investm ent Income W ithout Current-Cost A djustm ent, 
Royalties and License Fees Net o f  W ithholding Taxes, US A ffiliates’ Paym ents. R oyalties and 
License Fees N et o f  W ithholding Taxes, US A ffiliates’ Receipts, Royalties and L icense Fees Net 
o f  W ithholding Taxes, Net Paym ents. O ther Private Services, US Affiliates' Paym ents, O ther 
Private Services, US Affiliates' Receipts and O ther Private Services, Net Paym ents. For m ore on 
these m easures, see: Bureau o f  Econom ic A nalysis, “ International Data”, 
http://w w w .bea.gov/iTable/index_M N C .cfm . (W eb). Accessed 5/12/2012.
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are likely to identify with the philosophy o f  the com panies and the executives that ran  
them, which would hypothetically be pro-US. A high US FDI-abroad score will correlate 
positively with congruent voting with the US at the UN General A ssem bly as an 
expression o f  the relationship between the US and the foreign nation and also with the 
number o f  citizen diplomats.
A lthough the case o f  US investm ent in China dem onstrates that US econom ic 
concerns often trium ph preference for dem ocratic governance and respect for hum an 
rights in the target countries, A lesina and D ollar find that FDI responds to econom ic 
openness, often attributed to more dem ocratic countries. Therefore, I expect that 
countries that attract higher volum es o f  investment are more likely to vote w ith the US at 
the UN G eneral A ssem bly than those that do not due to the economic benefit they derive. 
The exceptions as noted previously include less or outright non-dem ocratic countries 
such as China, Hong Kong and Venezuela. Therefore;
Hay  H igh U S F oreign  D irect Investm ent recip ien ts vote m ore  in congruence  w ith  the US 
a t the U N  G eneral A ssem bly
Im m igration
The level o f  m igration into the US is expected to correlate positively w ith congruent 
voting with the US at the UN General Assem bly. Im m igration from foreign countries is 
likely to lead to increased rem ittances from the diaspora, a  perception o f  better welfare 
and standards o f  living abroad and therefore a positive perception o f  the U S. A 
preferential im m igration policy tow ards the second country in the dyadic relationship can
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therefore lead to congruent voting with the US at the UN General A ssem bly. For 
countries w hose representational interest groups have significant influence in the US, for 
exam ple the Am erican-Israeli Public A ffairs Council (AIPAC), the bilateral relationship 
-  and consequently voting at the UN G eneral Assem bly -  is likely to be stronger than 
countries where the bilateral relationship is weaker.
I expect that the level o f  interest in US governm ent policies, for exam ple on 
im m igration, w ill attract significant interest in M exico, C uba and other countries in Latin 
America w ith high im migration rates in to the US, and increase or decrease the mutual 
attraction between the countries. Overall, I expect that higher levels o f  global m igration 
into the US will correlate positively with congruent voting with the United S tates at the 
United Nations General Assembly.
Low  levels o f  im migration are expected to correlate with low er levels o f  foreign 
country congruent voting with the US at the UN General Assembly. H ow ever, since the 
US often allows immigration from  countries experiencing conflict, for exam ple Vietnam , 
Afghanistan, Iraq or Cuba, the findings m ight indicate a different finding, that in protest 
o f  im m igration and other foreign policies, such countries will not vote wdth the US at the 
LIN General Assem bly. Therefore, I expect that;
H c,4: H igher levels o f  im m igration  to  the U n ited  S la tes correlate w ith  m ore  congruen t 
vo ting  w ith  the U S a t the U N  G enera l A ssem bly
Host countries’ attributes
Some selected variables reflect in-country preferences, but have im plications for bilateral 
relations. Selection o f these variables is based in part on the areas o f  expertise and service
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in which the citizen diplom ats from the US are assigned, for example agriculture, 
education and small business developm ent. These variables include m ilitary spending and 
educational spending as percentage o f  GDP. a country’s G DP, extent o f  state failure and 
state fragility, the level o f  globalization and extent to w hich a country is dem ocratic. Each 
o f  these variables are hypothesized to affect the placem ent o f  citizen diplom ats, and by 
extension, affect the dyadic relationship between the IJS and the second country and the 
expected relationship is outlined in the hypotheses.
M ilitary  spend ing  as percen tage  o f  G D P
1 expect that higher military spending as percentage o f  GDP is likely to have a negative 
effect on congruent voting with the US on key votes -  and all votes -  at the UN G eneral 
Assembly. The more a country allocates to m ilitary spending, the less likely it is to 
receive US m ilitary assistance except in cases where the US has an alliance or a strategic 
interest. Since fewer insurgencies occur in dem ocratic countries, assum ing that 
dem ocratic processes allow' for alternative points o f  views to be tolerated and accounted 
for in governance through the opposition, the US is expected to provide few er military 
resources to governm ents that are less dem ocratic, and those that m ay suffer state 
fragility, save for Israel.
I hypothesize that low' military assistance will positively correlate w ith congruent 
voting w ith the US at the UN General Assem bly; the less military assistance a  country 
gets, the less it is likely to vote with the US. On the other hand, the US is expected to 
provide m ilitary assistance to countries where it has a strategic interest, for exam ple,
Israel, Egypt and Saudi A rabia and m em bers o f  NA TO  01 where it has m ilitary
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agreem ents. It is expected that higher m ilitary assistance w ill be positively correlated 
with congruent voting w ith the US at the UN General Assembly. I hypothesize that:
Ha$: C ountries w ith  h igher  m ilitary’ spend ing  as p e rcen ta g e  o f  G D P  vote m ore  in  
congruence  w ith  the U S a t  the U N  G enera l A ssem b ly
E duca tiona l spend ing  as p ercen ta g e  o f  G D P
Education is one o f  the areas in which countries can invest in order to im prove their long­
term  productivity, health and other HDI indicators. Education is also one o f  Peace C orps’ 
key areas o f operations; for exam ple, in 2012, 40 percent o f  Peace C orps volunteers 
worked in education, 23 percent in H ealth and HIV/AIDS. The other five sectors -  
business development, environm ent, youth developm ent, agriculture and "other" -  
com bined for 35 percent o f  the project areas o f  the Peace C orps.94 Education is an 
im portant area for the Peace Corps and the im portance is likely to be reflected in the 
volunteers placed and the funding priorities o f  USAID and the US governm ent.
Given these statistics, I expect that countries that allocate m ore o f  their resources 
tow ards education will receive m ore citizen diplom ats (volunteers) and will also vote 
m ore in congruence with the US at the UN General A ssem bly. I expect that education 
and citizen diplom ats' work in this area produces a higher convergence o f  interests, i.e. 
more mutual attraction. In addition, education is one o f the areas where citizen diplom ats 
are m ore likely to positively influence the perception o f the United States in foreign 
countries. 1 therefore expect to find that countries that spend a higher percentage o f  their
94 Peace Corps. “Congressional Budget Justification -  Fiscal Year 2012.’' 2012: 33, 
http://files.peacecorps.gov/manuals/cbi/2012.pdf. (Web). Accessed 1/23/2013.
106
GDP on education will vote m ore w ith the US at the UN General A ssem bly due to closer 
connections as a result o f  higher levels o f  funding and closer connections w ith the US 
through citizen diplomacy.
H a(l: C ountries w ith  h igher spen d in g  on educa tion  as a p ercen tage  o f  G D P  p e r  cap ita  
vo te  m ore  in congruence w ith  the U S a t the U N  G eneral A ssem bly
G D P  p e r  cap ita
GDP per capita is included as a predictor o f  how countries behave tow ards the US 
G enerally, the higher the GDP per capita, the better-off country is, and the less likely it is 
to receive citizen diplomats. Countries w ith higher GDP per capita are generally  more 
dem ocratic than countries with lower GDP per capita, and are more likely to  align with 
the US at the UN General A ssem bly. As a m easure o f  econom ic w ell-being, GDP per 
capita dem onstrates that countries have achieved some level o f  growth, that the citizens 
have access to resources and that they require less foreign socio-econom ic intervention 
through citizen diplom ats who mostly work in socio-econom ic developm ent capacities. 
Citizen diplom ats rarely serve in the wealthier, advanced industrial and O ECD  countries.
I expect to find that countries w ith a higher GDP per capita are m ore likely to be 
dem ocratic and therefore closer to the US in econom ic, political and social system s, and 
have less need for citizen diplom ats. Countries with a lower GDP per capita will have a 
higher foreign attraction index to the US (to achieve similar levels o f  developm ent) and 
are therefore more interesting to select for the study. Intuitively, I expect that higher GDP
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per capita will correlate with higher congruent voting w ith the US on key votes and on all 
votes at the United Nations General Assem bly. I develop the hypothesis that:
Ha?: Countries with a  higher GDP per capita vote more w ith the US at the U N G eneral 
Assem bly
State fa ilu re  and  slate frag ility
States that are ' ‘sim ply unable to function as independent entities" are defined as ‘failed 
states.5 The form er United Nations Secretary General Boutrous Boutrous Ghali defined 
failed states as characterized by collapse o f  state institutions and lawful use o f  force, 
breakdow n o f  law and order, general banditry, suspension o f  functions o f  governm ent, 
looting, destruction and displacem ent o f  the public.95 The exact definition o f  a  failed state 
is contested but generally implies a country that is unable to provide the traditional 
functions o f  a W eberian state to its citizens.
I expect that state failure w ill correspond with low numbers o f  citizen diplom ats, 
and a low incidence o f  congruent voting with the US at the UN General A ssem bly. The 
reasons thereo f are varied. At one point or another on their road to failure and com plete 
breakdown, the US often finds itself involved in reversing such failure. The outcom es 
have not always been positive. Exam ples o f  negative outcomes, w hether as a result of, or
95 T he com plete quote according to Daniel Thlirer was: “A feature o f  such conflicts is the 
collapse o f  state institutions, especially the police and jud iciary , W'ith resulting paralysis o f  
governance, a breakdown o f  law and order, and general banditry and chaos. N ot only are the 
functions o f  governm ent suspended, but its assets are destroyed or looted and experienced 
officials are killed or flee the country. This is rarely the case in inter-state w ars. It m eans that 
international intervention must extend beyond military- and hum anitarian tasks and m ust include 
the prom otion o f  international reconciliation and the re-establishm ent o f effect ive governm ent.5’ 
See: Daniel Thiirer. "The 'failed State1 and International law . " International Review o f  the Red  
Cross, N o. 836 (Dec, 1999).
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despite US involvement, include Som alia in 1993, Iraq in 1990 and in 2003. A fghanistan 
in 2001 to present. Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2011 to present where the US is perceived 
to be insufficiently involved and w here the outcom es are uncertain. T he US has 
alternately been accused o f  m eddling, or not being involved enough, and its involvem ent 
is often negatively perceived. In addition, the insecurity and breakdown o f  law and order 
in a country sliding into chaos presents obvious challenges to  any citizen diplom ats due 
to risks o f  kidnapping and other insecurities.
Failing states tire not territorially, econom ically or politically cohesive. They have 
fractured governm ents, often pitting one ethnicity against another; they m ay have equally 
fractured positions on different issues. Therefore, their voting patterns at the UN General 
A ssem bly may differ. W hen a state is fragile or failing, it is difficult to negotiate with the 
elites o f  such a state, who m ight not be cohesive. Therefore the expression o f  preferences 
does not always reflect the state’s priorities. A key exam ple o f  this is the current Som alia 
governm ent, which has long conducted its affairs from Nairobi, Kenya, and m ost 
recently, from  the ten blocks it controls in M ogadishu. Somalia.
1 expect a negative correlation between UN General A ssem bly voting and state 
fragility: the more fragile a state is, the less likely the state is to vote w ith the US at the 
UN General Assembly. This is because o f  the state’s fragility, factionalization o f  elites, 
and lack o f  recognition o f  a  governm ent by the United N ations and the U nited States. 
Fragile, failing and failed states often have governm ent changes through unconstitutional 
means, and in the case o f civil wars, often have com peting representation in bilateral 
relations and multilateral institutions. Internationally, countries’ voting patterns often 
lead to m issed votes due to logistical issues or contested representation. W ithin the
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country, the relationship with the US is com plicated by the lack o f  diplom atic 
accreditation or expulsion o f  US diplom atic representatives from those countries, as 
expression o f  disagreem ent with the US position on different issues, especially  those that 
concern issues o f  security, terrorism  and other im portant issues.
The problem s o f a fragile, failing and failed state are not only found at the 
bilateral or multilateral level; failure has im plications for the failing’s state citizens. 
M allaby w rites that “ once a nation descends into violence, its people focus on im m ediate 
survival rather than on the longer term , including external relations. Savings, investm ent 
and w ealth creating taper off; governm ent officials seek spoils for their cronies rather 
than designing policies that m ight build long-term prosperity .”961 hypothesize that;
Has: F ailed  states vote less in congruence w ith the US at the UN G eneral A ssem bly
Level o f  globalization
Scholars argue that over the past twenty years, globalization has intensified and 
accelerated significantly. Roland Robertson argues that globalization is a recent 
phenom enon and "is intimately related to m odernity and m odernization, as w ell as to 
postm odernity and ‘postm odernization.’"97 Stiglitz considers globalization to be "the 
removal o f  barriers to free trade and the closer integration o f  national econom ies" and a
96 Sebastian M allaby. "The Reluctant Im perialist - Terrorism , Failed States, and the Case 
for Am erican Empire." Foreign Affairs, 81 No. 2 (2002): 2-4
97 Roland Robertson. "M apping the Global Condition; G lobalization as the Central 
Concept." M ike Featherstone. Ed. Global culture: nationalism, globalization, and modernity: a 
Theory, culture society special issue. (N ew bury Park, London: Sage Publications, 1990): 20.
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force for good, especially for the poor.98 A ppardurai suggest globalization is linked with 
modernity: "globalization has shrunk the distance between elites, shifted key relations 
between producers and consum ers, broken many links between labor and fam ily life, and 
obscured the lines between tem porary locales and im aginary national attachm ents."99
A ppardurai further touches on a key aspect o f  globalization, culture. A ppardurai 
writes that developm ental m odernization "is often punctuated, interrogated, and 
dom esticated by the m icro narratives o f  film , television, m usic and other expressive 
forms, which allow  modernity to be rew ritten m ore as a vernacular g lobalization ."100 It is 
easier to know in a global instant the events occurring in different parts o f  the world, 
beam ed into the living rooms o f  billions worldwide. Recent exam ples include protests in 
Tahrir Square in Egypt at the beginning o f  the A rab Spring in 2011; the 25-year house 
arrest o f  Aung Sun Syu K i; the current Syria crisis; and even more pow erfully, the 
visibility o f  the warlord Joseph Kony in a “Kony 2012“ docum entary.10' This awareness 
is what Apparduarai argues are "diasporic public spheres tha t such encounters create are 
no longer small, m arginal or exceptional. They are part o f the cultural dynam ic o f  urban
98 Joseph E Stiglitz. Globalization and its discontents. ("New York: W .W . N orton. 2002): 
Introduction, pp. ix.
99 Arjun A ppadurai. Modernity at large: cultural dimensions o f  globalization. 
(M inneapolis, M N: University o f  M innesota Press, 1996): 9-10.
100 Ibid., 10.
l0‘ Kony 2012 is a documentary' about "invisible children", children o f  the 25-year civil 
war in Northern U ganda, detailing killings, abductions, forced and early m arriage and the effects 
that the civil war has had on the children and their fam ilies. The docum entary’ can be view ed at: 
http ://w w w .kony2012.com/
life and in m ost countries and continents, in which m igration and m ass m ediation co- 
constitute a new sense o f  the global as m odem  and the m odem  as g lobal."102
The spread o f  globalization is increasing aw areness o f  global experiences, which 
individuals characterize as either com patible or incom patible with their ow n values (for 
exam ple, tolerance for political opposition, free speech and women's rights). The global 
publics can then exert pressure on their governm ents to signal to the second country their 
(dis)satisfaction. A good exam ple o f  this pressure can be imputed from  the events o f  the 
Arab Spring beginning in 2011. A reciprocal relationship can be expected where dyadic 
levels o f  globalization are high As Pew Global research shows, foreign countries 
frequently express their opinions on the U nited States and US foreign po licy .
The levei o f  globalization is expected to be positively con-elated with congruent 
voting w ith the US at the UN General A ssem bly, in part reflecting the role o f  technology 
in im proving econom ic production. For exam ple, in 1970, the highest globalization 
indices w ere observed in W estern European, N orth Am erican and other O EC D  countries, 
which have also traditionally enjoyed higher levels o f  industrialization, m echanization *
and higher GDPs. The richer a country is. the higher its globalization index is likely to 
be. This can be explained by the fact that in richer countries, individuals have more 
disposable incom e, and can buy other accessories such as TVs, cable, access to  internet, 
faster je t travel and other com m unication opportunities. H igh levels o f  globalization do 
not cause congruent voting. Rather, it is the correlation between high levels o f  
globalization and GDP per capita and its relationship with dem ocracy that m ight explain 
the positive correlation in the globalization index and voting behavior. The level o f
102 A ppardurai. Modernity at large: 10.
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globalization can cause an indirect effect on congruent voting with the US at the UN 
General Assem bly through its correlation with other variables.
. Since richer countries are more globalized and therefore need less assistance with 
their social and econom ic developm ent, globalization index will negatively correlate with 
the num ber o f  citizen diplom ats and also with foreign aid. It will correlate positively  with 
GDP per capita. It is expected to correlate positively with level o f dem ocracy. In the 
regression statistics in the following chapter, I will test for evidence o f  high levels o f  
collinearity between levels o f  dem ocracy, GDP per capita and level o f  globalization. 
R icher nations are also expected to be more dem ocratic. O ECD  countries exhibit higher 
levels o f  dem ocracy and cultural sim ilarity with the US. Because o f  conditions incidental 
to their socio-political systems, these countries may enjoy mutual attraction that excludes 
the effects o f  citizen diplomats. 1 hypothesize that:
Haia: Technolog ica lly  a dvanced  countries vote m ore in congruence w ith  the U S a t the  
U N  G enera l Assem bly.
P o lity  score: level o f  dem ocracy
The system o f  governm ent often dictates the presence, direction and strength o f  bilateral 
and multilateral relationships between countries. To illustrate this concept, N incic argues 
“that the fabric o f  internal politics and foreign policy are interwoven is an im portant but 
not a novel idea.”’03 Nincic dem onstrates this by showing how the US Senate thw arted 
President W oodrow W ilson's attem pt to jo in  the League o f  Nations by non-ratification o f
l'>3 Miroslav Nincic. Democracy and foreign policy: the fallacy o f political realism. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1992): 1.
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the Treaty o f  V ersailles.104 W hile W ilson was in favor of. and cam paigned vigorously for 
the treaty to be ratified by the Senate, dem ocratic processes disallow ed ratification.
The foreign policy behavior o f  dem ocracies often leads to the perception that such 
dem ocracies m ay be interfering in other countries’ internal affairs.10:> Savun and Phillips 
find that "states that are actively involved in international politics are likely to create 
resentm ent abroad and hence m ore likely to be the target o f  transnational terrorism . 
Democratic states are m ore likely to be targeted by transnational terrorists not because o f 
their regime type per se but because o f  the type o f  foreign policy they tend to pu rsue."106 
This is because "democracies have incentives to prom ote dem ocracy abroad and do so 
through a broad range o f  m eans."10'
The Systemic Peace Institu te’s Ted Robert Gurr, M onty G. M arshall and K eith 
Jaggers have previously produced the Polity IV data  on Political Regim e Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800 - 2010. A m ong the several categories o f  data in the specific Polity 
IV data is a Polity II category which tracks the level o f democracy or political openness 
in different countries. Scores range from -10 to 10 where -10 is a totally  authoritarian 
regim e and 10 is a com pletely free country. I expect that countries that dem onstrate 
higher levels o f  tolerance but are poor are more likely to receive citizen diplom ats in
104 Ibid. 2.
105 See for exam ple, Sharon K. Horn, "Female Infanticide in China: T he Hum an Rights 
Specter and Thoughts tow ards (A n) O ther V ision." Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 23
(1991): 249; also, Mark J. Leavy. "D iscrediting Hum an Rights A buse as an A ct o f  State: A  Case 
Study on the Repression o f  the Falun Gong in China and C om m entary on International Human 
R ights Law in US Courts." Rutgers Law Journal. 35, (2003-2004): 749; A ndrew  J. N athan. 
"Hum an Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy." The China Quarterly. 139(1994): 622-643.
106 Burcu Savun and Brian J. Phillips. "Dem ocracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism ." 
Journal o f  Conflict Resolution, 53. No. 6 (D ecem ber 2009): 879.
107 Ibid.
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order to facilitate their transform ation into a western, liberal dem ocracy. It is also 
expected that dem ocratic countries m ay vote more frequently with the US at the UN 
General A ssem bly than mixed or authoritarian political systems. I hypothesize that:
H aii : D em ocra tic  countries vote m ore  in congruence  w ith the US a t the  U N  G enera l 
A ssem b ly  than  non-dem ocra tic  countries.
Control factors
Tem poral and regional variables m ay help explain the variation in congruence in voting 
with the US at the UN General A ssem bly. The tw o major control factors (variables) in 
this study are the year and the region. Since the beginning o f  placem ent o f  citizen 
diplom ats in foreign countries in 1961, various geopolitical events that d irectly  affect the 
need for citizen diplom ats have taken place. These have included the entrenchm ent o f  
ideological differences between the US and the-then USSR, and the gradual econom ic 
developm ent, for exam ple in India and China, the integration o f several form er W arsaw 
Pact countries such as the Czech Republic, S lovakia and M oldova, am ong others, in the 
European Union and therefore receiving allocations from the European U nion, 
conceivably dim inishing the need for citizen diplom ats in those and other countries.
Regional differences m ight also affect the placem ent o f  citizen diplom ats and 
therefore, the perception effects that regions have on congruent voting w ith the US at the 
UN  General Assembly. The study identifies six continental regions: N orth A m erica, 
South A m erica and the Caribbean, O ceania, Asia, Europe and Africa. The 1950-1960
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decade witnessed a significant increase in the num ber o f  countries in the international 
system as they becam e independent or broke apart from federations and unions.
In A frica for exam ple, o f  the 54 countries recognized by the A frican Union -  and 
the United Nations -  seven countries gained independence before 1960. A nother 19 
countries became independent in I9 6 0 .108 They required a lot o f assistance in developing 
their systems and infrastructure; the citizen diplom ats assisted in such developm ent. This 
assistance was provided within the context o f  the Cold W ar ideological divide between 
the "West" and the "East". Much o f  post-independence East and South A sia was 
em broiled in conflict or faced sim ilar challenges o f  cohesion, peace and nation-building.
By the early 1990s, the Soviet Union was disintegrating, negating the m ost 
plausible reason for the advent o f  citizen diplomacy -  that is, containing Soviet expansion 
to the new world. I expect therefore, that as the geopolitical landscape changed, the need 
for citizen diplom acy decreased. A fter 1990, despite their location and because o f  the 
prim acy o f  dem ocracy and capitalism  as the prim ary ideologies, countries would vote 
more consistently w ith the United States at the UN General Assem bly.
Regional and temporal differences are often correlated. Most A frican countries 
w ere quite poor and underdeveloped when they becam e independent. They benefitted 
from the placem ent o f  citizen diplom ats as much as they bore the brunt o f  East-W est 
ideological battles. Southeast A sia w as also fairly underdeveloped, but through the 
pursuit o f  different econom ic m odels and strategies developed econom ically faster than 
African countries. In their econom ically m arginalized state, I expect that different 
countries that received citizen diplom ats were more likely to vote with the US at the UN
m  IPOAA. "independence Y ears and Dates o f  African Countries." 
http://ipoaa.com /african_independence.htm . (W eb). A ccessed 1/23/2013.
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G eneral A ssem bly given the foreign aid and citizen diplom at assistance they attracted. 
Therefore, I expect to find some correlation betw een citizen diplom acy and some regions.
Regional differences are im portant, even in regions that do not benefit from  
citizen diplom acy or other instrum ents o f  bilateral cooperation such as foreign aid or 
m ilitary aid. OECD countries and O ceania are regions with higher levels o f  econom ic 
developm ent, and therefore less likely to receive citizen diplomats. The correlation 
between variables such as level o f  globalization, GDP per capita and levels o f  
dem ocratization and sim ilarity with the US are m ore likely to account for congruent 
voting w ith the US at the UN G eneral Assem bly. This is the case especially given the 
lim itation o f  citizen diplom acy from the US to these countries.
Temporal effects are also expected to show a gradual reduction in the num ber o f 
citizen diplom ats placed in different countries. The Peace C orps’ m ission ’s three goals 
include helping the people o f  interested countries in m eeting their need for trained m en 
and wom en; helping prom ote a better understanding o f  Americans on the part o f  the 
peoples served; and helping prom ote a better understanding o f  other peoples on the part 
o f  A m ericans.109 It is expected that w ith time, countries will more independently  train 
their own m anpow er, utilize tools o f  m odem  com m unication (TV, internet, radio and 
other popular culture) to learn about A m ericans and others with this they will gain more 
understanding o f  Am ericans w ithout the actual presence o f  citizen diplom ats in these 
countries. Therefore, over time, it is expected that citizen diplom acy will correlate less 
w ith congruent voting with the US at the UN General Assembly. I develop the following 
regional and tem poral effects hypotheses:
m  Peace Corps. "M ission." http://w w w .peacecorps.gov/about/m ission/. (W eb). Accessed 
1/23/2013.
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H a i2 : There is no variation in reg ions ’ congruence  in vo ting  with the  U S a t the U N  
G enera l A ssem b ly
C onclusion
This chapter has outlined the theoretical underpinnings o f  the twelve hypotheses that will 
be tested in the following chapter. It has outlined the three factors o f  organization, which 
are first, factors o f  bilateral cooperation, w hich outline specific dyadic relationships 
between the US and a second country. These factors include bilateral exchanges such as 
foreign direct investm ent (FDI), foreign aid, m ilitary assistance and im m igration to the 
US, am ong others. Secondly, it outlined the host country factors that can lead a citizen- 
diplom at recipient country to align its foreign policy behavior more w ith the US as shown 
by congruent voting with the US at the UN General Assembly.
These host country factors include level o f  dem ocratization, level o f  state failure 
and state fragility and the level o f  globalization am ong other variables. These factors can 
influence the decisions, levels and num bers o f  citizen diplom ats placed in the foreign 
countries. The chapter then outlined the third group o f  factors o f organization, w hich are 
the tem poral (year) and regional effects and how they are hypothesized to affect foreign 
states behavior tow ards the US as dem onstrated by congruence in voting with the US at 
the UN General Assembly. The next chapter will test the hypotheses that have been 
developed in this chapter and present the results.
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CH A PTER IV 
M ETH O D O LO G Y
Introduction
The previous chapter argued that international volunteering -  citizen diplom acy -  serves 
foreign policy purposes and is therefore a foreign policy strategy. There is a dearth o f  
studies on how  volunteering changes foreign nationals’ and nations’ perception o f  the 
United States or leads a country to align its foreign policy preferences with those o f  the 
United States. To address this deficit, this research investigates the correlation betw een 
factors o f mutual attraction, host country factors and tem poral and regional variables with 
countries’ foreign policy behavior in dyadic relationships specifically w ith the United 
States. Controlling for rival explanations, the research evaluates this correlation by 
investigating countries' congruence in voting with the US at the UN G eneral A ssem bly, 
and how  dyadic relationships w ith the US correlate with such voting.
The objective o f  the research is to evaluate the efficacy o f citizen diplom acy as a 
foreign policy strategy, using both qualitative and quantitative statistics by applying a 
m ixed-m ethods research design. Overall, I hypothesize that citizen diplom acy is 
effective, and citizen diplomats, through their service, are transm itting values considered 
to cause mutual attraction between the US and other countries in a dyadic relationship. I 
hypothesize that those countries which receive US assistance -  both in term s o f  foreign 
aid and citizen diplomacy -  vote m ore with the US at the UN General A ssem bly than 
countries that do not. The third expectation is that citizens -  foreign o r otherw ise -  
differentiate between state-level interactions and individual /  societal level interactions.
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A t the individual level, I hypothesize that even under foreign governm ent sponsorship, 
im portant and m utually attractive relationships are formed. These relationships affect 
bilateral relationships and influence the frequency o f  voting with the US at the UN 
G eneral Assem bly.
This chapter proceeds as follows: it introduces and justifies the use o f  m ixed 
m ethods, and then outlines the qualitative and quantitative sections o f  the study. It 
outlines the study variables, their coding in the dataset and the sources o f  the data. The 
following chapter presents the results o f  the quantitative analysis.
Research design: mixed methods research
The m ixed m ethods approach is an em erging research paradigm  that integrates both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to  social inquiry. For this research, m ixed 
m ethods are m ost suited for the type o f  study. The quantitative research com ponent, 
through the selected variables, paints the broad strokes o f  the expected interactions 
between the dependent, independent and control variables, using statistical approaches. 
The quantitative variables are broad and aggregated over countries, regions and time. 
U sing quantitative research, we can synthesize the broad outlines o f  phenom ena, 
although this does not give us specificity. These broad outlines often require more 
specific explanations to account for the observed variations, and this is where the 
qualitative research approaches and m ethods are im portant especially w hen used in 
conjunction w ith the quantitative research methods.
The qualitative case studies allow  a researcher to m ore closely investigate specific 
cases and hypothesize the reasons for the outcom es. Qualitative case studies are m ore
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specific and take into account regional, spatial and other considerations that m ay alter the
results or differ from one place to another w here the same phenom enon is observed.
Q ualitative case studies help a researcher to instigate the intervening factors that are not
always captured in the data and statistics. Thus, qualitative case studies provide a more
nuanced explanation and allow the researcher to m ore validly explain the differences
across countries and cases.
The use o f  mixed m ethods is gaining w ider acceptance in social inquiry. Brew er
and Hunter, for exam ple, argue the necessity o f  proper measurem ent -  presum ably
encom passing both qualitative and quantitative m easures -  writing that "empirical
m easurem ent is essential to determ ine the nature and frequency o f social phenom ena." To
do so, it is equally im portant to "know what to measure and to choose appropriate
m ethods."110 The utility o f  the mixed / m ulti-m ethod approach is to "explicitly solve
problem s at other stages o f  the research process as well as to answer m ore narrow ly
defined questions o f m easurem ent validity" such as the im pact of citizen d ip lom ats.111
Creswell defines mixed m ethods research as
a research design with philosophical assum ptions as well as m ethods o f  inquiry. 
As a m ethodology, it involves philosophical assum ptions that guide the direction 
o f  the collection and analysis o f  data and the m ixture o f  qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in many phases in the research process. As a  m ethod, it 
focuses on collecting, analyzing, and m ixing both quantitative and qualitative data 
in a single study or series o f  studies. Its central prem ise is that the use o f  
quantitative and qualitative approaches in com bination provides a better 
understanding o f  research problem s than either approach alone.112
' 10 John Brewer and A lbert Hunter. Foundations o f  Multimethod Research: Synthesizing 
styles. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 2006): 8.
111 Ibid.. 9.
112 John W. Creswell and Vicki L. Plano Clark. Designing and Conducting Mixed 
Methods Research. 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: 2011): 5.
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Greene defines the mixed m ethods approach as "an orientation toward social inquiry that 
actively invites us to participate in dialogue about m ultiple ways o f  seeing and hearing, 
m ultiple ways o f  m aking sense o f  the social world, and m ultiple standpoints on w hat is 
im portant and to be valued and cherished."113 M ixed m ethods are especially  utilitarian in 
their application as shown in G reene and Caracelli, who state that "these m ethods 
[observation and interview'] were invaluable in helping her [hypothetical researcher, 
Wanda] to understand, interpret and contextualize ... identities."114
In applying mixed methods to the evaluation o f  sep/ice organization m odels that 
are quite relevant to this research, Touati el a l find that the results o f  such approaches "do 
not lend them selves to an instrumental use", i.e. they have no utility for policy-m aking. 
They also find that the approaches "are instead better suited to either a 'conceptual' use, ' 
corresponding to an enlightenm ent function” i.e. deepening the understanding o f  the 
subject m atter and thereby help to persuade individuals to collaborate in the achievem ent 
o f  a goal.11 s According to Evans, Coon and IJme, studies o f  the mixed m ethods nature
11' Jennifer C. Greene. "Is M ixed M ethods Social Inquiry a Distinctive M ethodology?" 
Journal o f  Mixed Methods Research, 2008 2: 7. See also Jennifer C. Greene and V alerie 
Caracelli. "M aking paradigm atic sense o f  m ixed m ethods practice." in Abbas Tashakkori and 
Charles Eddlie. Eds. Handbook o f  Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research. (T housand 
Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2003): 91-2.
IH Jennifer C. G reene and Valerie J. Caracelli. "M aking Paradigm atic Sense o f  M ixed 
M ethods Practice”. In Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie, Eds. A Handbook o f  Mixed 
Methods in Social & Behavioral Research. (Thousand Oaks. CA: 2003): 91.
1,5 N assera Touati, Raynald Pineault, Francois C ham pagne, Jean-Louis D enis, Astrid 
Brousselle, A ndre-Pierre Contandriopoulos and Robert Geneau. "Evaluating Service 
O rganization M odels: The Relevance and M ethodological C hallenges o f a C onfigurational 
Approach." Evaluation 15 (2009): 375.
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"must com bine qualitative and quantitative research in viewpoints, data collection and 
analysis, and inferences."11 b
Q uantitative research com ponent
Since this is a mixed methods research study, it is im portant to set the term s for the 
research questions, hypotheses form ulation, data analysis and conclusions that will follow  
this and other subsequent chapters. Quantitative m ethods in (social and pure) scientific 
inquiry "focus attention on m easurem ents and am ounts o f  the characteristics displayed by 
the people and events that the researcher studies."’17 Thom as observes that the m ulti­
m ethod quantitative analysis provides a researcher w ith tools that provide best, but not 
necessarily rival explanations given the difference m the types o f know ledge a researcher 
is seeking and the data or variables available to the research e r.'18
King, Keohane and Verba write that "quantitative research uses num bers and 
statistics methods It tends to be based on numerical m easurements o f  specific aspects o f  
phenom ena; it abstracts from particular instances to seek general description or to test 
causa! hypotheses; it seeks m easurem ents and analyses that are easily replicable by other 
researchers."119 Quantitative researchers formulate research questions or hypotheses, 
whose variables are then categorized. Researchers perform statistical tests on the
1,6 Bron wvnne C. Evans, David W. Coon, and Ebere L'me. ‘'Use o f  Theoretical 
Fram ew orks as a Pragm atic G uide for M ixed M ethods Studies: A M ethodological N ecessity?’’ 
Journul o f Mixed Methods Research, 5(4) 276.
H / R, M urray Thom as. Blending qualitative & quantitative research methods in theses 
and dissertations. (Thousand Oaks, C a lif : Corwin Press. 2003): 1.
us Ibid.
1,9 Gary King, Robert O K eohane and Sidney Verba. Designing social inquiry : scientific 
inference in qualitative research. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994): 3-4.
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independent, dependent and control variables to determ ine their effects on the subject o f  
inquiry.120 Bernard provides a simple characterization o f  quantitative analysis, w riting 
that such analysis "in the social sciences involves reducing people as observed directly  or 
through their texts to num bers."121 This reduction therefore can miss out on im portant 
explanations and differences.
This research will begin by utilizing quantitative research m ethods to determ ine to 
what extent citizen diplom acy correlates with state signaling behavior -  congruent voting 
-  with the US at the UN General Assem bly, after controlling for effects o f  other bilateral 
and m ultilateral interactions between the US on the one hand and 191 countries in a 
dyadic relationship w ith the US. The research recognizes tha t even controlling for other 
possible explanatory effects such as im migration, bilateral foreign direct investm ent,
GDP per capita, foreign and m ilitary aid, am ong others, it is not possible to claim with 
absolute confidence that the correlations are actually causation. At best, the research will 
dem onstrate the significance o f  citizen diplom acy and other variables in explaining 
correlations am ong votes. The findings in the quantitative section w ill be further 
buttressed by the findings as outlined in the qualitative section that follows.
Q ualitative research component
In the study and conduct o f  citizen diplomacy, it is im portant to rely on the statistical 
tests that allow the research to test inferred foreign policy behavior tow ards the U S, but 
also consider other ways o f  understanding the same behavior. As is often the case in
120 ibid.
1“‘ Harvey Russell Bernard. Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and  
Quantitative Approaches. 5'1' Ed. (Plym outh, UK: A ltaM ira Press, 2011). 338.
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relations between nations, the expression o f  support through public statem ents is vital to 
credibility and expression o f  intentions. Previously, the research discussed the 1990 Iraq 
invasion o f  Kuwait and the then-president G eorge H. W. B ush 's public statem ent that 
“this aggression shall not stand”, and how  such signaling often sets the political and 
strategic course for the United States and other powers. Signaling can be quite difficult to 
capture from a statistical perspective and therefore, qualitative explanations suffice.
In the case o f  citizen diplom ats, there have been expulsions, for exam ple from  
Bolivia in 1969/1970. It is im portant to consider these cases whose m erits cannot be 
adequately captured by the data showing, for exam ple, that there w ere zero (0) Peace 
Corps V olunteers in Bolivia in 1970. Here, the explanation for having no citizen 
diplom ats matters. For this and other reasons, the research will, in the second portion o f  
the research design and m ethodology, turn  to qualitative analysis o f  selected cases.
A ccording to M urray, qualitative m ethods "involve a  researcher describing 
[kinds] o f  characteristics o f  people and events w ithout comparing events in term s o f 
m easurem ents or amounts."®22 This type o f research “ is multi-m ethod in focus, involving 
an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter" through studies o f  the subject 
in their natural environm ent, i.e. w ithout any attem pt to control for any o f  the variables 
involved in such interactions. On qualitative research. King, Keohane and V erba write 
that "qualitative research covers a wide range o f  approaches, but by definition, none o f  
these approaches relies on numerical m easurem ents. Such work has tended to focus on 
one or a small num ber o f  cases, to use intensive interviews or depth analysis o f  historical
,~2 M urray. Blending qualitative & quantitative research methods in theses and  
dissertations. 1.
materials, to be discursive in method, and to be concerned with a rounded or 
com prehensive account o f  som e event or unit."12j
Further support for the use o f  qualitative m ethods in social science research is 
found in Balnaves and Caputi. who write that, "case studies investigate 'w hat is 
happening' and are very com m on in policy research and in exploratory w ork ."124 Cresw ell 
holds that "in a qualitative study, inquirers state research questions, not objectives -  i.e. 
specific goals for the research -  or hypotheses. The research questions assum e two forms, 
a central question and associated question."125
Asking the broadest question, according to Creswell, and follow ing it w ith some 
sub-questions, is a m ost profiway to approach the qualitative study. B ernard writes that 
"most qualitative analysis involves reducing people to words -  your w ords about the 
m eaning o f  their words or actions or artifacts."126 This research will follow' in the 
tradition o f  exam ining case studies as an additional, complimentary' m ethod o f  
determ ining the impact o f  citizen diplom ats on state behavior.
Q uantitative variables and measures
Since Nye defines "soft power" as mutual attraction, the analogy o f  w ooing an individual 
com es to mind. W ooing cannot succeed uni-dim ensionally; it is expected that a country- 
wooing another will pull out ail the stops -  flowers, dinner, phone calls -  here equated
122 King; Keohane and Verba. Designing social inquiry. 4.
U4 Balnaves, Mark and Peter Caputi. Introduction to Quantitative Research Methods: An
Investigative Approach. (London: Sage. 2001): 66-67.
I2- John W Creswell. Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and m ixed methods 
approaches. (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2009): 129.
126 Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology’... (2011): 338.
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w ith citizen diplomacy, high FDL consistent and substantial foreign aid. ease in obtaining 
visas and other positive indices o f  a positive relationship. For this study, the process o f  
‘wooing other countries5 is expressed in term s o f variables that explain the relationships 
or interaction points between the countries. I identify three categories o f  variables: 
independent, dependent and control variables.
Operationalization of variables
This research synthesizes current approaches to international volunteering with national 
interest and foreign policy im plications, leading to findings that can be generalized across 
nations utilizing such soft power strategies. It also leads to the form ulation o f  theories 
that can be used to explain the success, or lack thereof, o f  international volunteering as a
• 127foreign policy strategy. One o f  the key steps in any research project is the 
operationalization o f  v a riab les .128 O perationalization o f  variable? refers to "defining a 
concept or variable so that it can be m easured or expressed quantitatively ."129
Operationalization o f variables involves two steps: form ulating a conceptual 
definition (what the variable / concept m eans) and form ulating an operational definition, 
i.e. how to m easure it.130 Variables, w'hen used in ordinary terms, can represent different
,27 Bobby J. Calder, Lynn W. Phillips. A lice M. Tybout. "Designing R esearch for 
A pplication." Journal o f Consumer Research, 8, No. 2 (Sep., 1981): 197-207.
128 On the im portance o f  variable operationalization, see: C ipriano Forza. "The im pact o f  
inform ation system s on quality perform ance: an em pirical study." International Journal o f  
Operations & Production Management, 15, 6 (1995) and K athleen E. Grady. “ Sex B ias in 
Research D esign.” Psychology.’ o f  Women Quarterly, 5 (1981): 62.
129 “O perationalization.” wwv> dietionary-refcrence.com . (W eb). A ccessed 2/13/2013.
1,0 Richards. “C hapter 3. O perationalizing." 
h ttp ://w w w .sfu.ea/personal/archivesVichards/Zen/Paaes/C hap3.htm  (W eb). A ccessed 2/13/2013.
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m eanings and be m easured in a num ber o f  ways, the definition o f a variable is often 
based on specificity o f  jargon in specific disciplines, in this case, political science. In 
addition, operationalization allows for specification o f  how  the variables w ill be 
m easured in quantifiable  terms. The unit o f  analysis (the object which w ill be described 
in term s o f  the research variables) o f  the cum ulative effect o f  citizen diplom acy on 
congruent voting behavior with the US at the UN G eneral Assem bly will be 
"interactional variables" which are the independent variables.131 These “ interactional 
variables" will prim arily express a non-essentially reciprocal or equal relationship, for 
exam ple citizen diplom acy (sent from one country to  another).
Variables, variable groups and coding
The study variables are coded into three m ajor groups. These groups p rovide a general 
expectation o f  the interactions between the dyads. The host country attributes, for 
instance, are present in the citizen recipient country; the factors o f bilateral /  mutual 
attraction happen between the two countries, and the third group o f  variables, tem poral / 
regional variables, consider the interactions o f  the dyad over time and region. The 
findings help explain the sources o f  foreign countries behavior towards the US, and the 
'interactional factors' represented by the variables are im portant in explaining the variable 
effect on the country's behavior. M em bership in the UN is interpreted as a forum  for 
international interactions and signaling. The U nited Nations Organization is selected as it 
is the all-inclusive m em bership o f  m ost countries in the international system .
L I Andrew Brown. Paul Dowling. Doing Research/Reading Research: A mode o f  
interrogation fo r  education. ( PA. Bristol Press, 1995): 27.
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The bilateral attraction factors include bilateral and m ultilateral interactions 
between the US and the dyadic state. They include the num ber o f citizen  diplom ats that 
the US sends to any the recipient country, levels o f  direct investm ent betw een the US and 
the foreign country, am ounts o f  foreign Aid the US gives and levels o f  m igration to the 
US. The expectation is that higher levels o f  m igration, for example, indicate friendly 
bilateral relations, a state o f  ethnic or internal conflict in the sending country, for exam ple 
Ethiopia and Cam bodia, or prior involvem ent o f  the United States in a w ay that may 
jeopardize individuals collaborating with the US, for exam ple the interpreters during the 
Iraq and A fghanistan conflicts.
The second group o f  variables consists o f  the host country factors w hich would 
make the dyadic country attractive to the US, by aligning its domestic preferences with 
US preferences. I expect that the factors and their positive direction especially  from the 
US will increase attraction between the US and the foreign country. A n exam ple o f 
factors in this category, and this hypothesized alignm ent would be in the provision o f  
education w ithout gender bias. This can be m easured in part through educational 
spending as a percentage o f  GDP. A higher expenditure on education w ould be an 
enhancing factor given that the citizen diplom ats serve about thirty nine percent o f  the 
time in educational fields. Other factors include military aid, levels o f  dem ocratization 
and level o f  state failure and state fragility.
State fragility however w ill decrease mutual attraction due to the insecurity that 
the citizen diplom ats m ight be subjected to. High levels o f  globalization and high GDP 
per capita will decrease the likelihood o f  citizen diplom ats being placed in the recipient 
country . O ther negative factors include political violence, and a higher m ilitary
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expenditure as a percentage o f  GDP, unless the country suffers from civil w ar or internal 
insurrections, in which case the citizen diplom ats would not go to the country anyw ay 
due to insecurity. The third group o f  variables, coded as dum m y variables for different 
regions, is intended to check for regional variances and determ ine if  citizen diplom acy is 
m ore successful in certain regions than in others. A  fourth group o f  variables will be 
derived com bining all the variables into one om nibus model with all observations.
R esearch  s tudy  p e r io d
This research looks at the period betw een 1960 and 2010. The logic for selecting the 
1961-2010 time period relies on a num ber o f  factors. If international volunteering that is 
supported by state bureaucracies is effective in influencing or altering foreign publics' 
perception o f  the US, it is im portant to select a tim e when such international volunteering 
w’as officially com m issioned as a foreign strategy function in 1961 w ith the start o f  the 
Peace Corps program. This also excludes other form s o f unofficial international 
volunteering such as missionary work or tourism.
Second, international volunteering as a function o f  U S foreign policy in its 
original form  has continued even after the end o f the Cold W ar. It is im portant to recall 
that Peace Corps began in part to serve a US foreign policy goal, that is, to counter Soviet 
expansion and its provision o f  trained, technical manpower. Since the Soviet Union is no 
longer a force to be countered, why is citizen diplom acy still a foreign policy strategy?
Third, em erging literature has argued for the utility o f ‘soft pow er' through 
econom ic, social and cultural exchanges such as those prom oted by citizen diplom acy. If  
citizen diplomacy is viable, can it be leveraged in the m odem  day foreign policy arena to
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counter em erging transnational issues and im prove the prospects for US foreign policy 
and global hegem ony? This study will seek to conclude whether, or how  these non- 
traditional diplom atic exchanges im pact states behavior in the international arena.
Justification o f  selected  perio d
The period after the Second W orld W ar, between 1945 and 1990, m ost countries aligned 
either with the Soviet-led W arsaw Pact/Eastern Bloc, or w ith the US and her allies in the 
western bloc. A third group o f  countries, com prising mostly o f  newly independent and 
Latin American countries, coalesced into the N on-Aligned M ovem ent (NAM ). O ther 
regional organizations distinguished themselves; however, they generally interacted with 
or supported one o f  the two major blocs. For purposes o f  this study, the N on -Aligned 
M ovem ent and other regional groups will not be distinguished as a 'third force', rather, 
they will be considered as aligned to either the East o r the W est and also as one o f  the 
contested spaces for the future o f  superpow er influence.
At the end o f  the Cold War, the benefits o f  a new state's alignm ent w ith one bioc 
or the other were not only non-existent; the incentives to do so, whether econom ic, 
military or diplom atic were dim inished. The em ergence o f  one super-power, the United 
States, and the lack o f  an effecti ve, viable com peting ideology decreased the 
attractiveness countries to the sole rem aining hegem on, the US, unless the country 
directly contributed to the national interest, pow er and security o f the hegem on, meant 
that the degree o f  attractiveness o f  any one country to another was dim inished.
Between 1950 and 2010 the nation-state system suffered significant international 
turbulence. It also saw the disruption o f  existing order with the addition o f  m ore than 100
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sovereign states. M embership to the UN, reflecting the total number o f  internationally 
recognized sovereign states increased from 51 in 1945, to 191 in 2000, a fourfold 
increase. By 1990, the UN System com prised o f  159 sovereign states. The increase from 
159 in 1991 to 180 represented the single greatest increase in m em bership in any one 
decade (30 m embers). The increase is only rivaled by the 39-m em ber increase in the 
1950-1960 decade, when 39 m em bers jo ined  the UN m ostly due to A frican countries 
becom ing independent. Other decades with significant increases included the 1960-1970 
and 1970-1980 with an average o f  27 m em bers, as shown in Fig. 4.1 below .132
Fig. 4.1: Increase in United Nations Membership, 1945-2010
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132 Aiso: M em ber States o f  the United Nations (http ://w w w .un.org /en /m em bers/) 
S tatistics draw n from  W orldO m eters (http://ww w .vvorldom eters.info/united-nations/ and 
http://w w w .socialresearchm ethods.net/kb/desdes.php
Study sample
The study sample consists o f 19 '! countries that have been adm itted to the United Nations 
as "M em ber States o f  the Record.-' There are 193 sovereign countries that are m em bers 
o f  the U nited N ations Organization, but the study elim inates the United States, with 
w hom  the dyadic relations with all the other m em ber countries are under study. It also 
elim inates South Sudan, because South Sudan became independent, and w as adm itted to 
the United Nations on 7/9/2011, it is outside the data period coverage and is excluded. 
The United States is the subject o f  inquiry -  how other countries behave tow ards the US 
as a result o f  its conduct tow ards the foreign nations, through the placem ent o f  citizen 
diplom ats; it is not represented in the data, producing a total o f  191 countries.
Countries that ceased to exist, or were am algam ated into new  countries and 
federations, for exam ple East and W est Germany, Yugoslavia, North and South Yemen, 
North and South Vietnam are not included in the dataset by  their old nam es; the 'n e w ’ 
countries are included instead. Therefore, data for countries such as Y ugoslavia is 
excluded, while that o f  Serbia, Croatia and the Form er Yugoslav Republic o f  M acedonia 
tire included. Countries that cam e into existence between 1960 and 1990 are included in 
the years for which their data w as available.
Some databases separate territories such as Guam and Puerto Rico, the 
Netherlands Antilles, British and US Virgin Islands and other non-independent territories 
from their affiliated countries: such distinctions are not reflected in this research and the 
countries, territories, principalities and holdings are considered unitary. The countries in 
both datasets are the M em ber States o f  the Record o f  the United N ations Organization.
Data collection and sources
This study utilizes secondary data drawn from different databases. The m ajor sources o f  
the research data comes a num ber o f  databases, datasets and organizations. The data and 
sources are discussed below.
The US State Department (U nited States A gency fo r  International D evelopm ent)
Under the auspices o f  the State D epartm ent, the US Agency for International 
Developm ent (USAID) keeps a record entitled "US Overseas Loans and Grants", which 
is also known as "The Green Book." Recent changes in reporting; as a resu lt o f  the Open 
G overnm ent initiative changed the form at o f  the data presented by U SA ID  on US loans 
and other obligations to foreign nations.133 The dataset tracks inform ation on 
disbursem ents to countries, beginning 1945, that have received over U S$500,000 in loans 
and/or grants / assistance and were considered "independent states".134 The State 
Department is also an im portant source o f  data on US military assistance to d iffe ren t 
countries since 1945.
Data on congruent voting with the US at the U N General Assem bly  
Data on voting practices at the United N ations com es from two m ain sources. Data on all 
UN General Assem bly voting is extracted from Alex Dreher and Jan-Egbert Sturm 's 2010 
study on IMF and W orld Bank influence on voting in the General A ssem bly. The second 
source is Erik Voeten's and Anton Strezhnev Dataverse Network. D ata on key UN
The W hite House. ‘"Open G overnm ent Initiative." w w w .w hitehouse.gov/open/around. 
(W eb). A ccessed 1/23/2013.
134 USAID. "US O verseas Loans and Grants." 
h ttp ://gbk.ead s.usaidallnet.gov/data/detaile d .htnil on 6-6-2012. (W eb) accessed 1 /2 3 /2 0 13.
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General A ssem bly votes is m anually extracted from the US State D epartm ent w ebsite on 
Voting Practices at the United N ations.135
D reher and  Sturm  UN voting data
This dataset, developed by Alex D reher and Jan-Egbert Sturm at the KOF Swiss 
Econom ic Institute, covers the years 1970 to 2002 .136 Data for the 2003 - 2010 period 
was m anually extracted from the State D epartm ent W ebsite on Voting Practices at the 
United Nations and combined with the D reher and Sturm data, following their data 
treatm ent procedures. In the data analysis and regression statistics m odels 1 - 4, sections 
(a) and (b) utilize the Dreher and Sturm data, while m odels 1-4, sections (c) and (d) 
utilize Erik Voeten's and Anton Strezhnev Affinity' o f  N ations data.
Erik Voeten's daiaverse (The Affinity o f  Nations data)
A ccording to the authors. Erik Voeten's A ffinity o f  Nations is a dataset o f  roll call votes 
in the G eneral A ssem bly 1946-2011. It also contains A ffinity o f N ations scores. The 
latter refers to a com putation o f  the congruence o f  voting on an issue betw een dyads o f  
all countries on all votes at the United Nations. Originally developed by Erik Gartzke, 
this dataset was updated through 2011 by Erik V oeten and Anton Strezhnev, w ho recoded 
the data as the Affinity o f  N ations data.
In this dataset, I select the s3n  variable, which is the computed variable on 
congruent voting at the UN. calculated based on  three types o f  votes: yes (1), no (2) and
135 US D epartm ent o f  State. "Reports." (V oting Practices in the U nited N ations." 
httpd/wvwv.state.gov /p/io/r is/ip V ( Web). A ccessed 2/9/2011.
16 Axel Dreher and Jan-Egbert Sturm, "D o IMF and W orld Bank Influence V oting in the 
UN General A ssem blv?”http://ideas.repec.org /p /kuf/\vpskof/06- 137.html A ccessed 1/31/2013.
abstention (3). V oeten and Strehnev calculate abstentions as half yes, ha lf no votes. 
V oeten and Strehnev's congruence in voting ranges from 0 to 1 with voting congruence 
presented as fractions; I convert this scale to 0 to 100. There are no data gaps in V oeten’s 
Dataverse, which both capture votes in the United N ations General A ssem bly from 1946 
to 2011, with dyads not involving the US excluded from the final datase t.137 This data is 
supplem ented by the US State D epartm ent's "Reports to Congress, US V otes, Fact 
Sheets, Testim ony, Reports" found on the State D epartm ent's w ebsite.138
K ey  U nited  N a tions G eneral A ssem b ly  (UNGA) vo tes
Data on key UN General A ssem bly votes extracted from the Bureau o f  International 
O rganization Affairs o f the US State Department. A ccording to Public Law' 101-246, 
"issues which directly affected United States interests and on which the United States 
lobbied extensively” constitute the basis for "key UN General A ssem bly vo tes."139
The U S P eace C orps
The US Peace Corps is the prem ier source o f  data on placem ent o f Peace C orps 
V olunteers, also labeled here as citizen diplom ats, for the purposes o f  this research. The 
data available reflects the activities o f  the Peace Corps, specifically num ber o f  citizen
1,7 For m ore discussion on Voeten's Dataverse, see: IQSS Dataverse N etw ork (Erik 
Voeten Dataverse). United N ations General Assem bly voting D ata  - Data and A nalysis. 
h ttp ://dvn.iq .harvard.edu/dvn/dv/V oeten/faces/study/S tudvPage.xhtm l7globalkN hdl: 1902.1/1237 
9& studyListinglndex=l_33a()772b05c356759d61da0068ab (W eb). Accessed 113112013.
BS US State Department. ' ‘R eports." http://ww w .state.gov/p/ip/rJs/rpt/ (W eb). A ccessed 
1/23/2013.
139 US State Departm ent, B ureau o f International Organization Affairs. "IV - G eneral 
Assem bly: Im portant Resolutions and Consensus A ctions."
http://w w w .state.gOv/p/io/rls/rp t/2011 /p ractices/189666.htm  (W eb). A ccessed 1/31/2013.
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diplom ats placed since the Peace C orps' inception in 1960. The Peace C orps w ebsite 
depository for mandated reports to Congress is the source for this d a ta .140
In tegrated Network fo r  Societal Conflict Research (INSCR)
The state fragility index data was obtained from the Integrated Network for Societal 
Conflict research (INSCR) and the Center for System ic Peace. It is draw n from  the M ajor 
Episodes o f  Political V iolence, 1946-2008 dataset using the variable C1VTOT2. 
CIV TO T2 sums up the total episodes o f  civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence and 
ethnic wars w ithin a country in any given y ear.141 The data is coded as 0 for no conflict, 1 
for conflict for the periods 1961 to 2008, the last year o f data  availability. I include this 
variable given the expectation that a state experiencing significant disruptions in these 
indices is unlikely to attract citizen diplom ats due to insecurity, and may not do much 
voting and/or vote against the US anyw ay since often the states have had som e sort o f  US 
intervention before their com plete failure.
Ethical considerations
A s is the case wuth most political science inquiries at the systemic level, this research 
does not involve human subjects and as such, ethical issues as related to the treatm ent o f 
subjects are non-existent. As discussed earlier, the research uses m ixed m ethods; for the
140 Data from the previous years was graciously provided courtesy o f  K elly  M cC orrm ack 
and was com puted from the reports available as part o f  the Congressional B udget Justifications 
from the 1960s-2004. From 2005-present, the data is available at
http : / / w w w .peacecorps. go v/open/
141 M onty G. M arshall. M ajor Episodes o f  Political V iolence (M EPV ) And C onflict 
Regions, 1946-2008, Center For System ic Peace. July 28. 2010. http ://w w w .Svstem icpeace.Q rg. 
(W eb). A ccessed 2/4/2013. For more on the codebook, see 
h ttp ://w w w .svstem icpeace,org/inscr/M EPV eodebook2008.pdf
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quantitative part, it uses quantitative data from widely available sources such as the 
W orld Bank and the United Nations. For the qualitative part, the research studies specific 
cases that illustrate the perceived and reported benefits o f citizen diplom acy as a soft 
power strategy, but also exam ines the less successful cases o f  citizen diplom acy. These 
cases will include instances in which the receiving governm ent perceived the volunteers 
as detrim ental to the national interests /  values, for exam ple in the 2012 stand-off 
between the United States and Egypt over the Republican Institute and the N ational 
D emocratic Institute staffers in Egypt (see chapter 7 for further discussion).
D ata limitations: availability
The data suffer from a num ber o f  lim itations. One o f  the m ajor lim itations is the o
availability period across a number o f  key variables. The classification o f  key votes by = 
the State D epartm ent began in 1983. Prior to 1983. there is no data on the key votes; 
therefore, m odels evaluating voting behavior with the US at the !TN General A ssem bly 
on key votes wifi have the 1983 to 2010 observation years.
The data lim itation leads to another possible issue, that of selection bias. In any 
study, the experience o f  participants is generalized to non-participants and taken to be 
what they would have experienced had they participated (aiso referred to as the 
generalization o f  effect). Since standard m ethods evaluate the outcom es for sam ples, not 
the entire population, the outcom es o f  the non-participants, are not know n. It is possible 
that non-participants would have had a different experience if  they had participated; this
1V *is the essence o f  selection bias. " Heckman identifies two sources o f  sam ple selection
142 Janies Heckman, Hidehiko Ichimura, Jeffrey Smith, Petra Todd "Characterizing 
Selection Bias Using Experimental Data." NBER Working Paper No. 6699. Econometrica, 66,
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bias: "self-selection by the individuals or data units being investigated and data m ay also 
be non-random ly selected because o f  decisions taken by data analysts," for exam ple the 
exclusion o f  now -defunct states and the changes that their inclusion w ould have brought 
about to the findings and conclusions.143
This research has some possible selection bias on a  number o f  variables, for 
exam ple the key UN General Assembly voting, w hose data is available beginning 1983.
It is possible that countries voted more in congruence w ith the US prior to 1983, and 
therefore the findings o f the study cannot be used to  explain foreign policy behavior 
tow ards the US before 1983 especially in the absence o f  tracking the votes. It is also 
possible that, confronted with the know ledge that their votes were being evaluated by the 
State Departm ent, countries started voting more w ith the U S at the UN G eneral Assem bly 
for fear o f  potential such monitoring and its outcom es.
W hile data are available on many o f  the variables which have observations for the 
entire study period (1961 ■- 2010), structural data lim itations i.e. lim itation o f  datasets 
have made some observations less than optimal. Countries o f  the form er Soviet U nion, 
for exam ple, have observations for country years dating from  1991 to 2010. Z im babw e 
became independent in 1980, M ozam bique in 1975 and Namibia in 1990. C ountries’ data 
availability is based on independence dates and international recognition before 2010. 
South Sudan, the w orld’s new est country, is not included in the study. O ther data 
lim itations include the effective start o f  the m easurem ent o f  the indicator; for exam ple, 
the W orld Values Survey, which began tracking individuals’ attitudes in 1981. Eight
no. 5 (1999): 1017-1098. See also: Richard A. Berk. "An Introduction to Sam ple Selection Bias 
in Sociological Data." American Sociological Review , 48, No. 3 (Jun.. 1983): 386-398.
143 Jam es J. Heckman. "Sample Selection Bias as a  Specification Error." Econometrica . 
47, No. 1 (Jan., 1979): 154-155.
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different regression m odels constructed on the basis o f  three main categories o f  test 
variables will be developed and tested .144
The research expects to find that a num ber o f  curious ‘outlier’ conditions and 
results. These will be manifested in results obtained from regressing variables especially 
with new ly independent countries. Countries transitioning to dem ocracy may show 
higher incidences o f  higher am ounts o f  foreign aid because they are m ore likely to be 
supported by the US as they transition to dem ocracy and new  statehood (for exam ple, 
Zim babw e in the 1980’s, Nam ibia in the 1990’s and M ontenegro after 2006). A lso, the 
form er Soviet satellite countries, in the 1990 period, may have received m ore foreign aid 
in an attem pt to stabilize them and orient them  more tow ards the w estern system  o f 
dem ocratic governance.
M ultiple regression analysis
M ultiple regression analysis will be used to investigate the degree to w hich foreign aid, 
citizen diplom ats and other interactional variables influence positive (or negative 
perceptions) o f  the US by foreign publics and how this reflects in voting at the United 
Nations by the specific country. Because the study is testing the hypothesis that citizen 
diplom ats positively affect foreign citizens' and countries’ perceptions o f  the US and its 
foreign policy, that countries signal their preferences at international forum s by voting in 
congruence with the US at the UN General Assem bly, variables will be added and 
excluded from the model to measure these expected variances. This and other bivariate 
and multivariate regression m odeling statistics and procedures will be used.
144 For more on the m odels and the variable selection factors, see chap ter 5
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Models
The eight m odels on which the data analysis will be perform ed are developed fully in the 
next chapter. There will be eight m odels, based on four groups o f  variables, these are: 1) 
measures o f  bilateral relationships, 2) hom e countries"' attributes and 3) tem poral and 
regional variances. The fourth model w ill be based on the om nibus m odel w hich includes 
all the variables. In addition, the m odels w ill test for differences on key votes versus all 
votes at the UN G eneral Assem bly to determ ine w hat variables help explain countries 
voting behavior, and w hether countries vote differently with the US at the UN General 
Assem bly on key votes versus all votes.
Statistical issues
Collinearity
livery quantitative researcher should w orry about correlation between study variables. 
Collinearity is simply defined as a close, alm ost perfect linear relationship between one 
or more o f  the independent variables in a regression model; in other w ords, tw o variables 
are in effect m easuring the same concept. It has also been defined as interdependence 
am ong selected independent variables. Collinearity may introduce bias to statistical tests.
Schroeder, Lander and Levine-Silverm an argue that the following six factors 
indicate possible collinearity: correlations between independent variables; regression 
coefficients are contrary to those which have been predicted; regression coefficients are 
unsover repeated m easurem ents (validation): the R2 estimate for the model is high, but 
the partial correlation coefficients are low; the estimated regression coefficient have large
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m ean square error (M SE) and the com m on interpretation o f  the regression coefficients 
cannot be m ade.145
Several positive correlations will be expected am ong some variables; for exam ple, 
it is expected that there will be correlation between the level o f  globalization and GDP 
per capita. R icher nations are more likely to be m ore highly globalized and vice versa. 
There is also a significant likelihood that GDP per capita will be correlated with levels o f 
dem ocracy, since m ost dem ocratic countries are also w ealthier (this does not im ply that 
dem ocracy causes wealth or vice versa; the two are correlated). On the o ther hand, lower 
GDP per capita may be correlated with high incidence o f state failure. The research will 
exam ine the preliminary bivariate and m ultivariate regressions for these correlations.
To control for the problem  o f  (multi)collinearity, initial bivariate regression 
analyses w ill be carried out am ong the independent variables and highly correlated 
variables excluded from the study. The research w ill review the correlation m atrix and * 
correlations between variables that exceed the r = 0.85 threshold H ow ever, recognizing ■ 
that even variables whose correlation is as low1 as 0.1 may exhibit m ulticollinearity, the 
selected variables will all be included in the m odels developed.
Collinearity im plies that variables m ay be m easuring the same concepts even 
when regressed separately.146 M ason and Perreault write tha t despite collinearity, "overall 
prediction is not affected, but interpretation o f  and conclusions based on the size o f  the 
regression coefficients, their standard errors, or the associated /-tests m ay be m isleading
145 M ary Ann Schroeder, Janice Lander and Stacey Levine-SiIverm an. "D iagnosing and 
Dealing w ith M ulticollinearity." Western Journal o f  Nursing Research. 12 (1990).
46 P. S. Petraitis, A. E. Dunham and P. H. Nievviarowski. “ Inferring M ultiple Causality. 
The L im itations o f  Path A na lysis/' Functional Ecology, 10, Mo. 4 (Aug., 1996): 425.
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because o f  the potentially confounding effects o f collinearity ."147 M ost researchers
caution on the im portance o f  dealing with the issue o f  data collinearity; how ever, M ason
and Perreault discuss why this is not a critical concern. They write that,
the harmful effects o f  collinear predictors often are exaggerated m ost im portant, 
we dem onstrate that collinearity cannot be viewed in  isolation. R ather, the effect 
o f  a given level o f  collinearity can be evaluated only in conjunction w ith the other 
factors o f  sample size, R ', and m agnitude o f  the coefficients. For exam ple, 
bivariate correlations as high as .95 have virtually no effect on the ability to 
recover "true" coefficients and to draw  the correct inferences if  the sam ple size is 
250 and the R2 is at least .75. In contrast, a bivariate correlation o f  .95 in 
conjunction with a sample size o f  30 and an R2 o f .25 results in Type II error rates 
o f  88% or more. Thus, the interactions o f collinearity with the other factors 
knowm to affect accuracy are both significant and im portant.148
O ther scholars disagree. For exam ple. M ansfield and Helms W T i t e  that "exam ination o f  a
set o f  data for the existence o f  m ulticollinearity should always be perform ed as an initial
step in any multiple regression analysis."149 They further outline the problem s o f
collinearity, writing that "the major problem  with m ulticollinearity is that the least
squares estimators o f  coefficients o f  variables involved in the linear dependencies have
large variances. All additional adverse effects are a consequence o f  these large variances:
the estim ates themselves are often large and may have signs that disagree w ith known
theoretical properties o f the variables."150
M assy provides one o f  the possible solutions to deal with m ulticollinearity:
deletion o f  com ponents or variables that are collinear; this research will, how ever, not
utilize this solution. This leads to the next question: "what com ponents should be deleted
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., 269.
1,9 M ansfield, Edward R. and B illy P. Helms. "Detecting M ulticollinearity." The 
American Statistician, 36, No. 3. Part 1 (Aug.. 1982): 158.
50 Ibid.
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in order to  sim plify the statistical analysis w ithout destroying w hatever basis m ay exist in 
the explanatory data for predicting the dependent variable?"151 M assy proposes deletion 
o f  “com ponents that are relatively unim portant predictors o f  the original independent 
variables" and “deleting com ponents that are relatively unim portant as predictors o f  the 
dependent variable (y) -  i.e. those have the sm allest values o f  gam m a."152
Because M ason and Perreault, and other scholars who do not consider 
m ulticollinearity a problem , do not actively advocate for exclusion o f  its exam ination and 
investigation, this research will adopt the M ason and Perreault approach and will not 
exclude any variables from the research. I propose to use M assey 's approach: deletion o f 
com ponents that allow  for the sim plification o f  the analysis without destroying the basis 
for the proposition that they are im portant in predicting state behavior tow ards the US.
H eteroscedastic ity
In weighted least squares estim ations, the values o f  y corresponding to various x values 
should be evenly weighted; when they are not, a condition o f  error variance not being 
constant on all observations is referred to as heteroscedasticity. H eteroscedasticity is 
therefore the violation o f  the assum ption that the error term in  the predicted  m odel has a 
constant variance.155 H om oscedasticity is an equal-variance assum ption that holds that 
given X, the error term s are constant for all observations, i.e. w henever X varies; the
151 Massy. William F. "Principal Components Regression in Exploratory Statistical 
Research." Journal o f  the American Statistical Association, 60, No. 309 (Mar., 1965): 241 -242.
152 Ibid.. 241.
153 Xin Yan and Xiaogang Su. Linear Regression Analysis: Theory and Computing. 
(Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. 2009): 198.
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corresponding response Y has the same corresponding variance (on Y) around the 
regression line.1' 4
W ang and Jain list the following as the two m ajor causes o f  heteroscedasticity: 1) 
one or m ore variables in a database with values with a large range (i.e. the range between 
the sm allest and largest values is very large); 2) degrees o f  growth betw een the 
independent variable and the dependent variable vary significantly during the m odeling 
period especially in series data and in heterogeneous data (cross-sectional data 
analysis).'55 By visually inspecting the residuals, carrying out the G oldfeld-Q uandt test or 
the Park Test, one can detect the presence o f  heteroscedasticity. ’' u Treating data for 
heteroscedasticity can often be a simple process through the use o f  the G eneralized Least 
Squares M ethod (GLS) transform ing the data by an appropriate factor and then applying * 
the OLS procedure to the transform ed data to estim ate the m o d e l157
Conclusion
The objective o f  this chapter is to outline the research m ethodology that the dissertation 
will use. In the chapter, I begin by outlining the research design and justify ing  the use o f  
a mixed-m ethods approach, i.e. qualitative and quantitative approaches and briefly 
discuss each o f  the approaches. I explain the choice o f  case studies for the qualitative 
section o f  the research, and then delves into the quantitative section o f  the research. In
154 Ibid. 197.
153 George C. S. W ang and Cham an L. Jain. Regression Analysis: M odeling &




this chapter, I outline the selection, grouping, coding and operationalization o f  variables.
I then discuss the study period and the theoretical underpinning o f the study period.
Next, I discuss the sources o f  data, which are m ainly drawn from  the US State 
Departm ent, the A ffinity o f Nations datasets by Voeten and by Dreher. the System ic 
Peace Institute's Polity IV and State Fragility datasets, and the Freedom H ouse and 
Foreign Policy's state failure data. I then discuss the lim itations o f the data, which 
includes unavailability o f  data (for exam ple, on key UN General A ssem bly votes, w hose 
tracking began in 1983) and the lim itations im posed by different countries' varying 
independence dates and break-up o f  countries, for exam ple the Soviet U nion in 1991 and 
Yugoslavia in 1993. I then discuss the data analysis procedures, the four analysis m odels 
and finally the statistical issues such as heteroscedasticity and collinearity.
In the following chapter, I perform  the data analysis across four base m odels 
outlined in the previous chapter, each m odel with tw o dependent variables. These m odels 
are- the omnibus model, the factors o f  bilateral attraction, attributes o f  the host country 
and the tem poral and regional variables. For robustness, I use two sources o f  data. i.e. the 
Gartzke Affinity o f  N ations voting data and D reher and Sturm data. The chapter therefore 
produces sixteen models which wall be then sum m arized in two tables. The findings o f  
the m ultiple regressions will then be outlined and discussed.
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CHAPTER V 
QUA NTITA TIVE A N A LY SIS
Introduction
This chapter tests the hypotheses developed in chapter 3, using the quantitative m ethods 
discussed in chapter 4. Keeping with the outline first developed in chapter 3, I develop 
four models based on the groups o f  variables. These groups o f  variables are: first, the 
entire group o f  variables grouped together in an “om nibus” model; secondly, the factors 
o f bilateral attraction; thirdly, the host country attributes and fourth, the control variables. 
I will first test the “Omnibus m odel” , which includes all the variables in the study. I f  the 
entire group o f  selected variables matter, this is the most robust model, since it allow s for 
testing o f  each variable while holding all the other variables constant.
I will then test the second group o f  variables, which are the factors o f  bilateral 
relationships: these are the variables directly related to US involvem ent in the second 
country. I will then test the third group o f  variables, the attributes o f  the host country that 
influence the way countries vote in congruence w ith  the US at the UN G eneral Assem bly. 
Third. I will test the final group o f  variables, w hich are the temporal and regional 
variables. These tests develop four models. The subsequent use o f tw o sets o f  data for the 
al UN General Assem bly votes produce a total o f  sixteen models.
Previously, I stated the expectation that countries will vote differently  on key UN 
General Assem bly votes than on all UN General A ssem bly votes. This expectation arises 
from the im portance attached to key votes and the support they signify for the voting 
country towards the United States. Key votes are “votes on issues which directly  affected
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United States interests and on which the United States lobbied ex tensively ."1581 will run 
regression tests o f  all variables on the UN General A ssem bly key votes and a second set 
o f  regression tests o f  all variables on all the UN General Assem bly votes. G iven the four 
groups o f  variables, there will be eight m odels total.
A fter perform ing the regression tests for the four base models, I will discuss the 
findings that the regressions procure. Finally, I will highlight the caveats and the 
challenges o f  determ ining w hether or not countries vote w ith the US at the UN General 
A ssem bly prim arily based on bilateral and multilateral interactions, specific attributes o f 
these interactions or through a com bination o f  factors. The chapter will conclude by 
exam ining other evidence o f  how  countries vote, the qualitative aspect o f  the study.
Hypotheses tests
In this section, I test and present the results o f the m ultiple regression statistics. There are 
a total o f  sixteen m odels, presented in four groups; a) the omnibus m odel, b) the factors 
o f  bilateral attraction, c) the host country attributes and d) the regional and tem poral 
effects. In each o f  the four models, J perform statistical regressions for key UN General 
A ssem bly votes and for all UN General A ssem bly votes. Additionally, I perform  these 
regressions based on the V oeten & Strezhnev Dataverse network data, and on the Dreher, 
Strum  and Vreeland KOF Institute data. W ithin each o f  the four m odels, the data is 
presented as a) Voeten & Strehnev (abbreviated as VS), b) key UN G eneral A ssem bly 
votes, Dreher, Strum and Vreeland (abbreviated DSV) key UN General A ssem bly votes, 
c) Voeten & Strehnev all UNGA votes and Dreher, Strum and Vreeland all UNG A votes.
158 US State Departm ent. "General Assem bly: Im portant votes and consensus actions." 
V oting Practices in the United Nations -  2010.
h ttp ://w w w .state.gOv/documents/o rc:anization/162417.p d f  (W eb). Accessed 1/23/2013.
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The omnibus model
I a} Voeten-Sirum (VS) key UN G eneral Assem bly votes
From table 5.1 below, the Voeten-Strum  model summary has an adjusted R 2 o f  .294.
Table 5.1 O m nibus, Kev UNGA V otes VS m odel sum m ary
    .I. t    i    r
Model R R Adjusted R Std. Error o f Change Statistics
Square Square the Estimate R Square 
Change
F Change dfl df2 Sig. F Change
1 .571“ .326 .294 12.07325 326 10.168 17 358 .000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Asia, GDP p.c., US Military Aid, Educ. Expenditure. M il. Expenditure, Europe. Year, 
US Aid. Immigration, Democracy, EDI from US, Citizen Diplomats, S. America, G lobalization, FDI to US. 
State Fragility, N. America
Table 5.2 O m nibus, kev UNGA votes VS Model Coefficients'1
Model Unstand. Coefficients Std
Coefficients 1
Sig. Collinearity Stats
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant^ 2549.870 495.327 5.148 .000
Year -1.263 .247 -.266 -5.105 .000 .693 1.443
Citizen Diplomats .029 .013 .127 2.234 .026 58'7 1.703
US Military Aid .001 .003 .019 .385 .700 .755 1.325
US Aid .009 .005 .081 1.683 .093 .806 1.241
FDI from US -.034 .032 -.054 -1.058 .291 ,716 1.397
FDI to US -.00! .00! -.067 -.68! .496 .192 5.205
Immigration .000 .000 -.232 -2.748 006 .264 3.792
 ̂ Mil. Expenditure .280 .193 .071 1.453 .147 .791 1.264
Educ. Expend .007 .054 .005 124 .902 .979 1.022
GDP p.c. .000 .000 .046 .602 .548 .318 3.149
State Fragility -.210 .212 -.075 -.988 .324 .328 3.046
Globalization .011 .084 .009 .132 .895 .397 2.520
Democracy .536 .138 .213 3.886 .000 .627 1.595
N. America 34.372 12.114 .366 2.837 .005 .113 8.844
S. America 9.614 2.089 .302 4.602 .000 .439 2 .279
Europe 21.991 3.294 .327 6.675 .000 .784 1.276
Asia 5.861 1.849 .186 3.170 .002 .548 1.825
a. Dependent Variable: Key UNGA votes
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M ore im portantly, as shown in table 5.2 above, the coefficients for the year, citizen 
diplom ats, im m igration, dem ocracy and regional dum m y variables for N orth and South 
America, Europe and Asia are statistically significant. H alf o f  the variables in the model 
are statistically significant. The coefficient for the year is negatively signed, indicating 
that over time, countries vote less w ith the US at the UN on key votes.
I b) D SV  key UN G eneral Assem bly votes
The Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland om nibus m odel has 444 valid observations. Its adjusted 
->
Rf is also more robust at 332 as shown in table 5.3 below.
fa b le . 5.3 O m nibus, key UNGA votes DSV M odel Summary
Mode! R R Adjusted P. Std. Error Change Statistics




F Change df! df2 Sig. F 
Change
i .598“ .358 .332 13.62740 .358 13 958 17 426 .000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Asia. FDI fro. US, US Mil Aid, EDUEXP% GDP, MILEXP%GDP US Aid, 
Immigration, Europe. YEAR, State Fragility, Citizen Dipl., Democracy, S, America, FDI 2 US. 
Globalization. GDP p.c , T\ America
in the DSV m odel shown in the o f coefficients table 5.4 below, the year, im m igration to 
the US, democracy and regional variables for N orth and South America, Europe and Asia 
are statistically significant. In this model, the citizen diplom acy variable unstandardized 
coefficient is not statistically significant contrary to the stated hypothesis. N either is the 
dem ocracy variable, unlike in the VS data model. The year variable is statistically 
significant and negatively signed, as is the case in the VS m odel, suggesting that over 
time, countries vote less with the US at the UN General Assembly. This finding holds 
across both models and this indicates some robustness.
150







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 2599.085 515.883 5.038 .000
YEAR • 1.290 .258 -.234 -5.001 .000 .688 1.454
Citizen Dipl. .021 .014 .079 1.561 .119 .583 1.715
US M il Aid .004 .003 .051 1.173 .242 .808 1.238
US Aid -.014 .291 -.002 -.049 .961 .825 1.212
FDI 2 US -.00! .001 -.090 -1.026 .305 .195 5.123
FDI from US -8.076E-005 .000 -.041 -1.019 .309 .948 1.054
Immigration .000 .000 -.162 -2.211 .028 .282 3.542
( Democracy .605 .140 .212 4.332 .000 .628 1.593
GDP p.c. .000 .001 .027 .400 .689 .331 3.019
Globalization .052 .085 .039 .611 .541 .380 2.634
EDUEXP% GDP -.023 .029 -.032 -.819 .413 .977 1.024
MILEXP%GDP . 170 .185 .040 .917 .359 .789 1.267
State Fragility -.319 .212 - 100 -1.509 .132 342 2.924
N America 36.469 13.264 .309 2.750 .006 .120 8.353
S. America 11.862 2.203 .305 5.385 .000 .47 i 2 .122
Europe 24.161 3.667 .286 6.590 .000 ,800 1.250
Asia 4.158 1.880 .115 2.211 .028 .557 1.796
a. Dependent Variable: Key UNGA Votes
I c) A ll U N  G enera l A ssem bly  votes  -  VS om nibus m odel
The VS om nibus model with all UN G eneral A ssem bly votes is more robust than the key 
UN General A ssem bly vote model, with an adjusted R2 o f  .474 as shown in the table 5.5 
model sum m ary below. The model has 451 valid observations. In this m odel, four o f  the 
eight variables are statistically significant, w ith the year variable dem onstrating 
consistency in being negatively signed. The variables for year, citizen diplom acy, 
im migration, democracy and the regional variables for North America, Europe and A sia 
are statistically significant and their coefficients positively signed. State fragility  is 
statistically significant and negatively signed, as expected and hypothesized. There is a 
negative correlation between state fragility and voting with the US at the U nited N ations 
General Assem bly.
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F Change d fl df2 Sig- F 
Change
1 ,702a .493 .474 7.23509 .493 24.806 17 433 .000
a. Predictors: (Constant). Asia, Year, Immigration. US Military Aid, Educ. Expenditure, Europe, Mil. 
Expenditure, State Fragility, US Aid, FDI from US, Citizen Diplomats, Democracy, S America. 
Globalization. FDI to US, GDP p.c., N. America
In this m odel, the citizen diplom acy variable is statistically significant and behaving as 
predicted, as shown in table 5.6 below. For every unit increase in the placem ent o f  citizen 
diplom ats, there is a corresponding increase in the congruence in voting w ith the US at 
the UN General Assem bly on all votes.







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance j V IV
(Constant) 3755.736 270.638 13.877 .000
h™ , r j ,  
i j
Yea- -1.362 .135 -.569 -13.779 .000 .6 8 5 , ! 460
Citizen Diplomats .021 006 i44 3.712 .00! .618 | i ,6! 2
US Military Aid -.00! .002 -.012 -.29' .767 , N 9  j 1.536
US Aid ii!;V, ' .003 .075 1.960 .05 i
1
7>l2  i i 26?
FDI Irom US ■ O ' 7  ■.v'J i .017 -.017 -.41S .676 i 1.379
FDI to US -.001 .001 -.097 -1 251 .21 1 .194 | 5.144
immigration .000 000 -.198 -3.066 .002 .281 | 3 562
Mil. Expenditure .054 .099 .021 .547 .585 .79! 1J 1.2.64
Educ. Expend -.001 .015 -.002 -.047 .962 .98! j 1.020
GDP p.c. .000 .000 .066 1.106 .269 .331 j 3.023
State Fragility -.253 .113 - 130 -2.242 .025 .348 ) 2.873
Globalization -.040 .044 -.048 -.892 .373 .406 | 2 463
Democracy .2 )2 074 .124 2.863 .004 .622 | 1.608
N. America 16 4 86 7.009 .231 2.352 .019 .121 j 8.278
S. America 2.072 1.1 16 .089 1.856 .064 . 51 f  | 1.943
Europe 22.2 i 3 1.910 .437 1 i ,o32 000 .831 j i ^04
Asia 5.240 .967 .24! 5.420 .000 .590 1 ! .696
a. Dependent Variable: AH UNGA Votes
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The negatively signed but statistically significant state fragility coefficient confirm s, as 
hypothesized, that the breakdown in law  and order and governance is likely to correspond 
with either absentee voting, or non-congruence votes with the US.
1 d) Dreher, Sturm  & Vreeland, all UN G eneral Assem bly votes
The DSV om nibus model for all UN General Assem bly votes has 444 valid  observations, 
and a significantly lower adjusted R2 o f  .170 as shown in the model sum m ary table 5.7 
below. O verall, this is not a very robust m odel for predicting how often nations will vote 
in congruence with the US at the UN G eneral A ssem bly on all votes.
T ab le 5. 7 O m n ib u s, al U N G A  v o te s  D S V  M od el Sum m ary
Model R R Adjusted Std. Error o f Change Statistics




d fl df2 Sig. F 
Change
1 .449* .202 .170 14.13269 .202 6.344 17 426 .000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Asia, FDI fro. US, Immigration, EDUEXP% GDP, US M il Aid, US Aid 
\1ILEXP%GDP, Europe, YEAR, State Fragility, Citizen D ipl., Democracy, S, Am erica, FDI 2 US. 
Globalization, GDP p.c., N America
From the table o f  coefficients 5.8 below, the DSV model on all UNGA votes has five 
variables with statistically significant unstandardized coefficients. These coefficients are 
for the year, foreign direct investm ent into the US, dem ocracy and the Europe dum m y 
variables. The m ilitary expenditure as a percentage o f  GDP per capita is statistically 
significant at the 90 percent confidence level, and also positively signed. From this 
coefficient, we can conclude that some countries’ military spending correlates positively 
with congruent voting at the UN. This finding will be examined in subsequent m odels to 
determ ine if  it holds. The year variable is positively signed, which suggests that over
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tim e, countries vote more in congruence w ith the US at the UN. This finding differs from 
some o f  the previous findings where the year coefficient is negatively signed.
This is, how ever, a w eaker model w ith few er statistically significant variables.







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) -1182.086 534.771 -2.210 .028
YEAR ■593 .267 116 2.218 .027 .688 1.453
Citizen Dipl. .011 .014 .044 .781 .435 .586 1.707
US Mil Aid .006 .003 .078 1.625 .105 .805 1.242
US Aid .379 .302 .060 1.255 .210 .830 1.205
FDI 2 US -.001 .001 -.102 -1.037 .300 .195 5.125
FDI fro. US .000 .000 .179 4.015 .000 .938 1.066
Immigration -3.471E-005 .000 -.039 -.483 .629 .282 3.541
Democracy .454 .145 .171 3.138 .002 .629 1.590
GDP p.c. .001 .001 .106 1.407 .160 .332 3.014
Globalization .100 .088 .080 1.135 .257 .379 2.638
EDUEXP% GDP -.004 .030 -.006 -.141 .888 .977 1.024
MILEXP%GDP .332 .192 .084 1.729 .084 .789 1.267
State Fragility -.050 .219 -.017 -.229 .819 .343 2.918
N America 5.677 13.741 .052 .413 .680 .120 8.336
S, America .347 2.277 .010 .152 .879 .474 2.108
Europe 14.969 3.802 .191 3.937 .000 .800 1.250
Asia 2.848 1.947 .085 1.463 .144 .558 1.791
a. Dependent Variable: All UNGA votes
Factors o f bilateral attraction
2 a) K ey U N  G enera l A ssem bly  Votes - Voeten & S trezhnev  data  
Factors o f  bilateral attraction are indicative o f  relationships between the US and the 
second country in the dyadic relationship. The selection o f  US military’ aid. US 
developm ent aid, foreign direct investm ent to and from  the US and im m igration are 
hypothesized to correlate with voting with the UN at the UN General A ssem bly. This is 
especially the case due to the “intim acy" o f  these factors, and their potential to
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dem onstrate the com m itm ent o f  the US to the bilateral relationship. In this m odel, I will 
also include the citizen diplom acy variable. The m odel produces a total o f  1463 valid 
observations.
This model tests for the effects o f  the individual bilateral attraction variables to 
determ ine the effects o f the variables on congruent voting w ith the US at the UN General 
A ssem bly on key votes. As a whole, the model is a poor predictor o f  congruent voting, 
explaining about 7 percent o f  the variation in congruent voting as show n by the adjusted 
R2 in table 5.9 below.
Table 5.9 Bilateral factors, key UNGA votes VS mode) sum m ary
Model R R Adjusted Std. Error o f Chanae Statistics




d fl df2 Sig. F 
Change
1 .105a .011 .007 16.69862 .011 2.700 6 1456 .013
a. Predictors: (Constant), Immigration, Citizen Diplomats, U S Military Aid, FDI from US, FDI to US, 
US Aid
As shown in the table o f coefficients, 5.10 below, only one coefficient is statistically 
significant -  the citizen diplom acy coefficient. It is nevertheless rem arkable that this 
coefficient is statistically significant, showing that controlling for rival explanations, 
citizen diplom acy may be a better predictor o f  how nations vote on key votes at the UN 
General A ssem bly than other variables that might be expected to be m ore significant, 
such as foreign direct investment, m ilitary aid or foreign aid. It also provides the first 
clear evidence that countries attach im portance to how' they vote with the US at the UN 
General A ssem bly on key votes. This is one o f  the significant findings in this research; it 
dem onstrates that there is a place for citizen diplom acy and by extension, soft pow er, in 
the conduct o f nations’ affairs.





t S jo Collinearity
Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 30.956 .680 45.542 .000
Citizen Diplomats .021 .006 .090 3.450 .001 .996 1.004
US Military Aid .002 .003 .023 .665 .506 .584 1.713
1 US Aid -.003 .002 -.047 -1.390 .165 .587 1.705
FDI from US -.006 .022 -.008 -.281 .779 .940 1.064
FDI to US .001 .000 .044 1.557 .120 .850 1.176
Immigration -1.932E-005 .000 -.015 -.525 .600 .831 1.204
a. Dependent Variable: Key UNGA votes
2 b) D reher, Sturm  & Vreeland, key UN G eneral Assem bly
The DSV model testing for im portance o f  different predictors towards voting on key 
votes at the UN General Assem bly, based on factors o f bilateral attraction has 1660 
observations, slightly higher than that o f the corresponding VS model. As shown in the 
model sum m ary table 5.11, the adjusted R2 is com paratively higher, but still quite low  as. 
d predictor o f  congruent key U NGA voting.












d ll df2 Sig. F 
Change
1 .158“ .025 .021 18.61171 .025 7.022 6 1653 .000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Immigration, Citizen Dipl., US Mil Aid, FDI fro. US, US Aid, FDI 2 US
The more interesting part o f  the results can be seen in the unstandardized coefficients in 
table 5.12 below. O f the total o f  six coefficients, four are statistically significant at the 95 
percent confidence level. These are the coefficients for citizen diplomacy, US foreign aid. 
foreign direct investm ent to the US and foreign direct investment from the US. The 
coefficients are positively signed. However, the coefficient for net US A id is negatively
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signed, suggesting that as has been previously found by other scholars and discussed 
earlier in this research, foreign aid does not correspond w ith congruent voting with the 
US at the UN General A ssem bly especially on key votes. The citizen diplom acy 
variab le 's coefficient is statistically significant and positively signed, once again showing 
that the variable is behaving as predicted.
Table 5.12 Bilateral factors, key UNGA votes DSV m odel coefficients3




B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 27.263 .851 32.043 .000
Citizen Dipl. .036 .007 .132 5.412 .000 .985 1.016
US Mil Aid .000 .003 .004 .158 .875 .984 1.016
1 US Aid -.429 .189 -.056 -2.265 .024 .972 1.029
FDI 2 US .001 .000 .060 2.299 .022 .863 1.158
FDI fro. US .000 .000 -.063 -2.550 .011 .981 1.019
Immigration 3.964E-006 .000 .003 .100 .920 .856 1.168
a. Dependent Variable: Key UNGA Votes
2 cj A ll U N G eneral Assem bly votes -  VS model
The VS model for all UN General A ssem bly votes has 1648 observations, with an 
adjusted R2 o f  .020 (see table 5.13 below y











F Change dfl df2 Sig. F 
Change
1 .152‘i .023 .020 11.06136 .023 6.489 6 1641 000
a. Predictors: (Constant). Immigration. Citizen Diplomats, US Mil. Aid, FDI from US, FDI to US. US Aid
O f the six variables in the model, the coefficients for two o f  the variables are statistically 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level, as shown in table 5.14 beiow. These are the
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citizen diplom at and US foreign aid coefficients. However, the coefficients are both 
negatively signed. The coefficient for US foreign aid in this model behaves more or less 
as predicted and expected: there is no positive correlation between foreign aid and voting 
in congruence with the US at the UN G eneral Assem bly. The citizen diplom acy finding 
in this m odel suggests that countries receiving citizen diplom ats do not vote in 
congruence with the US at the UN on all votes.







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 30.625 .422 72.656 .000
Citizen Diplomats -.013 .004 -.083 -3.408 .001 .994 1.006
US Military Aid -.002 .002 -.025 -.756 .450 .557 1.794
1 US Aid -.004 .002 -.086 -2 .640 .008 .560 1.786
FDI from US -.016 .014 -.030 -1.184 .237 .943 1.061
FDI to US .000 .000 -.025 -.965 .334 .855 1.170
Immigration -3.519E-005 .000 -.040 -1.482 .138 .836 1.196
a. Dependent Variable: All UNGA Votes
2 d) Dreher, Sturm  & Vreeland model, all U N G eneral Assem bly votes 
The num ber o f  observations in the DSV model for the factors o f bilateral attraction is 
1659, alm ost an equal num ber w ith the VS model o f  bilateral attraction factors. The 
adjusted R2 is .039 as shown in table 5.15 below.
T ab le  5 .15  B i ateral factors, all U MGA v o tes  D S V  M od el Sum m ary
Model R R Adjusted Std. Error o f Change Statistics
Square R Square the Estimate R Square 
Change
F Change dfl df2 Sig. F 
Change
1 .205* .042 .039 19.63693 .042 12.100 6 1652 .000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Immigration, Citizen Dipl., US Mil Aid, FDI fro. US, US Aid, FDI 2 US
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The table o f  coefficients (table 5.16 below) shows that ha lf o f  the coefficients in this 
m odel are statistically significant at the 99 confidence level. These are the coefficients for 
the citizen diplom acy, US m ilitary aid and foreign direct investm ent from the US 
variables. These coefficients are also positively signed, and therefore behave as 
hypothesized. There is a positive correlation between citizen diplom acy, US m ilitary aid 
and foreign direct investm ent to the US with congruent voting with the US at the UN 
General Assem bly, all UNGA voting.





t Sig. C ollineauty Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 17.341 .898 19.317 . 0 0 0
Citizen Dipl. .041 .007 .143 5.886 . 0 0 0 .985 F016
US Mil Aid . 0 1 0 .003 .083 3.406 .0 0 ! .984 1.016
1 US Aid -.181 . 2 0 0 - . 0 2 2 -.907 .364 .973 1.028
FDI 2 US 1.529E-005 . 0 0 0 .0 0 1 .038 ,970 .863 1.158
FDI fro. US . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
00o 4 .460 . 0 0 0 982 1.018
Immigration 5.042E-005 . 0 0 0 .032 1 . 2 1 2 . 2 2 6 .858 1.166
a. Dependent Variable: Al! UNGA votes
Host country attributes
3 a ) key UN G eneral Assem bly votes (VS model)
Host country attributes are im portant predictors o f countries’ foreign policy behavior. As 
previous literature has shown, factors such as dem ocracy can determine how  a country' 
votes with the US at the UN General A ssem bly. The VS m odel has 581 observations, and 
at .435, a  fairly robust adjusted R , as shown in the m odel summary table 5.17 below.
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Std. Error o f  
the Estimate
Change Statistics
R Square Change F
Change
dfl df2 Sig. F 
Change
1 .665“ .442 .435 13.93293 .442 64.921 7 573 . 0 0 0
a. Predictors: (Constant). Dem ocracy. Educ. Expenditure. Citizen Diplomats, M il. Expenditure, 
Globalization, GDP p.c.. State Fragility
As shown in the table o f  coefficients 5.18 below, o f  the seven variables, four o f  the 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The 
coefficients are also positively signed, as expected. The statistically significant 
coefficients are those o f  m ilitary expenditure as percentage o f  GDP. G D P per capita, 
level o f  globalization and level o f  dem ocratization. Globalization and dem ocracy’s 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 95 confidence level. The coefficient for the 
citizen diplom acy variable is not statistically significant.
This finding can be interpreted to mean that host country factors are im portant in 
determ ining the foreign policy behaviors o f  countries, but citizen diplom acy, as a foreign 
policy strategy, is not correlated with these host country factors. The statistically 
significant coefficients can be explained by the fact that liberal dem ocracies have tended 
to vote w ith the US on many issues before the UN anyway. Similarly, m ost dem ocratic 
countries tend to have a higher GDP per capita, which is also con-elated w ith higher 
levels o f  globalization due to advanced industrialization. Therefore, these variables m ay 
be simply confirm ing the existing status quo, rather than explaining w hat causes 
countries to vote in congruence with the US at the UNGA.
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B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 14.532 4.412 3.293 . 0 0 1
Citizen Diplomats -.009 .0 1 1 -.031 -.876 .381 .755 1.324
Mil. Expenditure .625 . 2 0 0 .106 3.132 . 0 0 2 .850 1.176
Educ. Expenditure - . 0 0 2 .061 - . 0 0 1 -.039 .969 .995 1.005
GDP p.c. . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 .147 3.113 . 0 0 2 .436 2.292
State Fragility -.305 .169 - . 1 0 2 -1.809 .071 .305 3.281
Globalization .265 .058 .244 4.583 . 0 0 0 .342 2.921
Dem ocracy 1.060 .130 .326 8.183 . 0 0 0 .613 1.630
a. Dependent Variable: Key UNGA votes
3 b) key UN G eneral Assem bly votes - Dreher, Sturm  & Vreeland  
The Dreher, Sturm  and Vreeland data produces a model w ith 657 observations, 
significantly few er than the VS model. From table 5.19 below, the m odei has a ro b u s t 
adjusted R2 o f  .435.











F Change dfl df2 Sig. F Change
1 ,664a .441 .435 15.76920 .441 73.131 7 649 . 0 0 0
a. Predictors: (Constant), State Fragility. EDUEXP% GDP, M1LEXP%GDP, Citizen Dipl., Dem ocracy, GDP 
p.c., Globalization
As was the case in the VS model, the DSV data m odel has four out o f  seven variables 
wTiose coefficients are statistically significant and positively signed as shown in table 
5.20 below. The finding o f  the VS model is repeated wdth regard to the citizen 
diplomacy: the coefficient is not statistically significant. In this model, the GD P per 
capita is not statistically significant. However, the coefficient for state fragility is 
statistically significant and negatively signed, as expected. State fragility was
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hypothesized to correlate negatively with voting in congruence at the UN General 
A ssem bly, due to breakdown in governance, ability to take votes and elite 
factionalization am ong other issues.
Table 5.20 Host Country, key UNGA votes DSV m odel coefficients'
M o d e l U n s t a n d a r d i z e d
C o e f f i c i e n t s
S t a n d a r d i z e d
C o e f f i c i e n t s
l S ig . C o l l i n e a r i t y  S t a t i s t i c s
B S t d .  E r r o r B e t a T o l e r a n c e V I F
( C o n s t a n t ) 1 5 . 1 4 0 4 . 7 0 5 3 . 2 1 8 .0 0 1
C i t i z e n  D i p l . - . 0 1 7 . 0 1 1 - . 0 4 9 - 1 . 4 6 3 . 1 4 4 . 7 5 6 1 . 3 2 2
D e m o c r a c y 1 . 1 9 9 . 1 3 2 . 3 3 9 9 . 1 0 1 0 0 0 6 2 1 1 . 6 1 0
, G D P  p . c . . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 7 7 1 . 7 1 1 0 8 8 . 4 2 6 2 . 3 4 8
G l o b a l i z a t i o n . 2 5 7 . 0 6 2 . 2 1 4 4 . 1 5 8 , 0 0 0 . 3 2 4 3 . 0 8 6
E D I J E X P % G D P - . 0 2 3 . 0 3 3 - . 0 2 1 - . 7 0 4 4 8 2 . 9 9 4 1 . 0 0 6
M 1 L E X P % G D P . 5 4  i . 1 9 6 . 0 8 8 2 . 7 5 8 . 0 0 6 . 8 4 5 1 . 1 8 4
S t a t e  F r a g i l i t y - . 5 7 3 . 1 7 8 - . 1 7 4 - 3 . 2 2 4 .0 0 1 . 2 9 7 3 . 3 6 6
a. D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e :  K e y  U N G A  V o t e s
3 c) A ll U N G eneral Assem bly votes - Voeten & Strezhnev
On the correlation between host country variables and voting with the US at the UN 
General A ssem bly on all votes, the Voeten and Strezhnev (V S) model generates 670 
observations, and a robust, adjusted R2 o f .445 as shown in table 5.21 below.













d fl df2 Sig, F Change
1 .67 l a .451 .445 10.79492 .451 77.638 7 662 . 0 0 0
a. Predictors: (Constant), Democracy, Citizen Diplomats, Educ. Expenditure. Mil. Expenditure, 
Globalization, GDP p.c., State Fragility
In this m odel, as shown in table 5.22 below', six o f the seven variables have statistically 
significant coefficients, including the coefficient for citizen diplom acy. H owever, it is
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negatively signed, suggesting that placem ent o f  citizen diplom ats correlates negatively 
with congruent voting between the recipient country and the United N ations at the 
General A ssem bly, especially on all UNGA votes. This is a  somewhat surprisingly signed 
coefficient. It is notable, however, that the coefficient keeps with the general expectation 
that host-country' variables explain some o f  the congruent voting w ith the US at the UN. 
The coefficient for state fragility is also statistically significant at the 90 percent 
confidence level and negatively signed as expected; state fragility w ill correlate with 
decreased congruent voting with the US at the UN General Assembly .







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIE
(Constant) 18.090 3.173 5.702 . 0 0 0
Citizen Diplomats -.030 .007 -.138 -4.218 . 0 0 0 .771 1.296
Mil. Expenditure .551 .134 .128 4.098 . 0 0 0 .852 1.174
Educ. Expenditure . 0 0 1 . 0 2 2 .0 0 1 .045 .964 .995 1.005
GDP p.c. . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 .174 3.965 . 0 0 0 .433 2.31 1
State Fragility -.203 .118 -.088 -1.713 .087 .317 3.154
Globalization .213 .042 .249 5.069 . 0 0 0 .343 2.919
Democracy .692 .090 .280 7.712 . 0 0 0 .628 1.593
a. Dependent Variable: All UNGA Votes
3 d) A ll UN G eneral Assem bly voles - Dreher, Sturm  & Vreeland m odel 
The DSV model on host-country variables and their explanation o f  the variation in 
congruent voting with the US at the UN General A ssem bly generates 657 valid 
observations and a less robust adjusted R2 o f .310 as shown in table 5.23 below.
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F Change dfl dO S ig .F
Change
1 .563’ .317 .310 17.16840 .317 43.097 7 649 . 0 0 0
a. Predictors: (Constant), State Fragility, EDUEXP% GDP, MILEXP%GDP. Citizen Dipl.. Dem ocracy, 
GDP p.c.. Globalization
O f the seven variables, five o f  their coefficients shown in table 5.24 are statistically 
significant and all are positively signed, including the coefficient for citizen diplom acy, 
indicating citizen diplomacy does help explain som e o f the variation in the congruent 
voting with the US at the UN General A ssem bly on all votes.







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 7.143 5.120 1.395 .163
Citizen Dipl. .008 .013 .025 .675 .500 .756 1.333
Democracy .759 .143 .218 5.294 . 0 0 0 .621 1.610
GDP p.c. . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 .242 4.871 . 0 0 0 .426 2.347
Globalization .185 .067 .157 2.751 .006 ,324 3.086
EDUEXP% GDP -.013 .036 - . 0 1 2 ,3 6 9 .712 .994 1.006
MJLEXP%GDP .786 .214 .130 3.682 . 0 0 0 .844 1.184
State Fragility -.326 .194 - . 1 0 0 -1.683 .093 .297 3.364
a. Dependent Variable: All UNGA votes
In this m odel, state fragility is statistically significant and negatively signed as expected. 
The level o f  level o f  expenditure on education as a percentage o f  GDP per capita is not 
statistically significant.
Temporal and regional effects
4 a) K ey UN General Assem bly votes (VS Model)
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Previously, I outlined the expectation that the data here is expected to suffer from three o f 
the most com m on tim e-series cross-sectional data (TSCS) statistical consequences, 
nam ely a) panel heteroscedasticity' (residuals will not have the same expected values 
between two countries, b) contem poraneous correlation (correlation betw een tw o dyadic 
measures, for exam ple countries in the same geographic region voting the sam e way, for 
exam ple Egypt and Syria) and c) serial correlation (the way a country voted the previous 
year is unlikely to change significantly from one year to the next). The control factors, 
which include the regional dum m y variables to control for regional variation, and the 
tem poral control (year) are introduced in order to control, for exam ple, for the serial 
correlation (by controlling for the year).
I develop two models each based on the V oeten & Strezhnev data m odel, and on ■ 
the Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland data m odel, conducting regressions on the key U NG A  
votes and all the UN General A ssem bly votes. The first m odel, the V oeten & Strezhnev 
data, generates a sample o f  2382 observations, with an adjusted R2 o f  .314 as shown in 
table 5.25 below.











F Change dfl df2 Sig. F 
Change
1 ,562a .316 .314 17.11184 .316 156.506 7 2374 . 0 0 0
a. Predictors: ("Constant), Oceania, N. America, Europe, Year, Citizen Diplomats, A sia, S. America
In the VS model coefficients shown in table 5.26 below, all seven variables have 
statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that as a predictor o f  voting w ith the US at 
the UN General Assem bly on key votes, the region a country is in m atters, that citizen
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diplom acy is an im portant predictor o f  how  countries vote. It is im portant to  note that the 
regional variable for A frica was excluded from the model. The year coefficient is 
negatively signed, rehashing an earlier finding that over tim e, countries vote less with the 
US at the UN General Assem bly on key votes.







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 2083.439 102.056 20.415 . 0 0 0
Year -1.029 .051 -.350 -20.137 . 0 0 0 .954 1.049
Citizen Diplomat .027 .005 .092 5.305 . 0 0 0 .955 1.047
, N. America 27.955 4.102 .117 6.815 . 0 0 0 .974 1.027
o. America 14.720 .856 .335 17.193 . 0 0 0 .758 1.320
Europe 31.578 1.195 .504 26.435 . 0 0 0 .792 1.263
Asia 5.978 1 . 0 2 0 .114 5.864 . 0 0 0 .769 1.300
Oceania 38.491 7.026 .093 5.478 . 0 0 0 .991 1.009
a. Dependent Variable. Key UNGA votes
4 b) Temporal and  regional effects - Key UNGA Votes (Dreher, Sturm  & Vr eel and)
The DSV model generates 2687 valid observations, with an adjusted R2 o f  .283 as shown 
in table 5.27 below, is less robust than the VS model despite 300 m ore observations.











F Change dfl dt2 Sig. F 
Change
1 .534a .285 .283 19.49681 .285 152.732 7 2679 . 0 0 0
a. Predictors: (Constant), Oceania, N  America, Europe, YEAR, Citizen Dipl., Asia, S. America
All the coefficients for the seven variables, as shown in the model coefficients in table 
5.28 below, are statistically significant and positively signed, apart from  the year variable
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whose signage is negative as in m ost o f the other models. The Africa regional variable is 
similarly removed. 1 conclude therefore that the regional and temporal factors affect the 
congruence in voting with the US at the UN G eneral Assembly.





t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 2035.491 109.673 18.560 . 0 0 0
Citizen Dip! .046 .006 .135 8.085 . 0 0 0 .959 i .042
YEAR -1.008 .055 -.305 -18.351 . 0 0 0 .965 1.036
, N America 32.376 4.661 .115 6 .946 . 0 0 0 .979 1 . 0 2 2
S. America 14.256 .914 .290 15.590 . 0 0 0 7 7 3 1.293
Europe 34.162 1.312 .470 26.037 . 0 0 0 .819 1 .2 2 1
Asia 5.266 1.071 .091 4 .918 . 0 0 0 .776 1.289
Oceania 43.473 7.998 .089 5.435 . 0 0 0 993 1.007
a Dependent Variable: Key UNGA Votes
4 c) Temporal and regional effects - A ll UNGA Votes - Voeten & S trezh m v  
The VS model for tem poral and regional effects on congruence voting with the US at the 
UN General Assem bly on all votes generates 3440 valid observations. The adjusted R 2 
shown in the model summary table 5.29 is a robust .512.






o f  the 
Estimate
Chanue Statistics
R Square Change F
Change
dfl df2 Sig. F 
Change
1 .716“ .513 .512 11.92567 .513 516.628 7 3432 . 0 0 0
a. Predictors: (Constant), Oceania. N. America, Europe, Asia, Citizen Diplomats, Year, S. America
The m odel’s seven variables, shown in table 5.30 below, have statistically significant 
coefficients at the 99 percent confidence level, except for the citizen diplom acy variable
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coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. This 
reinforces the finding that regional and tem poral effects are important in predicting and 
explaining countries congruent voting with the US at the UN General A ssem bly. The 
year coefficient is still negatively signed, concurring with the DSV and VS m odels on 
regional and temporal effects on voting with the US at UN General A ssem bly.





t Sig. Col linearity 
Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance V 1F
(Constant) 1844.352 35.114 52.525 . 0 0 0
Year -.910 .018 -.667 -51.641 . 0 0 0 .851 1.175
Citizen Diplomats .005 . 0 0 2 .026 2.045 .041 .882 1.13?
N. America 12.450 2.840 .053 4.384 . 0 0 0 .985 1.015
i
S. America 7.102 .486 .193 14.603 . 0 0 0 .810 1.234
Europe 27.032 .780 .449 34.673 . 0 0 0 .847 1.181.
Asia 5.027 .570 .116 8.812 . 0 0 0 .817 1.223
Oceania 31.088 4.885 .076 6.363 . 0 0 0 .995 1.005
a Dependent Variable: All UNGA Votes
4 d) Temporal and regional effects - A ll UNGA Votes - Dre.her, Sturm  «& Vreeland  
The temporal and regional effects DSV m odel on all UNG A votes has 3,282 valid 
observations, with an adjusted R2 o f  .125 as shown in table 5.31 below.













dfl df2 Sig. F 
Change
1 .356a .127 .125 17.94040 .127 67.962 7 3274 . 0 0 0
a. Predictors: (Constant), Oceania, N America, Europe, Asia, Citizen Dipl., YEAR. S, America
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The coefficients for the seven variables, including citizen diplom acy, tem poral (year) and 
the five regional dum m y variables (N orth and South America, Europe, A sia and O ceania) 
are all statistically significant and positively signed as shown in table 5.32 below. In most 
o f  the previous models, the year coefficient has been negatively signed; therefore this 
model shows a departure from previous findings w ith the year coefficient. This DSV 
model on all UN General Assem bly votes shows that over time, countries vote m arginally 
more in congruence with the US at the UN General A ssem bly on all votes than other 
previously m odels have shown. The changes are. however, quite m arginal. The result 
suggests that in every progressive year, countries are m ore likely to vote in congruence 
with the US at the UN General A ssem bly on all votes.





t Sig. C’ollinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIE
(Constant; -111.239 61.878 -1 798 .072
Citizen Dipl. .044 .004 .174 10.243 . 0 0 0 .927 1.079
YEAR .064 .031 .035 2.059 .040 .901 i . l  1 0
 ̂ N America 22.114 4.277 .085 5.171 . 0 0 0 .983 1.017
S. America 3.256 .748 .080 4.353 . 0 0 0 .799 1.252
Europe 22.640 1.175 .344 19.274 . 0 0 0 .836 1.197
Asia 2 . 8 8 8 .891 .059 3.240 . 0 0 1 .807 1.240
Oceania 20.884 7.353 .047 2.840 .005 .994 1.006
a. Dependent Variable: All UNGA votes
Sum m ary o f  results
The results from the sixteen models presented above have shown that for the m ost part, 
citizen diplom acy correlates with higher congruent voting w ith the US at the UN G eneral 













































T able 5.33 The Voeten-Strehnev Data m odel sum m ary



















.V 376 451 1463 1648 581 670 2382 2687
Estimated coefficient (standard error)
Citizen 0.029 *’ .0 2 1 '" .0 2 1 "
.013"*
(.004)
-.009 -.030" .027*" .005”
Diplomats (.013) (.006) (.006) (.0 1 1 ) (.007) (.005) (.0 0 2 )
US Military 0 .0 0 1 "* - . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 - . 0 0 2
Aid (.003) (.0 0 2 ) (.003) (.0 0 2 )
US Aid 0.009' .006* -.003 ’ -.004"
(.005) (.003) ( .0 0 2 ) (.0 0 2 )
FDI from US -0 034 -.007 -.006 -.016
(0.032). (.017) (.0 2 2 ) (0 1 4 )
FD1 to US -0 . 0 0  i - . 0 0 1 .0 0 1 . 0 0 0
(.0 0 1 ). ( 0 0 1 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 )
Immigration 0 . 0 0 0 .0 0 0 "
-1.93e- -3.52e-
(.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) 005
(.0 0 0 )
005
( 0 0 0 ) ‘
Military 0.280 .054 : .625" .551*’
Expenditure (.193) (.099) (.2 0 0 ) (.134)
Educational 0.007 - . 0 0 1 - . 0 0 2 .0 0 1
Expenditure : (.054) (.015) (0 6 1 ) (.0 2 2 )
GDP p.c.
0 . 0 0 0
(.0 0 0 )
. 0 0 0  
(.0 0 0 ) - -
.0 0 0 "
(.0 0 0 )
.0 0 0 "
(.0 0 0 ) - -
State .-0 . 2 1 0 - 253" -.305* -.203'
Fragility (.2 1 2 ). (.113) (.169) (.118)
Globalization
0 . 0 1 1 -.040 : .265“ .213“
(.084) ( 044) (.058) (.042)
Democracy 0.536
(.138)







34.372" 16.486" 2 7 .9 5 5 “ : 12.45”
(.138) (7.009) ' 4 .102 (2.840)
S. America
9.614" 2.072* 14.720“ 7.102"*










Asia 5.861" 5.240"* 5 978*" 5 ,027“ '(1.849) (.967) ( 1 .0 2 0 ) (.570)
Africa - - - - - - - -
Oceania 38.49*" 31.09***
(7.026) (4 .885)
Year -1 .26“ ' - 1 .8 6 *" -1.03"* .910***(.247) (.135) (.051) (.018)
significant at 0 . level " significant at the 0.05 level *** significant at the 0 . 0 1  
level
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In m ost o f  the models, the coefficient for citizen diplom acy behaves as predicted: it is 
statistically significant and positively signed, underlining this expected relationship. In 
the following section, I present the results in two tables, outlining the key findings o f  the 
research based on the V oeten-Strehnev (VS) data, and secondly, based on the Dreher, 
Sturm and Vreeland (DSV) data.
From the Voeten-Strehnev data sum m ary model, it is easier to determ ine w hat 
explanatory variables are statistically significant, as hypothesized by the different 
hypotheses regarding how different variables help explain voting behavior. This research 
hypothesized that citizen diplom acy correlates w ith congruent voting w ith the US at the 
UN General Assem bly as an expression o f  US support o f the achievem ent o f 
developm ent activities, training o f  m anpower, changing the wav the US is perceived 
abroad. In return, citizen diplom at recipient countries vote more in congruence with the 
US at the UN General A ssem bly. This indicates m utuality in bilateral relationships and 
allows the US and the dyadic country signal to each other their positive relationship 
especially where such signaling is open (that is, at an international forum).
A s hypothesized, citizen diplom acy is an im portant explanan o f  the congruence in 
voting w ith the US at the UN General Assem bly. In the Voeten-Strehnev D ata m odel, the 
coefficient for citizen diplom acy is statistically significant in seven o f  the eight m odels, 
which is in itself a robust finding. Countries therefore are more likely to vote in 
congruence with the US at the UN G eneral A ssem bly if  they receive citizen diplom ats.
O f the seven m odels whose coefficients are statistically significant, three o f  the 
model's coefficients are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level, w hile 
the rem aining four are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The
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coefficients are positively signed the placem ent o f  citizen diplom ats corresponds with 
congruent voting with the US at the UN General Assembly. The only finding o f  no 
significance in this data model was located in the host country factors as explanans o f  
foreign policy behavior: citizen diplom acy has no effect on voting congruence with the 
US at the UN G eneral A ssem bly on key votes even when they receive citizen diplom ats.
There are other statistically significant coefficients — and therefore -  findings. In 
three o f  four m odels, at the 95 percent confidence level, the coefficient for dem ocracy 
was statistically significant and positively signed. M ore dem ocratic countries therefore 
vote more in congruence with the US at the UN General Assem bly. This is an im portant 
finding, since it can be argued that for the US, dem ocratization has a positive outcom e for 
support o f  the US at the UN General Assembly.
A nother key finding is that in half the models in w hich the variable was tested, 
globalization's coefficient was statistically significant and positively signed. This finding 
confirm s the hypothesized effect o f  globalization, w hich is expected to  correlate with 
congruent voting with the US at the UN General Assem bly. State fragility was 
hypothesized to correspond with more congruent voting w'ith the US at the U N  General 
A ssem bly, but the finding is ju s t the opposite. In one o f  the four m odels, state fragility’s 
coefficient is statistically significant and negatively signed. State fragility is expected to 
correlate w ith less congruent voting with the US at the UN General A ssem bly. The 
explanations can vary, but the breakdown o f  governm ent, difficulty in logistics, 
factionalization o f  elites and other difficulties in the country can lead to this outcome.
Foreign direct investment, contrary to expectations, has no correlation with the 
congruence in voting with the US at the UN General Assem bly. The case o f  trade
between the US and china can perhaps best illustrate the priorities o f  a country in pursuit 
o f  their econom ic interests w ithout regard to how  m uch support they get from the trading 
partner. In tw o o f  the four m odels High GDP per capita, w hich often denotes and 
corresponds with higher levels o f  dem ocratization and globalization, has a statistically 
significant coefficient. It is also positively signed, indicating that as a  country becom es 
wealthier, it is more likely to vote in congruence with the US at the UN General 
Assem bly. Imm igration to the US is not a robust explanan for w hether countries vote in 
congruence with the US at the UN G eneral Assem bly. In the four m odels in which the 
variable w as tested, the coefficient is statistically significant in only one o f  the four It 
w ould appear that im migrating to the US does not translate into significant benefits for 
the US or the im migrant origin country.
The coefficient for US foreign aid is statistically significant in one o f  the four 
m odels in which it is tested. In addition, the coefficient is negatively signed, indicating 
that foreign aid does not lead to more congruent voting w ith the US at the UN General 
Assembly. US net military aid is also not an im portant consideration for countries in 
deciding their voting practices; in the four m odels where net IJS m ilitary aid was tested, 
none o f  the coefficients were statistically significant. This m ay be explained by the more 
robust consideration o f  US national interest, m ilitary alliances and other security 
com m itm ents, for example the Cam p David agreem ents that saw military' aid to Egypt 
increase substantially.
On the host country factors, a country's m ilitary expenditure’s coefficients are 
statistically significant in two o f  the four models and positively signed. H owever, the 
coefficients are only significant in the host country model. Expenditure on education is
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also not an im portant explanan o f  how  countries vote with the US at the UN G eneral 
Assem bly. O f the four coefficients from four different m odels, none o f  the coefficients 
are statistically significant.
The temporal and regional variables are statistically significant in four o f  the eight 
m odels. The regional variables' coefficients are positively signed. The coefficient for 
A frica is rem oved from all the eight m odels, while the coefficient for O ceania is only 
present in two o f  the eight models, but is positively signed. The year coefficient is 
statistically significant in four o f  the eight models. It is negatively signed, indicating that 
over time, countries vote less in congruence with the US at the UN G eneral A ssem bly.
The Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland data  model
The Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland D ata model (D SV ) was primarily used as a control 
m echanism  to determine if  the findings obtained by using the V oeten-Strehnev dataset 
and findings hold, given the different ways o f  com puting the affinity o f  nations scores.
As previously stated, the V oeten-Strehnev m odel calculates affinity based on all roll call 
votes at the UN, based on three criteria: yes votes, no votes and abstention.
A bstention counts for a half-yes. half-no vote. This accounts for all the votes 
taken at the UN General Assembly, w hereas the Dreher, Strum  and V reeland's data that is 
used in this study uses the variable inlinehlusa , denoting voting in line w ith USA, 
definition according to Barro and Lee. In addition, the coding of the data begins in 1970, 
and elim inates nine years in which citizen diplom ats were being placed by the US. Since 
the models w ith key UN General A ssem bly votes account for data beginning in 1983, it is 
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in the Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (DSV) model, the citizen diplomacy variable produces 
the hypothesized results in five o f  the eight models. The citizen diplom acy coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in four o f  these eight m odels 
and statistically significant at 90 percent confidence level in the rem aining m odel. In 
these five m odels, all the coefficients are positively signed indicating a correlation 
between voting in congruence with the US at the UN General Assem bly and the 
placem ent o f  citizen diplom ats. This is a significant finding since it dem onstrates that 
even when the data is treated differently, and the congruence in voting w ith the US at the 
UN General A ssem bly defined in several ways, citizen diplomacy is still an im portant 
variable in bilateral relations and in how  states behave tow ards the US.
In the bilateral attraction factors m odels, US m ilitary aid's coefficient is 
statistically significant in one o f  the four models; it is also positively signed. US foreign 
aid's coefficient, is statistically significant in one o f  the three models, hut is negatively 
signed, showing that countries that receive US foreign aid either to not vote <n 
congruence with the US at the UN. or that countries do not view US foreign aid as a 
condition for their support o f the US at the UN G eneral Assembly.
Foreign direct to the US, however, has a coefficient that is statistically significant 
in three o f  the four variables, and is positively signed. However, the rate o f  change in the 
coefficients is very marginal. FDI from the US to the country in the dyadic relationship 
has a statistically significant coefficient in one o f  the four models. This coefficient is 
positively signed. Therefore, foreign direct investm ent as a whole, to and from  the US. is 
statistically significant in four o f  the eight models.
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In the host country factors, m ilitary expenditure as percentage o f  GDP per capita 
has a statistically significant coefficient in three o f  the four models and these coefficients 
are positively signed. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 90 percent. 95 
percent and 99 percent confidence levels. Countries spending more o f  their GD P per 
capita on their m ilitary, surprisingly, vote m ore in congruence with the US than those that 
do not. In one o f  the models, however, the coefficient is statistically significant at the 90 
percent confidence level. In the educational expenditure as percentage o f  G D P category, 
one o f  the four models has a statistically significant coefficient at the 95 percent 
confidence level.
A s the previous model found, countries w ith higher GDP per capita also tend to 
vote more with the US as shown by the two out o f four statistically significant and 
positively signed coefficients, although again, in the DSV key votes m odel, the statistical 
significance is at the 90 percent confidence level. G lobalization, which has been 
hypothesized to be closely related with GDP per capita, also has two statistically 
significant and positively signed coefficients. Democracy's statistically significant 
coefficient is present in one out o f  four m odels in which the variable w as tested, and in 
this modej it is surprisingly negatively signed. State fragility has no statistical 
significance, contrary to the previous finding.
The temporal and regional variables m irror those o f  the prior m odel. N orth 
A m erica’s coefficients are statistically significant and positively signed in three o f  four 
m odels, Europe's four out o f  four coefficients are statistically significant and positively 
signed, as is the case with Asia and the two o f  four statistically significant coefficients for 
the Oceania regional dummy variable. A frica's coefficients have been rem oved. The
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temporal effects are interesting in that w hile the coefficients for the four m odels are 
statistically significant, in two o f  the four, the coefficients are negatively signed and two 
are positively signed. It is not clear from these m odels whether over tim e, countries vote 
more, or less, with the US at the UN General Assembly.
Summary of key results
In this chapter, I perform ed the statistical regressions for tw o sets o f  data, the first dataset 
by V oeten-Strehnev (VS m odel) and the second by Dreher, Sturm and V reeland (DSV). 
Each o f the datasets had eight m odels, based on a) all variables observed, b) factors o f  
bilateral relationships, c) host country attributes and d) regional and tem poral variations. 1 
found that as expected, citizen diplom acy correlates positively with congruent voting 
with the US at the UN General A ssem bly in seven o f  the eight models in the Voeten- 
Strehnev dataset, and in five o f  the eight m odels in the Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 
model. In all these models, the coefficients were statistically significant and positively 
signed, denoting this positive relationship. A ll told, citizen diplomacy correlates with 
congruent voting w ith the US at the UN Genera! A ssem bly in twelve o f  the sixteen 
models tested.
O ther results are w'orthy o f note. The level o f  dem ocracy w-as statistically 
significant and positively signed in four o f  the total eight models, indicating that 
dem ocratization may be beneficial for the United States in its pursuit o f  its foreign policy 
goals and objectives. The level o f  globalization, closely correlated w ith dem ocratization 
and GDP per capita, was statistically significant in four o f  the eight models.
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Regional variables were also significant in about 90 percent o f  the m odels in 
which they were tested, as were the temporal effects. It is clear from the results that some 
regions are more likely to vote in congruence with the US at the UN General A ssem bly 
than others: this is especially true o f  North A m erica, Europe, Asia and O ceania. O ver 
time, how ever, as has been dem onstrated by the year variable, countries vote less in 
congruence with the US at the UN General A ssem bly. In six o f the eight m odels with 
statistically significant coefficients, the coefficients were negatively signed indicating a 
decline in the support o f  US foreign policy.
The next chapter evaluates w hether these correlations that are evident in the data 
are supported through case studies that dem onstrate areas o f  agreem ent between foreign . 
countries (governm ents, citizens and elites) w ith those o f  the United States. In particular,.* 
1 w ill look at case studies o f  countries in which the country received citizen diplom ats, 
and the work o f  such diplom ats made a difference to the country in som e w ay ot another, 
where the outcom e could change the country’s institutions, practices or perception 
towards the US. i will utilize three case studies that highlight areas in which citizen 
diplom acy has the potential to have m uch effect. These case studies will be a) effect o f  
citizen diplom acy on national policy (Tanzania), b) issue linkage (US m ilitary and 
econom ic developm ent support and Ethiopia’s education sector) and c) personal and 
interpersonal connections and their effect on elites (Peru).
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CHAPTER VI 
Q UA LITATIVE EV ID ENCE - CASE STUDIES
Introduction
The previous chapter dem onstrated quantitatively that a relationship exists between 
citizen diplom acy and recipient states’ foreign policy behavior m easured through 
congruence in voting with the United States at the United Nations. The discussion on the 
use o f  m ixed m ethods argued that quantitative studies are one of the ways in  which a 
researcher can interrogate the relationship between citizen diplom acy and state behavior. 
This chapter explore.-!, the second o f  the mixed m ethods -  that is, the qualitative approach 
through case studies -  to exam ine the outcom es o f  citizen diplomacy.
M uch o f  the research on the im pact o f  citizen diplomacy has been largely based 
on qualitative m easures, and the quantitative aspects o f  citizen diplom acy are still in their 
early stages. As such, it is im portant to use tools that have served the e valuation o f  citizen 
diplom acy well to consider its impact. Indeed, Bhandari and Belvavina note that while 
citizen diplom acy research has existed since the advent o f  the exchange o f  ideas betw een 
people and across nations, "scholars and program im plem enters have collected 
inform ation on the outcomes o f the program s, although much o f the inform ation gathered 
in the past has been anecdotal and focused m ostly on the im pact on individual 
participants" rather than the recipient societies and countries.1
Due to the overwhelm ing focus on the im pact o f volunteering on the volunteer 
and not the recipient country, this has created a situation where assessm ent and  analysis
‘ Rajika Bhandari & Raisa Belvavina. "Evaluating and M easuring the Im pact o f  Citizen 
Diplom acy: C urrent Status and Future D irections." Institute o f International Education (HE). 
Report prepared for: U.S. C itizenship D iplom acy Sum m it, W ashington. DC, N ov. 17-19, 2010.
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o f those outcom es for the target com m unities is minim al, alm ost nonexistent. This
situation therefore necessitates researchers to use existing and/or propose new  approaches
to qualitatively exam ine the im pact o f citizen diplom acy on the countries the diplom ats
serve; this research, recognizing the dearth o f  such approaches, proposes new  ones.
The chapter proposes three lenses through which the impact o f  citizen diplom acy
abroad will be considered. These are, first, the interpersonal model, which exam ines
personality and personal connections and how these changed the perception o f
indi viduals, com m unities and countries towards the US as a  result o f  the citizen
diplomatcv. The second lens, the foreign policy m odel, wall assess the role o f  citizen
diplom ats in affecting or changing the national policy o f the countries in which they
served, in a w ay that potentially altered the relationship w ith  the United States. Third, the
issue linkages model will be exam ined in view' o f  the contributions o f  citizen diplom ats;
that is, how the US linked different issues with foreign policy behavior tow ards the US.
The chapter analyzes the contribution o f citizen diplomacy through these three
approaches. Three case-stuaies are selected: Tanzania. Peru and Ethiopia. The selected
cases do not reflect an attem pt to fit the cases to the models; rather, they represent some
o f the best successes that the Peace C orps’ citizen diplom ats have experienced, and
places where they have made the m ost significant contributions to changing the
perception o f  the country 's foreign policy towards the United States. The selection o f  the
cases also builds into some existing research about the outcom es o f  volunteering. M ati,
for exam ple, arguing in support o f  regional and international volunteering and its
benefits, that in East and Southern Africa
volunteer exchange program m es are bridges for people-to-people interactions that 
can aid a regional identity form ation and in facing common developm ent al
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challenges. As such, a num ber o f indications are em erging that the enhancem ent 
o f  regional awareness and the developm ent o f  a regional identity at grassroots 
level could be fostered through regional youth exchange program m es that support 
the developm ent priorities o f  regional integration initiatives such as SADC, the 
EAC and the African Union. Such priorities include poverty alleviation, 
com bating health challenges such as HIV and AIDS, human resource 
developm ent, gender equality, environm ental conservation and sustainable 
developm ent, and even peace and security."
It is im perative that the models suggested address the strongest cases possible, link to
existing literature but also evaluate the outcom es which are adequately covered by the
citizen diplom at outcom es in these three countries. In addition, the case selection takes
into account the fact that approxim ately 40 per cent o f  Peace Corps volunteers go to
Africa, w hich explains the two cases selected from the A frican continent. The research
recognizes the im portance o f diversifying the case selection to different continents in
order to account for any regional variances and account for rival explanations. However,
the issue o f  missing and incomplete country reports where the models w ould be
adequately justified  w as weighed against the need to  begin form ulating credible m odeis
that can help explain citizen diplom acy and its outcomes.
The three selected cases will be analyzed through the three m odels proposed,
namely a) the interpersonal model, b) the foreign policy processes and approaches model
and the c) issue linkages model.
Case studies
Case studies as defined by George and Bennett, are exam inations o f  "a class o f  events" 
such as revolutions, types o f  government regim es, kinds o f  economic system s or
" Jacob M wathi M ati. "Youth volunteer exchange program m es in southern and eastern 
Africa: M odels and effects." V olunteer and Service Inquiry (V O SESA) and the U niversity  o f  the 
W itwatersrand, (2011): 3.
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personality types. These m ethods have grown in acceptance and application in 
explanation o f phenom ena and developm ent o f  theory.3 T heir use derives from  the 
lim itation o f  quantitative m ethods and because o f  the stability o f new' qualitative m ethods 
and suitability o f  such m ethods in filling knowledge gaps.4 Dorothy Leonard-Barton 
views the qualitative study method as com prising o f  case study m ethodology (how  and 
why) multiple cases and longitudinal studies.5
As for the role o f  interpretive case studies in research, W alsham attributes their 
im portance to the "three distinct uses o f theory: as an initial guide to design and data 
collection; as part o f  an iterative process o f  data collection and analysis; and as a final 
product o f  the research."6 While quantitative scholars may argue the undesirability o f  
generalizing from single experim ents such as the "classes o f  events" alluded to by G eorge 
and Bennett, Yin writes that "scientific experim ents are rarely based on single 
experim ents; they are usually based on a multiple set o f experiments" and further argues 
that "case studies, like experim ents, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not 
to populations or universes."' The significance o f  case studies expanding and 
generalizing theories o f citizen diplom acy and the larger topic of soft pow er therefore
" Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. Case studies and theory development in the 
social sciences. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005): 17-18.
4 Ibid., 4.
3 Dorothy Leonard-Barton. "A Dual Methodology for Case Studies: Synergistic Use of a 
Longitudinal Single Site with Replicated Multiple Sites." Organization Science, 1. No. 3, Special 
Issue: Longitudinal Field Research Methods for Studying Processes of Organizational Change 
(1990): 250.
" G. Walsham. "Interpretive case studies in IS research: nature and method." European 
Journal o f Information Systems, 4 f 1995): 77.
Robert K Yin. Case study research: design and methods. (Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications, 1994): 15.
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will aim to "expand and generalize theories, not to enum erate frequencies (statistical 
generalization). "8 The objective then, is to generalize on the perceived im pact o f  citizen 
diplom acy across different com m unities, not to particularize such im pact.
This chapter proceeds as follows: I begin by outlining the im portance o f  case 
studies in furthering the understanding o f  the alternative approaches to citizen diplom acy, 
its role in foreign policy and the larger soft power theoretical and policy questions. T then 
discuss the selection o f  case studies through three hypothesized approaches di scussed 
previously. The chapter then discusses how the case studies illustrate the im portance o f  
citizen diplomacy, and concludes by showing the com plem entarity o f  the qualitati ve and 
quantitative approaches.
Qualitative impact on foreign policy
Data from the previous quantitative section showed that there is, in man}- instances and 
controlling for a num ber o f  rival explanations, a correlation between citizen diplom acy 
and state behavior as m easured through congruent voting with the US at the United 
N ations General Assembly It is im portant to note that citizen diplom ats on a larger scale, 
and their work, do not necessarily directly cause countries to vote in congruence with the 
United States at the UN General Assem bly. As the quantitative section dem onstrated, 
bilateral, m ultilateral and host-country variables also correlate with som e level o f  
congruence in foreign policy behavior. This dem onstrates that soft pow er as a foreign 
policy option, through its m ultifaceted approaches, is an effective foreign policy strategy.
Correlation is not causation: citizen diplom acy has not been shown to cause 
countries to vote m ore in congruence w ith the US at the UN General A ssem bly as a result 
8 Ibid.
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o f citizen diplom at placem ent. Indeed, since its founding, the Peace Corps dem onstrated 
general apathy tow ards quantitative m easurem ent o f  its im pact in the recipient nations. 
One o f  the m ost challenging difficulties o f  m easuring the Peace Corps im pact is 
illustrated by Searles,9 who writes that "Ashabranner lamented in the 1960s that 'the 
rhetoric o f  the Peace C orps as a dram atic world force' had become a burden" and 
therefore "Peace Corps declared that the work o f  the agency was not susceptible to 
quantitative m easures and needed to be accepted by faith.” 10 The question still remains: 
has the Peace C orps' 200,000- volunteers made a difference especially in how  the US is 
perceived abroad and does this translate to countries being more US-friend!y?
M ost scholars and a m ajority o f  the public and policy makers agree that it has. but 
measuring that difference is exceedingly difficult. Searles quotes Peter M cPherson, 
USAID adm inistrator as suggesting that "the very nature o f  the Peace C orps m ilitates 
against effective and sustained m easurem ent o f  progress — tw o-year tours, in-country jobs 
negotiated yearly with host governments., work with institutions that arc disorganized 
and, most importantly, the intangibility o f  the Peace Corps service to the disenfranchised 
and disengaged."11 W hile this m ight be a plausible explanation, it is im portant to seek 
other ways o f  ascertaining that citizen diplom acy is indeed effective. H ow else then, can 
we measure the impact o f  citizen diplom ats on state behavior, on elites and on citizens o f 
the recipient countries? One o f  the ways to m easure the im pact is through qualitative
9 P David Searles. Major problems in American foreign The Peace Corps experience: 




means: assessing the statem ents o f  the foreign countries, foreign countries' leaders and 
com m unities for evidence o f  positive assessm ent o f  international vo lun teering 's  impact.
Evaluating Peace Corps V olunteers' qualitative im pact ought to target foreign 
countries' nationals and policy-m akers, and develop survey instruments and/or interview s 
that elicit responses regarding the perceived im pact. However, as studies will repeatedly 
dem onstrate, evaluation o f  Peace Corps volunteers’ work is often carried out through 
surveying the PCVs themselves. Cohn, W ood and Haag illustrate this, w riting that "in 
1978 the Evaluation Division o f  A C TIO N ’S O ffice o f  Policy and Planning distributed a 
20-page questionnaire to all Peace Corps volunteers abroad"'" to determ ine am ount o f  
time spent w orking w ith women.
Qualitative citizen diplomacy outcomes
The outcom es o f  citizen diplomacy, as represented by the Peace Corps Program , were 
m ulti-fold. A s a quasi-developm ent program  originating from  the “’w est” and com ing so 
soon after m any o f  the recipient countries becam e independent, it was im portant that the 
volunteers w ere perceived differently from  the form er colonial powers and their work 
understood in that particular context. The practice o f  citizenship and dem ocratic 
participation, for exam ple was not a theoretical exercise.
M adow  writes that “instead o f  offering condescending lectures o f  on ‘citizenship’, 
(volunteers) m ust find a vital local project that can serve as a  laboratory" for 
participation. Such a “ laboratory” could be a com m unity developm ent project which 
would eventually “develop all com m unity functions and institutions that are essential to a
12 Steven Cohn, Robert Wood and Richard Haag. "US Aid and Third W orld W om en: The 
Impact o f  Peace Corps Programs." Economic Development and Cultural Change, 29, No. 4, 
(1981): 798.
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strong dem ocratic socie ty ."1"' Early on in its existence. M adow suggested tw o possible 
outcomes: "give em erging nations a truer understanding o f  the United States and its 
people and encourage the growth o f  dem ocratic institutions.’‘I4
The Peace Corps recognized this potential trap, a pitfall that could lead to its 
philosophy, work and volunteers finding resistance and therefore strived to build itse lf as 
a different experience from the colonial experience. The Peace C orps’ range o f  activities 
can be evaluated qualitatively from a num ber o f  approaches, given w hat the program  
aimed to accom plish. The program m ay have started with lofty goals expressed through 
its three objecti ves, but the work that volunteers perform ed was often m odest in its scope.
G etachew  M etaferia. for exam ple, w rites that Peace Corps "volunteers w orked in 
rural developm ent, education, law and agriculture" and that "the contribution o f  the US . 
Peace C orps to Ethiopia's m odem  education and developm ent is laudable”15; these were 
hardly lofty, foreign policy goals. Often, Peace Corps volunteers w ere suspected o f  being 
a cover for subversive activities. For exam ple, the (Peace Corps) program  had becom e 
controversial in the 1960’s; "the (Ethiopian) students alleged thai som e PC Vs were 
w orking for the CIA  and underm ining Ethiopia's national interests and its cu ltu re ."16
D espite the mix o f  global skepticism  such as that highlighted above, the 
contributions and experiences o f  volunteers -  citizen diplom ats -  w ere largely positive 
even in the face o f  opposition to LIS other foreign policy positions. M errill and Paterson
13 Pauline Madow. The Peace Corps. (N ew  York, H.W. Wilson Co., 1964): 131.
14 Ibid.. 132.
15 Getachew Metaferia. Ethiopia and the United States: History, Diplomacy, and  
Analysis. (Algora Publishing, 2009): 56.
16 Ibid.
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note that generally, the experiences o f  m ost volunteers are positive and for the m ost part, 
volunteers believed that they contributed to the countries in which they served. M errill 
and Patterson write that ‘'Canada and Britain also sent volunteers to G hana and their 
experiences in many ways paralleled those o f  the A m ericans." The A m ericans’ 
experiences led one volunteer to write that "I am  m ore pleased with the world and 
humans and m yself than previously"17 indicating a positive experience.
The experiences o f  volunteers can be further aggregated, although to date, such 
experiences are often reported upon based upon volunteer nationality and the 
program m atic differences such as the role o f  the state, funding, training, length o f  service 
and extraction from trouble spots. The objective o f  this chapter is tc  especially evaluate 
through the policy lenses, the im pact o f  citizen diplomats.
1. The interpersonal model
Chapter two o f  this dissertation outlined the elite theory approach to foreign p o l i c y ,  in 
which I discussed the view that elites play a key role in the formulation o f  foreign policy. 
The case o f  form er Peruvian president A lejandro Toledo illustrates the pow er o f  
interpersonal connections and how such connections often produce elites, w ho then affect 
the formulation o f  foreign policy based on their previous experiences.
Knocke argues that "debate about state structures and processes fundam entally 
revolves around the existence o f  a cohesive ruling class, w hich effectively dom inates all
Dennis Merrill and 1 hornas Paterson. Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: 
Vol. 2 Since 1914. (Belrnont, CA: Wadsworth, 2009): 356.
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the m ajor decisions made by governm ent officials."18 The governm ent officials often act 
in concert, as much as they often act individually; their m otivations are varied but the 
outcom es often have im plications for policy.
Indeed, it has been argued that in countries with strong executives, and in sem i- 
and autocratic countries, the executive is less constrained in the exercise o f  agreem ents 
such as those with the Peace Corps. The fragm entation o f  political order leaves the 
executive with both supporters and opponents for w hatever actions the governm ent takes. 
Similarly, in fragmented countries, it is possible to  place such citizen diplom ats with little 
oversight from legislative and other bodies. The citizen diplom ats therefore com plem ent 
the elite function o f  determ ining the foreign policy o f their countries, including appearing 
to be in good standing with w estern governm ents and thereby attracting "foreign aid and 
assistance" through the Peace Corps.
More im portantly, elites' and individuals' experiences can be instrum ental in 
shaping a country’s orientation towards citizen diplomacy. For exam ple, in his visit 10 the 
United States in 2002, President A lejandro Toledo reopened the doors to the Peace Corps 
to return to Chile after a 21 -year absence. More im portantly, President Toledo's desire to 
re-engage with the Peace Corps was first expressed during his inaugural address in 
2001.19 Such a declaration points tow ards a foreign policy strategy and direction, for 
signaling and practical purposes.
18 David Knocke. "Networks of Elite Structure and Decision Making". In Stanley 
Wasserman, Joseph Galaskiewicz. Eds. Advances in social network analysis: research in the 
social and behavioral sciences. (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications. 1994): 275.
15 Peace Corps. ‘'Peruvian President visits Peace Corps/' (Web). 2001,
httn://www.peacecon)s.gov/index.cfni?she!l-resources.media.nress.view&new.s id=664) ( Web).
Accessed 2/13/13.
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The Peace Corps President
The case o f  the Peace Corps in Peru illustrates the influence that elites can exert on public 
policy and therefore foreign policy. Peru welcom ed the first group o f  Peace Corps 
V olunteers in 1962. and has hosted a total o f  3.170 Peace Corps V olunteers since then .20 
Sheffield states that the Peace Corps program  in Peru was one of the largest and m ost 
robust programs" and provided the tem plate for how  most o f  the other Latin Am erican 
country Peace Corps program s would be run.22
Even as the Peace Corps program  w as taking hold in Peru, o ther foreign policy 
issues were ongoing, including a dispute between the United States and the International 
Petroleum  Company and Peru's purchase o f  French M irage warplanes, foreign policy 
crises that strained US-Peruvian relations.23 In addition, 1962 marked the overthrow  o f  
President Manuel Prado, P eru 's  constitutionally elected president, by Perez Godoy. 
leading to the suspension o f  diplom atic relations between the US (and m any Latin 
A m erican countries; with Peru. The subsequently elected president, Fenando Q elaunde
">4Terry, w as deposed in 1968 by a m ilitary junta." Yet, even in the face o f  a grow ing 
dom estic insurgency occasioned by the protests to military rule and despite the non- 
dem ocratic governm ent changes, the Peruvian Peace Corps program continued.
20 Peace Corps. “Peru .” http://w w w .peacecorps.gov/learn/w herepc/southam erica/peru/ 
(W eb). A ccessed 1/31/2013.




24 Jam es M. Malloy. "Peru before and after the Coup o f  1968. "Journal o f  Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, 14, No. 4, Special Issue: M ilitary and Reform G overnm ents in Latin 
A m erica (Nov., 1972): 437.
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The Peace Corps program  in Peru appeared not only to be broad, but to also enjoy 
significant support and participation, w hatever fields o f  endeavor the volunteers were 
active in. For exam ple, Anderson writes that the Peru arts and crafts "program  has served 
as the basis for one o f  the most exciting and potentially productive Peace Corps programs 
to date." ~ But did the Peace Corps volunteers in Peru participate, in Sargent Shriver's 
words, "advancing freedom and Peace"26 especially in the case o f Peru?
It appears that even as the Peace Corps program  was suspended in 1975 due to 
increasing political instability m Peru and the volunteers were w ithdraw n, the program  
may have achieved some o f  its objectives o f  changing foreigners' view  o f  .Americans.
The Peace Corps not only assisted to weave baskets, create art program s and survey 
forests for preservation by the Peruvian Congress, it also made lasting im pressions on 
dem ocracy, service and volunteering on one A lejandro Toledo as early  as 1964.27
Toledo ' s journey il lustrates the pow er o f  the interpersonal connections that the 
Peace Corps volunteers have brought to their work. Born Alejandro Ceiesrino Toledo 
M anrique, bom  on 28 March 1946, he was elected to the presidency o f  Peru in April 
2001. The eighth oldest o f  sixteen brothers and sisters, seven o f  whom died in infancy, he 
grew up in Chim bote, a poor tow n outside o f  Lima, Peru. His father was a m ason, his 
m other a grocer. A lejandro shined shoes, sold newspapers and lottery tickets arid snow  
cones, w orking nights and weekends and was the first m em ber o f his fam ily to attend
23 Ann Anderson. "Peace Corps Helps G ive N e w  Life to Old Arts." Art Education , 18,
No. 8 (N ov., 1965): 22.
26 John Lunstrum . "The M ystique o f  the Peace Corps: A D ilem m a." The Phi Delta
Kappan, 48, No. 3 (Nov., 1966): 98-110.
27 M ary L. Barker. "National Parks, C onservation, and Agrarian Reform  in Peru." 
Geographical Review, 70, No. i (Jan., 1980): 15.
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high school. While he was still in school, in 1964, 21-year-old US Peace C orps V olunteer 
N ancy Deeds assisted by Joe! M eister, arrived in Chim bote, looking for housing Toledo, 
then a teenager, convinced his m other to allow N a n c y  to rent a room for $7 a month, 
w hich was more than his m other made selling fruit and vegetables.
Toledo would go on to assist the Peace Corps Volunteers N ancy and Joel w ith the 
sum m er cam p they ran, and spend tim e talking to N ancy about the world outside in the 
evenings. Eventually, the personal bond was dem onstrated at Joel and N ancy’s w edding 
in 1965, w hen T oledo 's parents Anatolio and M argarita stood for in the absentee parents. 
In the same year, Toledo won a grant to go to the U niversity o f  San Francisco in the US 
Despite his reportedly poor English, Toledo had good soccer skills, held down part tim e 
jobs won a partial grant and com pleted University. He obtained a Ford Foundation 
fellowship to study at Stanford, graduated with two M asters Degrees in education and 
econom ics, and later with a PhD in Econom ics.28
At his presidential inauguration, Joel and Nancy were in attendance. Toledo is 
quoted as stating that ‘’A large portion o f  the path that I took -  through m y education, 
leaving the shanty town in Chim bote - Peace Corps had a lot to do with. Y ou people tire 
responsible for this president!" Alejandro Toledo would go on to be referred to as "The 
Peace Corps President.”
O f course the Peace Corps alone did not have everything to do w ith the future 
President Toledo’s personal path to success. N onetheless, one o f the first actions o f  his 
presidency was to invite the Peace Corps to return to Peru. The Peace Corps returned to
28 See Stanley M eisler. “A fterw ord. Does the Peace Corps do any good?" When the 
world calls: the inside story’ o f  the Peace Corps and its first fifty  years. Boston: Beacon Press,
(2011). See also: A lejandro Toledo.. http://fsi.stanford.edu/people/alejandrotoledo (W eb). 
A ccessed 2/1/2013.
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Peru in 2002" and w as one o f  the highlights o f  President B ush 's visit, the first ever by a 
sitting US President to Peru. There are perhaps many other untold stories o f  how  personal 
and interpersonal connections changed the lives o f  individuals and com m unities, but it is 
clear that these actions have had an effect on Peruvian elites, possibly the country and its 
relationship with the US.
Toledo may be the m ost fam ous o f  the elites who w ere im pacted by the Peace 
Corps and later rose to becom e president, but the Peruvian experience is not necessarily 
an isolated case. It is plausible that m any more untold stories o f  small and large im pacts 
abound. Peru’s case dem onstrates citizen diplom acy interfaces with individuals, 
com m unities and nations, in addition, statem ents and testam ents about the effect o f  the 
Peace Corps in different countries by different leaders dem onstrate the value o f  Peace ,< 
Corps volunteers.30
2. Issue linkages model
The history o f  the Peace Corps in Ethiopia, w ith its sporadic interruption and resum ption, 
illustrates how' the US successfully linked foreign assistance in the form o f  citizen 
diplom acy to its security objectives. The Ethiopian Peace Corps program  has been active
29 Lucien O. Chauvin. "For Peru's Toledo, return o f  Peace Corps is personal."  C hristian 
Science M onitor. M arch 25, 2002. http://vv\v\v.csm onitor.eom /2002/0325/p07s01-w oam .htm l 
(W eb). A ccessed 2/1/2013.
30 See for exam ple the statem ents by M am adou Tandja (Niger's president), Ilham  Aliyev 
(Azerbaijan president), Bakili M uiuzi (form er M alawi president), Justin M alew ezi (form er 
M alaw i Vice). President Teburoro Tito (form er Kiribati President), Nevers M um ba (form er 
Zam bia Vice President), am ong others.
http ://w w w .peacecorps.gov/resources/m edia/med iares/quotes/ (W eb.) A ccessed 2/5/2013.
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in the years 1962-1977. 1995-1999 and from 2007-present.''1 During these periods, US 
security interests in the Horn o f  A frica region have been paramount: first, during the 
post-colonial period, during the im mediate post-Cold W ar period and in the post-9 /13 era 
o f  war against terrorism.
The processes, benefits and pitfalls o f issue linkage, cooperation and collaboration 
have been well chronicled by literature, for exam ple in D avis (2004), H aas (2004)
Gilbert, M orabito and Stohr (2010), Long and Leeds (2006), among others. 5" Long and 
Leeds, for exam ple, write that “ issue linkage may allow  leaders to surm ount the 
dilem m as o f cooperation by increasing the type and range o f  distributed benefits and by 
limiting incenti ves for opportunism ." Davis argues that “ issue linkage is a com m on 
negotiation strategy that involv es com bining m ultiple issues to change the balance o f 
interests in favor o f  a negotiated agreem ent.”j4 Haas view's the need for collaboration as 
arising "from the recognition that the costs o f  national self-reliance are usually
11 Peace C orps. “Ethiopia.” vyvvw .peacecoips.aov/leam /w herepc/africa/ethiopia/(W eb). 
Accessed 2/5/2013.
'2 See: Andrew' Long and Brett A .Leeds. "Trading for Security: M ilitary A lliances and 
Econom ic A greem ents." Journal o f  Peace Research 2006 43 : 433 -  451; Ernst B. H aas. "W hy 
C ollaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regim es." World Politics, 32, N o. 03 (A pril 1980): 
357-405; C hristina L. Davis, ‘International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for 
Agricultural Trade L iberalization’. American Political Science Review, 98, No. 1, 2004: 153-169; 
G ilbert Engels, Joseph M orabito and Edward Stohr. "K now ledge Sharing and D ecision M aking in 
the Peace Corps." Knowledge and Process Management, 17, No. 3 (2010): 128—144.
22Long and Leeds. "Trading for Security: M ilitary A lliances and Econom ic A greem ents." 
Journal o f Peace Research, 43 no. 4 (July 2006): 451.
'4 Christina L. Davis. ‘International Institutions and Issue Linkage: B uilding Support for 
A gricultural Trade L iberalization ', American Political Science Review, 98, No. 1, (2004): 153.
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excessive.”35 It is not absolutely clear that issue linkage equally benefits both parties, 
even though the expectation is that both parties benefit.
Literature on issue linkages between US foreign policy goals and citizen 
diplom acy is muted. There are few  overt declarations o f the linkage betw een particular 
issues o f  national interest to the US with the Peace Corps V olunteers. O ne possible 
explanation o f  this was that the US wanted to appear to be altruistic, rather than pursuing 
a foreign policy agenda in placing Peace Corps volunteers. On the part o f  the recipients, 
Searles writes that in some instances the “acceptance” o f such volunteers was used as a 
strategy to hopefully unlock US foreign aid by dem onstrating cooperation w ith a program 
that was im portant to the United S ta te s /6
However, as Hoffman w rites, "the Peace Corps was perhaps the m ost explicitly • 
hum anitarian means o f  foreign policy ever undertaken on a long-term basis."37 The 
establishm ent o f  the Peace Corps program , how ever, often brought about unintended 
issue linkages. Hoffman w rites, For exam ple, that even as the Peace C orps program  was 
prom oted as a w ay o f  showing the "different America", separate from the prior 
experience of im perialism  "International criticism s o f  American dom estic policies 
strongly influence the em ergence o f  the Peace corps, which sought to show that Am erica
”3 0
was not at base a racist n a t i o n . T h e  problem s posed by US domestic policies extended 
to the placem ent o f  the diplom ats from the new nations, the very nations that the US
35 Haas, 357.
36 P David Searles. The Peace Corps experience: challenge and change. 1969-1976. 
(Lexington, KY: University Press o f  Kentucky, 1997): 8.
' Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman. All you need is love: the Peace Corps and the spirit o f  the 
1960s. (Cam bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1998): 6.
38 Ibid., 28.
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sought to place citizen diplom ats in. It also com plicated the US dom estic political
landscape with regard to race and equality and probably hastened the subsequent social
changes that led to the Civil Rights Act.
The presence o f  the US Peace Corps volunteers in Ethiopia reflected a general
rapprochem ent between the US and Ethiopia. The US viewed Ethiopia as "one o f  the
m ost backward areas in the w orld;"39 this guided the US attitude and response to appeals
by Ethiopia to the US “for political and m ilitary as well as economic support."40 Yet. the
same National Intelligence Estimate (M E ) outlines the overall strategy from  the
perspective o f  ensuring "denial o f  the Horn o f  A frica to Soviet dom ination and
minim ization o f  Soviet influence11 by cooperating with friendly nations to resolve
conflicts, deny soviet dom ination and m inim ize Soviet influence, ’strengthen US
inform ation and cultural exchange program s in the Horn o f  Africa."42
The clearest articulation o f  the issue linkage between US foreign policy in
minim izing the influence and expansion o f  Soviet influence and the Ethiopian education
sector is made by the N1E. In paragraph 29. the NFE called for policy guidance to
strengthen Ethiopia's orientation towards the west, continue to provide Ethiopia 
with: a) technical assistance, w ith em phasis on education and train ing program s, 
b) lim ited econom ic assistance, c) m inim um  military' equipment and training o f  a 
kind suifor maintaining internal security and offering resistance to local 
aggression, making every effort to avoid a m ilitary build-up w hich w ould strain
39 The National Security Council. "National Security' Council Report - N SC  5903." 
February 4, 1959; see also: "US Policy tow ard the Horn o f  Africa and the Sudan; US relations 
with Ethiopia. Som alia and the Sudan." Foreign Relations. 1958 - 1960, X IV  (1958): 175
40 Ibid., 176.
41 NSC. “National security Council Report." 180. para. 24.
42 Ibid.. para 27, 28.
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the Ethiopian econom y, iead to com m itm ents for indefinite US support, or 
increased tension within the area.43
The previous discussion has dem onstrated the problem s o f  issue linkage and establishing
clear pathw ays that dem onstrate that the US and the recipient country link the issues
explicitly, or that the issue linkage is clear to all the parties involved. Issue linkage,
however, can be inferred in the US National Security Council (NSC) policy to strengthen
US Inform ation and cultural exchange program s in the Horn o f  Africa, and provision o f
technical assistance with em phasis on education and training program s and the
subsequent involvement o f  the US Peace Corps in the education system  in Ethiopia.
The overt issue-hnkage between the US and Ethiopia is inferred; how ever.
Lefehvre argues that "arms transfers have generally been considered a barom eter o f  US
interest in a particular recipient state and region o f  the vvorid."44 Lefebvre finds that
from  1953 until the term ination o f  the U S-Ethiopia m ilitary relationship  in 1977. 
Addis Ababa stood at the top o f  W ashington's arms client list for sub-Sahara 
Africa. During this tim e the United States provided Ethiopia with over Si 85 
million worth o f  grant m ilitary assistance, approved $36 in FM S financing credits, 
concluded FMS cash agreem ents valued at about $135 million and spent 
approxim ately $22 m illion training 3.912 Ethiopian military personnel.41
W hile this am ounted to only 0.5 percent o f  IJS global security assistance budget, Ethiopia
reportedly received 80 percent o f  the M ilitary Assistance Program, 55 percent o f  the
International M ilitary Education and Training Program and 20 percent o f  Foreign
military Sales financing to Africa in the same period. This figure rem ained a t 45 percent
4 ' Ibid.. para. 29.
44 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre. A rm s for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and  Somalia, 
1953-1991. (Pittsburgh, PA: U niversity o f  Pittsburgh Press, 1991): 13.
45 Ibid.
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o f all m ilitary assistance to A frica even as assistance elsewhere increased.46 At the same 
time, the U nited States has, over the 25 years that the Peace Corps program  has been 
operational in Ethiopia, assigned 3.244 PCVs to Ethiopia.
The im portance o f  Ethiopia was described thus: "the basic strategic im portance o f 
the Horn is not the presence o f  copper deposits, the fate o f  democracy or the future o f  the 
Ethiopian m onarchy; it is simple geography"47 since it lay near the com m ercial shipping 
lanes from east to west, and within strategic access to M iddle Eastern oil. Lefebvre 
further argues that "US political-m ilitary relations w ith the governm ents o f  Ethiopia and 
Som alia were based alm ost exclusively upon W ashington's interest in having access to
j j i
m ilitary facilities in the Red Sea region." Lefebvre further asserts that linked issues 
such as arm s w'Jth access. He writes that "the quid pro quo (arm s-for-base-aecess) 
arrangem ents arrived at with Addis A baba and M ogadishu em phasizes that, in the eyes o f  
US defense planners, the principal assets these countries have to offer to the United 
States are geostrategic."46
A plausible argum ent can be made that the US did not particularly care about the 
ability o f  Ethiopians to speak better English, but that the invitation o f  Peace Corps 
volunteers offered the US an opportunity to dem onstrate benign intention, and providing 
the volunteers masked a more strategic, national interest goal o f  securing a foothold that 
allow ed the US access to the Red Sea, refueling facilities and amis transfer foothold. This
46 ibid. 13, 14




proxim ity is evident in the US selection o f  Djibouti, which neighbors Som alia, E thiopia 
and Eritrea, as hom e to the largest contingent o f  US troops in Africa.
The Peace Corps is particularly keen on the safety o f  its volunteers. The gaps in 
Peace Corps service may well reflect periods w hen Ethiopia was politically unsand 
therefore required removal o f American citizens from Ethiopia. A lternately, E th iop ia’s 
developm ent indices did not change significantly enough to eliminate the need for Peace 
Corps V olunteers.50 Their presence in Ethiopia therefore w as not ju st a question o f  social 
and econom ic developm ent, rather, as Lefebvre has shown. Ethiopia served a geostrategic 
role in US national security and therefore, cooperation and placement o f  Peace Corps 
volunteers in Ethiopia w as in the national interest o f  the United States. This m ay help 
explain the frequent return after the interruption o f  the program  in Ethiopia.
Issue linkage is often presented as beneficial to the recipient country, and but 
often solicits minim al input o f the target com m unity. An example o f  this can be seen in * 
the 2010 EPA and US Peace Corps M emorandum o f  Understanding t'MOU) signed to 
support Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves in Ethiopia which “will result in increased 
prom otion o f  clean cooking stoves and education related to air quality issues, partly as a 
response to the burden o f  disease associated with the use o f  solid fuels”51 and thereby
50 Relations between the US and E thiopia gradually soured after the overthrow  o f  
Em peror Haile Selassie in 1974 by the Derg. The Peace Corps volunteers w ere w ithdraw n in 
1979. They returned in 1995 but due to instability and conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, were 
w ithdraw n in 1999. The Peace Corps volunteers returned for the most current program  phase in 
2007. On E thiopians’ perception o f  the US, see: Pew Research. "Opinion o f  the United States." 
Pew G lobal A ttitudes Project.” http://w w w .pew global.org/database/?indicator=  1 (W eb).
A ccessed 2/5/2013.
51 A bebe Dam te and Steven F. Koch. "Clean fuel saving technology adoption in Urban 
Ethiopia." U niversity o f  Pretoria D epartm ent o f  Econom ics W orking Paper Series (A pr., 2011): 3
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increase alternative energy use and reduce the incidence o f  illness associated w ith these
biom ass sources o f  energy 52
Some issue linkage activities do not produce positive outcomes; lofty' goals to link
issues do not always align with the conditions on the ground. Burke, for exam ple, w'rites
o f her experience as a Peace Corps volunteer
soon realized that the teachers' priorities w ere different than m y aim s or the aims 
o f  the Peace Corps. The teachers' priorities were directed tow ard taking care o f  
their fam ilies, their land, and m aintaining their predom inantly subsistence 
lifestyle. If  there was tim e left after these priorities v/ere taken care of, then they 
dedicated it to teaching. Usually I was on m y own at the elem entary school, 
teaching from US textbooks that had pictures o f  kites caught in pow er lines.
W hiie the people recognized that education was important, their everyday lives 
took precedent, and the agenda that 1 attem pted to carry out as a Peace Corps 
V olunteer was not m eaningful to their everyday lives.x
E th iop ia ’s benefits: educational system reform and  ESL learning  
W hile the US was pursuing its strategic interests in the Horn o f  Africa through mi litary 
assistance to Ethiopia to the tune o f  80 percent o f  its Foreign M ilitary Sales to Africa, 
providing foreign aid and placing Peace Corps volunteers. Ethiopia was benefiting from ' 
the bilateral relationship. Ethiopia w as one o f  the first countries to request for Peace 
Corps volunteers. Ethiopia has provided one o f  the clearest exam ples o f  how  the PC Vs 
can contribute to national developm ent, or a governm ent program critical to a  sector o f  
the econom y. The Peace Corps Volunteers have been involved in Ethiopia since the 
inception o f  the Program in 1962 (with a 16-year absence after the fall o f  M engistu Haile
32 A ccording to  Damte and Koch. 90%  o f  E th iop ia’s total dom estic energy dem and is met 
through biom ass energy sources, with rural households using 99%  biomass energy, which is also 
associated with 4.9%  o f  "burden o f  disease.”
Deborah A. Burke. An Analysis o f  Social R elationships at a D evelopm ent Site in 
Kenya. A Thesis ( i 999): 2.
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M ariam 's regime); their prim ary involvem ent has been in secondary and higher 
education, and the teaching o f  English as a Second Language (ESL).
In 1960, 90 percent o f  the Ethiopian people w ere reported to be illiterate .54 
Ethiopia had one o f  the earliest and m ost significant “project volunteers’' where all 276 
initial volunteers were placed in the Education sector.35 The issue o f  education in 
Ethiopia w as always so im portant that at the time, the M inistry o f Education w as 
“directed personally by the Em peror Haile Selassie."36
The need -  and therefore the contribution o f  the Peace Corps to the Ethiopian 
educational system is reflected in Sullivan 's finding that “the country claim ed a force o f  
476 secondary school teachers'’ who w ere serving a school-going population o f  8,000 
students; the addition o f  the Peace Corps boosted the teaching force by approxim ately 58 
percent.57 Over a third o f  Ethiopian Secondary School English teachers cam e from  the 
Peace Corps, another third from Ethiopia and a third from European V olunteers. Peace 
Corps volunteers helped significantly shape the Ethiopian educational system .58
By 1965, w ere about 500 volunteers w orking in Ethiopia alone.39 The Ethiopian 
program and request o f  Peace Corps volunteers continued until 1977, when it was 
suspended due to increasing political instability. The Peace Corps returned to Ethiopia




38 M ordechai Abir. “ Education and National Unity in Ethiopia." African Affairs, 69, No. 
274 (Jan., 1970): 55; see also: Karin L. Stanford. Beyond the Boundaries: Reverend Jesse 
Jackson in International Affairs - see pp. 5 onwards.
59 P David Searles. The Peace Corps experience: challenge and change, 1969-1976. 
Lexington, Ky.: U niversity Press o f  Kentucky, (1997): 10.
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between 1995 and 1999, leaving due to intensification o f hostilities betw een Ethiopia and 
Eritrea (US Embassy). The current Peace Corps program eventually restarted in Ethiopia 
in 2007.60
Even in the absence o f  critical contributions o f  Peace Corps V olunteers in its 
education sector, in 2000, Ethiopia began im plem enting an English Language 
Im provem ent Program (ELIP) a com ponent o f  the "Teacher D evelopm ent Program " 
proposed by E thiopia’s M inistry o f  Education (M oE). The goal o f ELIP w as "to im prove 
the quality o f  teaching in the Ethiopian education system by raising the level o f  English 
o f  all teachers".61 This program  was im plem ented for the period betw een 2000 and 2008.
The return o f  the Peace Corps in 2007 eventually reinstated E th iopia’s 
relationship w ith the Ethiopian M inistry o f  Education. In 2011, 35 new  Peace Corps 
Volunteers were sworn in by the US am bassador to serve in Ethiopia, w ith 50 percent o f 
the new  volunteers designated as "education volunteers" w hose "prim ary role is to 
support existing efforts to strengthen English language teaching and learning in Colleges 
o f  Teacher Education (CTEs) and prim ary cluster schools." There is therefore a direct 
connection between the PCVs and national policy o f  improving teaching and learning o f 
English. These volunteers were brought back following an agreem ent w ith the U SAID in
60 Peace Corps. "Peace Corps V olunteers return to Ethiopia." 
http://w w w .peacecorps.aov/reso urces/m edia/press/1255/: (W eb). Accessed 2/1/2013. See also 
Peace Corps. “E thiopia.” http://w w w .peacecorps.gov/learn/w herepc/africa/ethiopia/
61 British Council. “Education and English Language D evelopm ent.” 
h ttp://w w w .britishcouncil.org/africa-ds-english.htm  (W eb). Accessed 1/26/2013.
61 US Em bassy (Ethiopia). “Peace Corps Ethiopia Doubles its N um ber o f  V olunteers: 
English Language Volunteers are A dded” htt p ://e thiopia.usem bassv .gov/pr-201 1/peace-corps- 
ethiopia-doubles-its-num ber-of-volunteers-engIish-language -volunteers-are-added.htm l (W eb). 
A ccessed 1/2/2013.
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2 0 10.6’’ Ethiopia's official languages are Am haric, English and Arabic; E thiopia is also 
the headquarters o f  the African Union, and English is one o f  the six official languages o f 
the A frican Union.
The case o f  Ethiopia, exam ined from a historical perspective o f  US national 
interests at the onset o f  the Peace Corps program , concern over the stability o f  the Horn 
o f  Africa, the desire to lim it Soviet influence in the region and Ethiopia’s lack o f  
resources to expand and m odernize its education system created a confluence o f  
convergence points that linked the issue o f  US national security to E th iopia’s 
developm ent o f  its education sector.
3. FPA: Tanzania’s infrastructure development
The case o f  the Peace Corps and their contribution to the national developm ent o f  
Tanzania can best be understood in the context o f  three issues: a) Tanzania’s post­
independence Pan-A frican leadership, b) E ast A frican regional integration and c) 
Tanzania’s internal political culture o f  Ujamaa. Tanganyika attained independence in 
1961 and united with Zanzibar, which becam e independent in 1963, in 1964, to form  the 
United Republic o f  Tanzania.64 This section exam ines the Foreign Policy A pproaches 
(FPA) and the im pact o f citizen diplom acy on infrastructure developm ent in Tanzania.
Tanzania’s first president, M walim u Julius N yerere, was one o f  the earliest Pan 
A fricanists who becam e leaders o f  their countries. It was also associated w ith advocates 
such as W .E.B. Du Bois, M arcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrum ah, M alcolm X and Jom o
63 see USAID. Ethiopia: Country D evelopm ent C ooperation Strategy, 201 1 -  2015. 
A ccelerating the Transform ation Toward Prosperity. M arch 2012.
http ://eth iopia.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/im ages/C D C S-Ethiop ia.pdf. A ccessed 7/3 1 /2 0 12.
64 A nnabel Skinner. Tanzania <& Zanzibar. (London, UK: Cadogan G uides, 2001): 15, 16.
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Kenyatta. Pan-Africanism  pursued a philosophy o f  "collective self-reliance" w hich was 
captured by A gyem an, writing that “power consolidation in Africa w ould com pel a 
reallocation o f  global resources, as well as unleashing a fiercer psychological energy and 
political assertion am ong D iaspora A fricans that w ould unsettle the social and political 
(power) structures o f  many a polity in the A m ericas, from Cuba through Brazil to the 
United States."65
Tanzania’s national policy after independence, Tanzania was labeled "Ujam aa". It 
was a policy o f collective self-reliance based on one party political system, 
institutionalization o f  social, econom ic and political equality through creation o f  a central 
dem ocracy, collective local econom ic production, fostering self-reliance through 
econom ic and cultural attitudes, free and com pulsory education including cultural 
education and national unity through the use o f  Sw ahili.66 A fter Uganda, K enya and 
eventually Zanzibar became independent; Tanzania began pursuing a  policy o f  regional 
integration which would culm inate with the founding o f the East A frican Com m unity 
(EAC) with headquarters based in Arusha, Tanzania. This would denote the future trend 
o f  Tanzania with her neighbors, pursuing regional trade, integration and stability, gradual 
dem ocratization and econom ic development.
Tanzania’s immediate econom ic developm ent needs revolved around creation o f 
infrastructure that would allow  it to accom plish its national and regional goals as 
previously outlined. Pan-African integration, regional trade and national cohesion 
continued to be the key drivers o f  its foreign policy. Foreign aid and external assistance
65 Opoku Agyem an. “ Pan-Africanism  and Its D etractors: A Response to H arvard’s Race 
Effacing U niversalists.” African Journal o f  Political Science , 3, N o. 2. (1998): 98-101.
66 Julius K. Nyerere. "Ujamaa". The basis o f  A frican Socialism. 
http://w w w .juliusnyerere.info/im ages/uploads/uiarnaa 1962.p d f (W eb). A ccessed 2/5/2013.
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w as prim arily geared tow ards m eeting T anzania 's national, regional and Pan-A frican 
goals. The developm ent o f  Tanzania’s infrastructure with the assistance o f  the Peace 
Corps can thus be seen in the context o f  Tanzania’s pursuit o f  Pan A fricanism , regional 
integration, trade and national cohesion.
The Peace Corps program  to different countries began in 1962, Tanganyika, like 
Ethiopia and despite its African socialist leanings, accepted volunteers in the sam e year. 
A fter 1964, the Peace Corps program  was classified as sending volunteers to Tanzania. 
Tanzania is currently classified as a H ighly Indebted Poor Country (H IPC). T anzania is 
ranked 152nd by the UNDP in term s o f  Human D evelopm ent Index, w ith a com posite 
index o f  0.523 and a GNI per capita in PPP term s at $1,328.67 Tanzania's econom ic 
grow th has been so marginal that in 2000, its GDP per capita was $482.68 At 
independence, Ndulu, M utalem w a and the W orld Bank estimated that the G D P per capita 
income, m easured in constant dollars at international prices in  1998, w as $371.69
Tanganyika received 35 Peace Corps volunteers in 1962. In that sam e year, the 
then C h ief M inister o f  Tanganyika "was enthusiastic in accepting for his country the first 
Peace Corps project to be announced."70 Tanzania's need was evident and identified thus: 
"this new A frican nation has a  critical need for a feeder road system, but actual
67 UND P. "Tanzania, United R epublic of. C ountry Profile: Human D evelopm ent 
Indicators. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TZA .htm l. (W eb). A ccessed 211 /2 0 13.
68 Robert J. Barro, X avier Sala i M artin. Economic Growth. (Cam bridge. M ass.: M IT 
Press, 2004): 47.
69 B. J. N dulu, Charles K. M utalem w a, World Bank. Tanzania. Tanzania at the Tarn o f  
the Century: Background Papers and Statistics. A World Bank Country Study. W ashington DC: 
W orld Bank Publications (2002).
70 Peace Corps. Presentation o f  FY 1962 Program  to United States C ongress, June 1,
1961. http://files.peacecorps.gov/inanuals/cbi/1962.pdf (Nd): 4. (W eb). A ccessed 2/1/2013.
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construction cannot begin until appropriate surveys have been made. T anganyika can 
produce only tw o people trained in land survey work in the next five years. Its 
governm ent has asked the Peace Corps to supply the surveyors and civil engineers 
needed to assist in surveying a feeder road system ."71 The construction o f  a transportation 
system m eant "greater econom ic opportunity" for the individual African, "for it puts him 
within reach o f  the local m arket."72
The construction o f  feeder roads was, in the words o f  the Tanganyika M inister for 
Finance, "a key elem ent in the developm ent plan o f  the country" and the assignm ent o f  
Peace Corps had the im pact that "the G overnm ent o f  Tanganyika is now  redrafting its 
developm ent plan to include the Peace Corps project."73 The project w as further outlined 
as com prising o f  "three parts: (a) feeder road surveys; (b) engineering on m ain territorial 
roads and (c) geological survey m apping."74 In Septem ber 1961, four civil engineers, six 
geologists and 20 road surveyors, all volunteers from  the Peace Corps, arrived in 
Tanzania and began working on their assignm ents. They w ere assigned to w ork with 
Tanganyikan apprentice surveyors to assist in m aintenance, grading and surveying o f  
main territorial arteries.0
The Peace Corps volunteers w ere instrum ental in developing the first significant 





75 Peace Corps. Presentation o f  FY 1963 Program  to United States C ongress, June I ,
1962. http://files.peacecorps.gov/m anuals/cbj/1963.pdf  (W ebl. Accessed 2/1/2013.
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group o f  Peace Corps civil engineers were in the front rank o f  all m ajor highw ay 
construction in T anganyika/’76 It is not quite evident that the Peace C orps influenced the 
perception o f  the locals tow ards the United States m ore than other avenues; Sullivan 
writes that while the average Tanzanian was pro-A m erican, “the view is som ew hat 
distorted due to the im age o f  A m erica represented by the local movie houses in the 
capital city, Dar es Salaam , which portray the idea that A m erica is still the land o f  
cow boys and Indians, Chicago gangsters, and adulterous w ives."77 The w ork o f  the 
volunteers w as recognized by the Tanzanian governm ent to the extent that “w hen the 
corps was attacked by a m em ber o f  parliam ent, Prem ier R. M . Kawawa im m ediately 
cam e to its defense. He praised the work being done by a group o f A m erican engineers 
and geologists and reaffirm ed his governm ent’s hope o f  obtaining m ore corpsm en.”78
Peace Corps volunteering in Tanzania not only developed critical national 
infrastructure, it also fostered public debate about the value o f  volunteering as part o f  
national policy and provided external reinforcem ent and validation o f  the goal o f  
Ujamaa. that is, collective self-reliance. The fact that foreigners could volunteer their 
tim e for free to assist Tanzanians m eet their developm ent goals was a pow erful indicator 
o f  the validity o f the U jam aa philosophy.
This growing congruence o f  Tanzania’s national goals -  in term s o f  infrastructure 
and national philosophy -  was dem onstrated in the 1964 Congressional budget 
justification presentation to the US Congress by the Peace Corps. In that presentation, a 
Tanzanian new spaper editor is quoted as reflecting that " if they (the volunteers) are
'6 Sullivan. The Story o f  the Peace Corps. 148.
77 Ibid., 144.
'8 Madovv. The Peace Cops. 132.
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w illing to offer their services for our benefit, why shouldn't our young m en also go into
the villages and into the fields and volunteer for service in the national pro jects?"79 The
volunteers in Tanzania appear to have im pressed their hosts. "Adapting them selves
quickly to their new  life, they have m ade friends in all sections o f the com m unity ."80
Despite this obvious early rom anticism  with the nobility o f  the Peace C orps goals,
volunteers and even the significant national policy and infrastructure areas in w hich the
volunteers were w orking in, there were political concerns w ith the program . The Peace
Corps volunteer program  was phased out in 1969 before resuming in 1979.81 Before
being phased out, the last eight volunteers had been w orking as water technologists. The
reason for phasing out the program was
was basic distrust w ith all US ventures, particularly those connected w ith the 
United States government. Suspicion o f  the large nonprofit foundation program s, 
Rockefeller and Ford, was alm ost as great. Tanzanian governm ent representatives 
did not trust the motives o f  U nited States em issaries; there w as the assum ption 
that an A m erican was a C.I.A. agent.82
There was also growing discontent with US policy in V ietnam. ~ Sim ilarly, the growing
expertise w ithin the country and increasing num bers o f  volunteers from  other politically
neutral countries m ay have dim inished the need for volunteers.
,y The Peace Corps. "Peace Corps Congressional Presentation, FY 1964, (1962): 1 ,12 . 
http://files.peacecorps.gov/m anuals/ebj /1964 .pd f (W eb). A ccessed 2/1 /2 0 13.
80 Ibid. 31.
81 Peace Corps. "Tanzania.’’ http ://w w w .peacecorps.gov/leam /w herepc/a frica/tanzania/ 
(W eb). A ccessed 2/1/2013.




The Peace Corps V olunteers returned to Tanzania in 1979 after the signing o f  a 
treaty between the US (A m bassador to Tanzania) and the Tanzanian M inister o f  
M anpow er D evelopm ent.84 Since then, the US A gency for International D evelopm ent's 
program in Tanzania averages about $20 million per year. "The Peace C orps program , 
revitalized in 1979. provides assistance in education through the provision o f  teachers. 
The Peace Corps is also assisting in health and environm ent sectors."85 O ther area that the 
Peace Corps currently works in is in soil conservation techniques and increasing co­
existence with w ildlife.86 The Peace Corps program in Tanzania not only provided 
Tanzania with the training that facilitated the developm ent o f  infrastructure necessary to 
Tanzania’s regional cooperation and pursuit o f  its national goals, it also potentially 
changed Tanzania’s trajectory tow ards alignm ent w ith the Soviet Union.
The Peace Corps volunteer projects in Tanzania appear to have focused on the 
value o f  the long-term view  o f  the ability to, in the long-run, affect and change foreign 
policy. In the case o f Tanzania, because o f the principles o f  Ujamaa, the low  rates o f  
literacy and participation, the socialist m odel o f  dem ocracy and the absence o f  pluralist 
foreign policy making, the Peace Corps program  helped build institutions and 
infrastructure that would m oderated T anzania 's foreign policy behavior w ith regard to the 
Pan-A fricanist movement, regional integration, trade and interdependence.
This may well have changed Tanzania’s socialist trajectory due to the progressive 
regional integration w ith K enya and Uganda, which were pro-western countries, through
84 See: US State Departm ent. United States Treaties and O ther International A greem ents, 
Vol. 30, Part 3, (1978-1979): 3487.
85 International Business Publications. "‘Tanzania Investm ent & B usiness G uide.” 
International Business Publications, 4 th Ed., (2 0 1 1): 31.
Sft Ibid. 144.
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m em bership o f  the G77 and the Non-Aligned M ovem ent and pursuit o f  Pan Africanism . 
By cooperating regionally through building infrastructure for transportation and trade, 
and by supporting and validating the com m unity-building aspect o f  U jam aa, prom oted by 
the volunteering Peace Corps, the Peace Corps m ay have further helped lay the 
foundation for pluralist and participatory dem ocracy that U jam aa put into practice.
Conclusion
This chapter has com prehensively discussed the qualitative impact o f  volunteering based 
on three m odels: the interpersonal m odel, the issue linkage model and the national policy 
m odel, using these approaches to exam ine the overall qualitative im pact o f  citizen 
diplom acy on state behavior. It looked at how  the evolution o f  citizen diplom acy 
accelerated from the occasional self-appointed diplom at to special envoys, to the age o f  
"mass citizen diplomacy" with the onset o f  program s such as the Peace C orps, the 
V olunteer Service Overseas, am ong others. This brand o f citizen diplom acy has gained 
im portance particularly even after the collapse o f  the Cold W ar and as the w ar on 
terrorism  and ideological struggles have becom e more prominent.
The chapter the im pact o f  citizen diplom ats on national policies and perceptions 
o f  Am ericans as they serve as up to 50 per cent o f  the educational labor force (secondary 
school teachers), making contact with m illions o f  foreign publics and in som e cases, 
being called upon to "Americanize" the educational systems o f  form er colonies and move 
them aw ay from  a British orientation. The chapter also looked at qualitative im pacts o f  
citizen diplom acy as expressed by the elites o f  the recipient countries including opinion 
leaders, the m edia and governm ent officials.
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Target com m unities and individuals w orking with the citizen diplom ats have gone 
on to becom e im portant figures in their countries (presidents, ministers, am ong others), 
positively reflecting on the im pact o f  the Peace Corps years on their career progression, 
and the steps that elites often take in establishing bilateral relations based on their prior 
experience. The section concluded that there are m any positive changes that com m unities 
bring to their com m unities, although these do not necessarily influence the country's 
foreign policy but are instrum ental in shaping the positive view  o f the U nited States 
among the citizens and their leaders. The chapter also highlighted how , at the onset, 
placem ent o f  citizen diplom ats was targeted at countries that already had good relations 
with the US or had a positive view o f  President Kennedy.
This analysis recognizes that there are other was to understand w hat happened in 
Peru, in Ethiopia and in Tanzania, and that there are many other factors that determ ine 
the placem ent o f  citizen diplomats. Yet, the analysis provided in these case studies is 
plausible qualitatively for the trends we see in voting. There are subtle and overt ways in 
which citizen diplom acy shaped the interest o f  states and statesmen, the interests o f 
countries and com m unities. The quantitative m ethods used to arrive at these conclusions 
allow researchers to pose plausible scenarios w hich are often confirm ed through 
quantitative data analysis; the chapter’s findings are consistent with the quantitative 
findings. These qualitative findings also point the scholarship in the direction o f  the need 
for a richly descriptive process-tracing o f  the decision-m aking in these states, in order to 
better understand how  citizen diplom acy affects the foreign policy behaviors o f  countries. 
The next -  and final -  chapter will sum m arize the conclusions o f the dissertation and 
propose avenues for future research.
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CH A PTER VII 
D ISCUSSION AND CO NCLU SIO N S
Introduction
There remain im portant questions about what values citizen diplomats im part, the extent 
to which these values are transm itted from the grassroots to the national levels, and 
w hether the values reflect already existing positive relationships betw een the sending and 
receiving country, rather than causing mutual attraction between them . The two previous 
chapters have addressed this issue from a quantitative and a qualitative perspective.
C hapter 5 addressed the contributions o f  citizen diplom acy to foreign policy and 
soft pow er strategies from  a qualitative approach, finding correlation betw een citizen 
diplom acy and voting in congruence with the US at the UN General A ssem bly in 75 
percent o f  the models. Chapter 6 discussed the qualitative approaches to understanding 
the impact o f  citizen diplom acy through the interpersonal model, the foreign policy 
model and the issue linkages model.
This chapter will consider the findings in the context o f  the entire research, 
provide conclusions, and articulate the place o f  this research in the greater foreign policy 
debate. The chapter proceeds as follows: it briefly recaps the findings o f  the qualitative 
chapter, and then suggests a cautionary note in how  the findings can, and should be 
interpreted. It then proposes eight key conclusions and follows these up w ith im plications 
for foreign policy and the greater theoretical question o f soft power. The chapter then 
considers different avenues for future research.
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Qualitative find ings: a review
The qualitative chapter, through the three m odels and their exam ples, found that 
countries, especially the US, have often linked developm ent assistance in the form o f  the 
Peace Corps to strategic and national security strategies. In the process; the country in the 
dyadic relationship benefits and in the case o f  Ethiopia, this was through the reform  o f  its 
education system and provision o f  high school and college teachers. T he chapter also 
found that the Peace Corps volunteers have affected national policy through their w ork in 
developm ent o f  infrastructure such as the road system  in Tanzania, and increasingly, to 
com bat health issues such as HIV/AIDS transm ission in Sub-Saharan Africa.
By applying foreign policy strategies to countries’ socio-econom ic developm ent 
and dom estic priorities, the US has affected national and regional outcom es. These 
outcom es include allow ing Tanzania to draw parallels between US foreign policy 
strategies (citizen diplom at volunteering) to validating Tanzania’s collective self-reliance 
model, paving way for regional trade, regional integration and interdependence, changing 
Tanzania’s trajectory from socialist-leaning to an eventual path to dem ocratization.
O ther areas where the Peace Corps has succeeded in helping countries meet their 
social, econom ic and health goals and objectives, include Ethiopia, M alawi and Senegal, 
where the citizen diplom ats were integral in setting up educational system s at the high 
school level, and also teaching in colleges. In other countries such as H onduras and 
U ruguay, am ong others, citizen diplom ats have been instrumental in the agricultural 
sector. In M alawi. South A frica and other countries affected by the H IV /A ID S scourge, 
citizen diplom ats have worked in the health-care sector, providing testing, counseling and 
other outreach services, often overcom ing cultural barriers to  effect necessary change. At
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a glance, these do not appear linked with US foreign policy goals; how ever, the recipient 
countries value the citizen diplom at contributions and view their w ork as a positive 
contribution by the US.
The US governm ent pays attention to the im pact o f  citizen diplom acy. Successive 
presidents have frequently attem pted to increase the size and often the scope o f  the Peace 
Corps. For exam ple, on taking office. President O bam a promised to  double the Peace 
Corps size to 16,000 volunteers serving per year.87 Like m any other federal agencies, the 
Peace Corps is required to justify  its budgetary allocation each year. Part o f  this 
justification is outlining the achievem ents o f  the agency, based on the three (expanded) 
goals in its mission. The budgetary allocations based on Congressional hearings are 
illustrative o f  the achievem ents o f  the Peace Corps, its work, its scope, and the 
im portance o f  the agency to  US foreign policy.
In foreign travels, US presidents routinely m eet w ith Peace C orps volunteers. On 
20th February, 2008, President Bush, the First Lady, the Secretary o f  State and the US 
A m bassador to G hana met with Peace Corps volunteers in Ghana, to "thank them  for 
their service and discuss their projects around the country." If citizen diplom ats o f  the 
Peace C orps’ work were unim portant, the president would not meet w ith them.
87 A ssociated Press. "Barack O bam a Proposes N ew  and Expanded N ational Service 
Program s." Fox News. 12/05/2007. http://vvw w .foxnew s.com /storv70.2933,315361.00.htm l 
(W eb). A ccessed 2/12/2013.
88 Peace Corps. "President Bush M eets with Peace Corps Volunteers in G hana." 




The Peace Corps, the prem iere citizen diplom at placem ent organization, is not a perfect 
organization. The previous two chapters have shown that there are correlations between 
citizen diplom acy and foreign policy behavior. Yet, there are good reasons to be cautious. 
As M adow  notes, "Peace Corps was called 'Kennedy's K iddie Korps'", a  "haven for draft 
dodges”, another "giveaway program" and "abroad, it was viewed in som e quarters as an 
intervention by a foreign pow er and a m anifestation o f  im perialism ."89
Form er President Eisenhower was reported consider the Peace C orps a “a juvenile 
experim ent devised to spend m oney w astefully” and Senator Barry G oldw ater predicted 
that it w ould be a “bunch o f  beatniks who w ouldn’t work.” 90 Concerns rem ain that as a 
soft power strategy, recipient com m unities are not sufficiently politically engaged to an 
extent that they can significantly influence the foreign policy o f  the host governm ents 
towards the United States. Some have argued that engaging in com m unity developm ent 
projects is outside the domain o f  formal diplomacy. Other criticism s have suggested 
disconnects between the stated purposes o f  program  and host country understanding o f  
why Peace Corps are there.
However, this criticism m akes the findings o f  the significance o f  citizen 
diplom acy and the inference that citizen diplom acy has a soft power effect all the more 
surprising. Citizen diplom acy can be quite effective as a tool for soft pow er, i f  the 
intentions, outcom es and processes were better m anaged through com m unication o f  the 
purposes and aligning these purposes with the need. The fact that citizen diplom acy
89 Pauline Madow, Ed. The Peace Corps. 36, No. 2. (H.W. Wilson Company, 1964): 3.
90 Ibid. 131.
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affects foreign policy is quite interesting and important; the rest o f  the chapter will 
discuss the im portance and im plications o f  the findings for soft pow'er and foreign policy.
Summary o f findings
The overall objective o f  this research is to determ ine the effect o f citizen diplom acy on 
foreign policy behavior. The research has determ ined these effects by running regression 
statistics on four m odels based on all the variables hypothesized to be im portant, factors 
o f  bilateral attraction, host country factors and temporal and regional factors. This 
research falls under a grow ing body o f  literature on soft power. Soft pow er is grow ing in 
im portance as a foreign policy strategy, and it is im portant to determine its effectiveness 
and also set out credible analytical tools and m easurem ent param eters. Until this research, 
save for the Congressional budget justifications and internal Peace Corps evaluations, 
there has been few empirical tests o f  the independent effects o f  citizen diplom acy on 
foreign policy. This research has made a  num ber o f  im portant findings.
The quantitative data found that citizen diplomacy is positively correlated with 
congruent voting at the US in more than 75 percent o f  the m odels in w hich its effect was 
exam ined. As hypothesized, it was positively correlated and statistically significant at the 
99 percent confidence level in half o f  the m odels, a finding that shows that countries 
should pay attention to aspects o f  soft pow er such as citizen diplomacy.
The other important finding regarding citizen diplom acy and voting at the UN 
G eneral Assem bly is that voting on key UN General Assem bly votes differs from  voting 
on all UN General Assembly votes. In the case o f  citizen diplom acy, seven o f  the tw elve 
m odels with statistically significant coefficients are on key UN General A ssem bly votes.
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w hile the rem aining five are on all UN G eneral Assem bly votes. This suggests that 
countries signal their support for US foreign policy objectives through their congruent 
voting on issues im portant to the US at the UN General Assem bly. It also im plies that the 
US, by m onitoring how  countries vote on different issues can m anipulate o r intensely 
lobby countries that are less likely to vote in congruence, by offering them  incentives or 
disincentives.
The results also dem onstrated that countries in different regions vote differently, 
with the highest congruence in voting with the US occurring in Europe and A sia, North 
A m erica and South America, follow ed by Oceania. Over tim e, countries vote less w ith 
the US at the UN as shown in seven o f  the eight models, with six o f  the seven m odels 
statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. This finding is im portant 
because in the context o f  citizen diplom acy and positive relations w ith o ther countries, 
the US faces challenges o f  m aintaining support for its foreign policy.
- Fragile, failing and failed states pose not only a danger to regional stability and to 
global security; they also vote less w ith the US at the United Nations G eneral Assem bly. 
This finding holds true in five o f  eight m odels, where state fragility correlates negatively 
with congruence in voting with the US at the UN. Given this finding, it is im portant for 
the US and other countries around the world to take note and work diligently  to resolve 
state failure, w hich has been on the increase since 1990. M ilitary expenditure is also 
statistically significant in explaining how  countries vote w ith the US at the U N  G eneral 
Assem bly being positively correlated.
Interestingly, spending on  education is not statistically significant. US aid 
correlates w ith congruent voting at the UN, but the coefficient is negatively signed.
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im plying that foreign aid does not lead to m ore congruent voting w ith the US at the UN.
In the five o f  eight m odels where the coefficient is statistically s ign ifican t it is only so at 
the 90 percent level o f  confidence. It is evident that countries do not consider aid as a 
payoff'to congruent voting with the US at the UN General Assembly.
The relationship between im m igration into the US and foreign policy was 
hypothesized to lead to positive consideration for the US. The research found that 
im m igration to the US does not lead countries to vote more in congruence w ith the US. In 
three o f  the eight models with im migration as a test variable, the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, and positively signed. Foreign 
direct investm ent into the US is a more significant predictor o f  congruent voting 
behavior. It is statistically significant in three o f the eight models.
W e can conclude that countries w ith trade and investment relations w ith the US 
are more likely to support the US foreign policy agenda than those in which the FDI is 
weaker. The mixed findings here can help explain why the U S-China trading relationship 
is robust and why the US continues trading with G u lf Oil states, or V enezuela. The 
im portance o f  the econom y to the US may often trum p other soft pow er and mutual 
attraction considerations. The econom ic relationship points to such considerations, over 
and above issues o f  hum an rights, foreign aid. am ong other variables.
Discussion and conclusions
This chapter will articulate eight key points derived from the previous two chapters' 
findings. The crux o f  these eight points is that countries care about how  they are 
perceived by other countries and adjust their foreign policy behavior accordingly.
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Countries signal their intentions tow ards m ajor pow-ers, especially the US, on issues o f  
im portance. Citizen diplom acy is an im portant predictor o f  foreign policy behavior. In 
addition, foreign countries recognize the im portance o f  US citizen diplom acy.
N on-traditional instrum ents o f  soft pow er are grow ing in im portance as the world 
becom es m ore globalized. While soft pow er is an im portant strategy in foreign policy, 
isolating independent effects o f  individual com ponents o f  soft power can be quite 
challenging. Soft pow er as a current and future strategy in foreign policy requires m ore 
research to determ ine its effect on inter-state politics. Finally, the research findings show 
that studying citizen diplom acy among other soft power strategies is im portant for m ajor 
powers and rising pow ers in order to best determ ine how  to best leverage soft power.
States care about how other states view them
Contrary to the long-held Realist view  that self-help and anarchy lead states to 
unilaterally pursue their self-interest w ith hard power, countries care about how they are 
perceived by other countries. To the extent that they can, they align their preferences w ith 
those o f  others. This is shown by the key UN General Assem bly voting in congruence 
with the US on key votes. The floor o f  United Nations General A ssem bly Countries is 
one o f  the m ost visible forums at which states can signal their intentions and support for 
the US, by voting for different resolutions.
States differentiate between the key UN General A ssem bly votes, defined as votes 
in wftich the US has lobbied intensively or has a significant interest in achieving a 
particular outcom e, and all the rest o f  the UN General A ssem bly votes. This voting 
reflects country interests, which are arrived at through bilateral and m ultilateral
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exchanges such as trade, military and security cooperation, and. as th is research has 
shown, through other non-traditional. soft pow er strategies such as citizen diplom acy .
And as previously shown, citizen diplom acy is positively correlated w ith congruent 
voting w ith the US at the United N ations General Assembly.
O ne conclusion on states’ voting behavior is that states are cognizant o f  the 
im portance o f key UN General A ssem bly votes, and recognize that the US governm ent 
and Congress, in allocation o f other benefits such as aid, m ilitary aid and form ulation o f  
preferential trade policies and incentives -  for exam ple the AGOA A ct — take into 
consideration states’ foreign policy behaviors as expressed through UN G eneral 
Assem bly voting. On the other hand, all UN General Assem bly votes allow  states to 
signal to the US. to other states and to their dom estic audiences their sovereignty and 
ability to stake a position contrary to that o f  the US despite strong bilateral relationships.
Such votes can give political cover to elites and governm ent principals in their 
interaction with domestic audiences, w hile allow ing states to signal their congruence with 
the US on key issues. Therefore, all UN G eneral Assem bly votes can be considered a 
"foreign policy dance” where states exercise more leeway in their vote and allow s them  
to signal to other actors such as regional blocs. In their votes, states jugg le  the ir national 
interests wdth bilateral, regional and global interests, and their behavior.
Perception and signaling through voting at the UN General A ssem bly can reflect 
mutual attraction. Countries can arrive at mutual attraction through perceived benefits; if 
a country votes in congruence with the US at the UN and the vote aligns w ith its interests, 
then it is likely to be more rewarded for its vote. Such reward can be in form  o f  
traditional, m ilitary or other assistance, or through the placement o f  citizen diplom ats.
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Citizen diplom acy therefore can be used as a way o f  signaling bilateral cooperation 
between the US and the recipient country', dem onstrating attraction to  both countries and 
to other areas the hegem on may seek to influence.
In this context, citizen diplom acy becom es an im portant calculation am ong states. 
As a hegem on, the United States signals its com m itm ent to the social and econom ic 
developm ent o f  states in the UN system by placing citizen diplom ats and by providing 
other avenues o f  assistance such as foreign aid and m ilitary aid. At the national policy 
levei, the recipient states are able to obtain free labor, which has often built and altered 
their national infrastructure and been instrum ental in putting systems in place, as was the 
case in E thiopia 's educational system. The elites in the recipient scales are able to signal 
io their constituents that they pursue independence while leveraging US support for their • 
local developm ent and also build relationships with the US. The citizen diplom ats 
provide invaluable services that the recipients m ight otherw ise not have access to and 
also create person-to-person relationships such as the case o f  Peru 's A lejandro Toledo
Key and a ll UN G eneral Assem bly votes are different
The US and countries w ith which the US is in a dyadic relationship know  this too, and 
vote differently. This is an im portant finding: countries behave differently given the 
foreign policy interests o f  the other country, in this case the US. The US has an 
overriding interest to attract support for its global agenda, from  dem ocratization to w ar 
against terrorism , free trade, capitalism  or the elim ination o f  nuclear w eapons. One tool 
that solves these overriding interests is citizen diplomacy.
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Countries that, for exam ple, do not possess nuclear weapons can vote with the US 
on its preferred position since their net opportunity cost is almost non-existent; K iribati is 
quite unlikely to achieve nuclear fission any tim e soon, yet the US considers how  
countries vote on key issues such as nuclear proliferation, human rights, am ong others, in 
allocating aid and in strengthening bilateral relationships. The consideration for the 
voting pattern may also reflect the desire to be perceived as having support for US 
foreign policy positions and its position on a key issue. The calculated benefit o f  the 
various votes is a key consideration o f  how  states will vote. States therefore can signal 
the level o f  agreem ent w ith the US even when their cost for supporting key issues is 
alm ost negligible.
By looking to the US and determ ining its foreign policy preferences and priorities 
-  as identified by the key votes' designation, states can adjust their ow n foreign policy 
preferences and align them  with those o f  the US. This gives credence to two im portant 
concepts: there is mutual attraction between the tw o states in the dyadic relationship, and 
further, that as institutionalists argue, com plete and prior inform ation regarding other 
actors in international studies are instrum ental in determ ining w hether states get 
cooperation or not. M utual attraction is the central elem ent o f  soft pow er; that one state 
can get another to align its preferences with that o f  the m ore powerful state is shown by 
congruent voting with the US, m ore so on key UN General A ssem bly votes.
Citizen diplom acy matters and predicts fo re ign  behavior
Citizen diplom acy serves dual socio-econom ic developm ent and foreign policy purposes. 
For the receiving nation, there are dual benefits o f  socio-economic developm ent and
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signaling foreign policy achievem ents through friendship with the hegem on. The benefits 
o f  citizen diplom acy to the socio-econom ic developm ent within the different preferences 
in the dyadic relationship were especially evident in the post-independence era, w hen 
A frican governm ents were left w ith little trained manpower. Exam ples o f  th is include 
Tanzania’s lack o f  trained road surveyors, Congo K inshasa’s lack o f  trained A frican 
doctors and engineers and Ethiopia’s education system being half-staffed by Peace Corps 
volunteers. The US sending volunteers to work in different sectors either for free or very 
little cost m ade citizen diplom acy attractive to the receiving nations and to the US since it 
could exert its influence in a benevolent way.
For the receiving nations, it offered an opportunity to recruit experienced workers 
for free -  or for a  very m inimal cost, com pared to the departing colonial expatriates -  and 
to achieve the double political coup o f  elites being able to claim freedom  from  the 
colonial pow ers and forging new  relations with non-im perial powers such as the United 
States or the Soviet Union. The work o f  citizen diplom acy is som etim es adjusted to fit 
global needs, for exam ple the Bush A dm inistration’s use o f  the Peace C orps to contain 
and reverse the effects o f  HIV/AIDS.
Through citizen diplom acy, leaders can convincingly lay claim  to the friendship 
factor o f  the citizen diplomacy. As previously shown, leaders in foreign countries pay 
attention to the work o f  citizen diplom ats and often arrange elaborate reception and 
departure cerem onies for the volunteers. These cerem onies give stature to leaders w ho 
may be faced w ith difficult social, econom ic and political conditions w ith their publics.
US leaders also pay attention to citizen diplom acy, through Congressional budget 
justifications, congressional testim onies and oversight, confirm ation o f  Peace Corps
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directors and m eetings with citizen diplom ats while they are serving in foreign countries. 
Even as a signaling strategy for either country -  benign care and non-im perial assistance 
to countries in need by the US and support o f  US foreign policy positions during votes 
with the US and other public expressions o f  mutual friendships, citizen diplom acy 
becom es one o f  the tools that any state has in its arsenal to carry out foreign policy.
The im portance o f  citizen diplom acy can also be seen in state-to-state relations: 
France in the 1960’s was reported to pressure G uinea to expel Am erican Peace C orps 
Volunteers who were w orking in its education system  since France was not keen on 
iosing influence in Guinea. This friction in the sphere o f interest / influence further 
dem onstrates that even other countries pay attention to citizen diplom acy and the 
potential for erosion o f their entrenched interests.
Citizen diplom acy can be perceived  as a threat
C ountries recognize the im portance o f  citizen diplomacy and their actions som etim es 
confirm the perceived im pact that citizen diplom ats can have. This recognition leads to ' 
states constraining them, im posing tough conditions and oversight on the citizen 
diplom ats, or allow ing the actions o f  such citizen diplom acy to be earned  out. W hen 
foreign countries exercise sovereignty, they can use citizen diplom ats as leverage to 
express displeasure with the United States by asserting non-interference in the internal 
activities o f  the country, em barrass the sending governm ent o r welcom e citizen diplom ats 
to express solidarity with the U S 9’ Even weaker nations have dem onstrated the
91 Peace Corps volunteers have been thrown out o f several countries for a variety of 
reasons, including suspicion of spying for the US (or suspected affiliation with the CIA), 
apprehension by host governments against their work (for example, in the case of Tanzania in
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inviolability o f  their sovereignty and self-determ ination by detaining or expelling citizen 
diplom ats, as was the case in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake when it expelled a religious 
organization accused o f  engaging in hum an trafficking.92
Citizen diplomacy often has negative consequences, for the sending nation and 
the receiving nation. For the sending nation, citizen diplom ats have often been bundled 
out uncerem oniously and branded “CIA cover agents” (in Turkey) or, “ im perialists” 
(Bolivia), am ong others. W hile this study assessed the m ost widely recognized citizen 
diplom acy organization, the US Peace Corps represents only a narrow spectrum  o f  citizen 
diplomacy. O ther citizen diplom acy tracks include funding, religion (and associated 
missionary' work), research, training and education (for exam ple, service learning, study 
abroad and student exchanges) and to some extent business.9’
Other closely associated forms o f  citizen diplom acy, outside the main areas o f  
operation -  agriculture, health, education and small business -  have included w orking lor 
non-governm ental organizations as foreign staff in support o f  domestic operations ( tor 
exam ple. CARE, O XFA M , M edecins sans Frontieres, United Nations agencies such as 
the W orld Food Program s, am ong others); or m onitoring and assisting nations as they 
increase civic education, conduct dem ocratic elections and put in place institutions that 
support dem ocratization. The im portance o f  the work o f these individuals and groups 
often leads to diplom atic standoffs arising from accusations o f  interfering w ith the
1969), for activities associated with the US for example the release of the Blood o f the Condor or 
as expression of lack of support for US activities especially in Vietnam in the late 1960’s.
92 Ginger Thompson. "Case stokes Haiti's fear for Children, and Itself." February 1, 2010. 
http://wwvv.nytinies.com/2010/02/02/world/americas/02orphans.html?pagewanted=all (Web). 
Accessed 6-27-2012.
9’ Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. "Annual Report 2010 http://wvvw.iuitd.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2011/07/2010-Annual-Report.pdf" . (Web). Accessed 6-26-2012.
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activities o f  a sovereign nation. A part from  B oliv ia 's Blood o f  the Condor incident 
targeting citizen diplom ats, the m ost illustrative cases o f the opposition to the perceived 
influence o f citizen diplom acy can be located in Russia and Egypt.
Russia
The conflictual relationship betw een N G O s and the government in Russia has not been 
the subject o f  extensive study. H owever, news m edia and reports from  Russia have often 
highlighted the im portance o f  N G O s -  or m ore accurately, the threat they pose to the 
governm ents o f  the countries in which they operate. Some o f  the N G O s are backed by or 
funded by the US, for exam ple Golos.
In the 2012 elections, the Russian courts fined Golos 30,000 rubles for being a 
"representative(s) o f  foreign countries" seeking to "influence the course o f the election 
cam paign" in Russia. To dem onstrate the significance that NGOs can oortend lor bilateral 
relationships, the US governm ent, through the National Security Council spokesperson, 
expressed its objection to governm ental suppression o f  the work o f  the NGO: ‘'The 
United States has supported and will continue to support those citizens and non­
governm ental organizations w orking for free and fair elections in R ussia."94
Interestingly, according to Proskuryakova, current Russian president V ladim ir 
Putin differentiates between local and international organizations; Proskuryakova writes 
that Putin's governm ent worked more closely with the International N G O s that influence
94 Ria Novosti Website Group: http://en.rian.nl/world/201 11203/169274048.html. (Web). 
Accessed 6-26-2012.
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European policy, such as M ake Poverty H istory.9'1 In recognition o f  their potency, Putin 
in 2006 stated that NGO s "must not be used by som e states as an instrum ent o f  foreign 
policy on the territory o f  other states."96 The assault was not just over N G O s; it was also 
over "rights’ groups" which were seen to "threaten Russia's Sovereignty or 
independence.”9 The result o f  the conflict with N G O s was muzzling the N GO s, in order 
to prevent color revolutions in Russia such as those that had taken place in U kraine and 
G eorgia with US backing.
Egypt
One o f the most illustrative cases o f  the im portance o f citizen diplomacy is the case o f  the 
Republican Institute (RI), and the N ational Dem ocratic Institute (NDI). The latter defines 
itself as a "nonprofit, nonpartisan organization w orking to support and strengthen 
dem ocratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness and
Q G
accountability in government." The NDI has a strong relationship with the US 
governm ent as is evident from its funding.99 A lthough its m em bership rem ains private, 
more im portantly, the w ork o f  NDI attracts US governm ent attention to the extent that the
95 Liliana N. Proskuryakova. "How Russia Deals With NGOs." 8/5/2006. 
http://www.globalpo litician.com/22019-russia-ngo. (Web). Accessed 6-26-2012.
96 BBC News. "Putin warning over ’puppet’ NGOs." 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/4664974.stm (Web). Accessed 6-26-2012.
97 BBC. "Russia ’to close rights group."’ 28 January 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/4658026.stm (Web). Accessed 6-26-2012.
98 NDI. "Who we arehttp://www.ndi.org/whoweare." (Web). Accessed 6-26-2012.
99 Robert W. Merry. "Unmasking the Democracy Promoters." April 2, 2012. 
http://nationalinterest.org/cpmnientary/ngos-not-beyond-reproach-6719. (Web). Accessed 6-26- 
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US Secretary o f  State com m ents on exclusions or inability o f  the organization to fulfill its 
mandate abroad.
The National D emocratic Institute's work is funded by the N ational Endow m ent 
for Democracy, US Agency for International Developm ent, US D epartm ent o f  State 
(Bureau o f  Democracy, Hum an Rights and Labor, Bureau o f  Educational and Cultural 
Affairs and M iddle East Partnership Initiative) and foreign governm ents including 
A ustralia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Canada, Denm ark, the European Union, Finland, 
Germ any, Ireland, Japan, Bahrain, Namibia, N etherlands, N orway, Sw eden, Sw itzerland, 
UK and Yemen. M ultilateral organizations such as the Organization o f  A m erican States, 
OSCE. UNDP, UN Dem ocracy Fund. W orld Bank Group, W orld Food Program and 
private foundations also provide funding to N D I.100
The case o f  Egypt is interesting, given the 2011 Arab Spring that toppled long­
time Egyptian dictator. Hosni M ubarak. The appearance w as that Egypt was advancing 
tow ards dem ocratic rule, despite the control that the military has continued to assert. In 
D ecem ber 2011, Egyptian security forces confiscated com puters, records and funds from  
the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute URI), Freedom  
House and the Konrad A denauer Foundation.101 Eventually, the Egyptian judiciary  
announced that charges would be filed against fifteen em ployees, including five
10(1 NDI. "Who Supports Our Work." http://wvAv.ndi.org/who_supports_our_work. 
(Web). Accessed 6-26-2012.
I0‘ Sheila Carapico. "Egypt's NGO Suspicions." The National Interest. 1/27/2012. 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentanVegvpts-ngo-suspicions-6416 . (Web). Accessed 6-26-2012.
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Am ericans for "m anaging an unlicensed nongovernm ental organization and receiving 
foreign funds w ithout the approval o f  the Egyptian governm ent."102
As "norm s entrepreneurs’’, international and local Non-Governm ental 
O rganizations (NGOs) can influence the conduct o f  government, specifically by funding 
citizen groups to advocate for increased dem ocratization, agitation for hum an rights, 
justice and inclusion, and in some cases, m onitoring electoral fraud and governance 
standards. N G O s and INGOs are avenues through which governm ents can attem pt to 
further influence other governments. Hard pow er and soft power pursuits support the US 
governm ent’s attem pts to influence other nations either through sheer pow er, or by 
influencing other nations to want the sam e outcom es, such as dem ocracy, individual 
freedom s and respect for human rights.
Since the US through its executive leadership has continuously professed its goals 
to encourage freedom  and dem ocratization, it is unsurprising that it supports the National 
Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute in their w ork tow ards the 
spread o f  dem ocratic norms. Likewise, the support o f  theoretical propositions advanced 
by the D em ocratic Peace Theory support the U S’ position and objectives o f  spreading 
dem ocracy through the support o f  N GOs and the involvem ent of formal state appar atus 
when such work, staff and values are threatened.
The case o f  Russia, but m ore im portantly the case o f  Egypt dem onstrates that 
states value the work o f  non-state actors and recognize that they have an im pact on 
bilateral relations. It also illustrates that governm ent, especially the US governm ent, is 
supportive o f  the initiatives, even by private entrepreneurs, who in the course o f  their
102 NDI. "Charges in Egypt to be filed against 15 NDI Employees." 2/6/2012. 
http://'vVww.ndi.org/eharges-fi!ed-against-ndi-employees. (Web). Accessed 6-26-2012.
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w oik advance US governm ent preferences. This is illustrated by the recent A tlantic and 
The National Interest reports that the United A rab Em irates had shut down the National 
Dem ocratic Institute. Citizen diplom ats matter; citizen diplom ats’ work m atters too.
O ther soft po w er variables matter
A spects o f  soft power have been leveraged for longer periods than the notion o f  soft 
pow er has been in the public domain. Before 1990, citizen diplom ats were serving in 
different countries, religious exchanges were on-going, as were research, education, 
training and provision o f  grants; citizens o f  far-o ff countries were w atching Ram bo 
movies. Soft pow er’s prim ary utility has been to elevate the debate on the utility o f  
alternative approaches, rather than singular reliance on m ilitary and econom ic resources.
W hile these traditional tools are indispensable -  perhaps except in the case o f  
Costa Rica -  bilateral interstate relations can often be best explained through the lens o f  
soft power. Denmark m ay have more military capabilities than Uganda, but the prim ary  
means o f  leverage between the two countries is not fear o f  a military strike: rather, it 
arises from D enm ark’s ability to provide financial resources to Uganda, or w ithhold them 
if  U ganda's preferences do not by and large align w ith those o f  Denmark.
Non-traditional hard-pow er instrum ents o f  power, that is, soft pow er -  given its 
different variables and modes o f  expression -  is a useful, strategic force in foreign policy 
and has been shown to influence how' states behave tow ards the US.
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Citizen d iplom acy's effect on foreign policy: an em pirical challenge 
'T h e  shape o f  the world a generation from now w ill be influenced far m ore by how  well 
we com m unicate the values o f  our society to others than by our m ilitary or diplom atic 
s u p e r io r i ty .-  Senator J. William Fulhright, 1964
The findings o f  this research have led to the conclusion that citizen diplom acy is an 
im portant predictor o f  foreign states' behavior tow ards the US at the UN General 
Assembly. However, as the quantitative section dem onstrated, citizen diplom acy is not 
the only soft pow er variable that is either positively correlated with foreign policy 
behavior, or statistically significant as an explanan. There are a number o f  positive 
correlations between other varied soft pow er variables. Isolating and m easuring the effect 
o f  citizen diplom acy can be quite challenging. O ther variables affect the behavior o f  
states towards the US and other states. A s the research stands, conclusions can be drawn 
on the correlation between citizen diplom acy and foreign policy behavior.
It is em pirically di fficult to isolate the effects o f  citizen diplom acy and assert 
w ithout reservation that citizen diplom acy causes, for exam ple, 10 or 20 per cent o f  
congruent voting with the US at the UN general Assem bly. In addition, m utual attraction 
should not only be measured by the congruence in voting w ith the US; the effects o f  
citizen diplom acy may be more in-country, for exam ple the agitation for greater personal 
freedom, civil and w om en 's rights, thereby leading to higher levels o f  dem ocratization. 
These are equally im portant outcomes.
A more specific test o f  the impact o f citizen diplom acy on foreign policy behavior 
should seek to interrogate the individuals who w w k  directly with the citizen diplom ats.
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and determ ine w hether their attitudes towards the United States change as a  result o f 
citizen diplom acy. Such a test should also investigate the voting patterns o f  individuals 
who have w orked directly w ith citizen diplom ats in order to  draw analyses and correlate 
voting w ith citizen diplomacy. A parallel inquiry should interrogate the m otivations o f  
elites and governm ent officials to determ ine their considerations w hen selecting foreign 
policy behavior tow ards the US and other countries. A com parison o f  the tw'o studies 
could accurately determ ine w hether foreign policy behavior is influenced by elites’ 
attitudes and experiences, the extent to which such elites pay attention to their dom estic 
audiences, and the extent to which dom estic audiences affect the foreign policy choices 
o f  their elites, if  they affect them at all.
Soft pow er in fo re ign  policy: benefits fo r  great a nd  rising pow ers
Citizen diplom acy originated as an idea. John F. Kennedy expressed his be lie f that young 
men and w om en from the United States could help foreign countries increase their 
technical capabilities, increase foreign nations' understandings o f the United States, and 
increase A m ericans’ understanding o f  foreign peoples. The "idea” then led to the Peace 
Corps, and to citizen diplom acy and a belief that individuals can change the way the 
United States is perceived by and perceives others through interpersonal interactions.
Studying and understanding countries’ current foreign policy behavior tow ards 
the US portends invaluable benefits towards rising powers in the m anagem ent o f  world 
affairs. In a constantly changing global reality, the assum ption that the old is relevant can 
im pede progress and paradigm changes in international relations. Bilateral and 
m ultilateral relationships are changing. This change has reflected the rise and increasing
relevance o f  norms, institutions and individuals (hence the im portance o f  realist, liberal 
and constructivist approaches to international relations). Ideas are im portant in fostering 
global changes.
U sing the exam ple o f  decolonization, Jackson writes that "social and political 
ideas can become institutionalized as norm ative fram ew orks o f  hum an relations... w ithin 
which utilitarian interests and purposive activities are played out" even as actors attem pt 
m axim ize self-interest. W ithin the rules, deviations that do not necessarily m inim ize the 
strength o f  ideas altering relations between individuals and states often o ccu r.,(b
That statesm en can learn to navigate bilateral and multilateral relations betw een 
their countries and others differently from  the traditional hard power approach is 
articulated by Hall, who argues that "the concept o f  policym aking as social learning (has) 
been applied with some success to the process o f  foreign policym aking."104 The 
navigation o f  these relationships is not im plicit in leadership, or in the conduct o f  
governm ent; indeed, determ ining the best political decisions and policy choices is driven 
by precedent, uncertainty and the pursui t o f  power.
According to Heclo and W ildavsky, "politics finds its sources not only in pow er 
but also in uncertainty -  men collectively wondering what to do. G overnm ents not only 
'pow er'... they also puzzle. Policy m aking is a form o f  collective puzzlem ent on society's 
behalf; it entails both deciding and know ing...m uch political interaction has constituted a
’0’ Robert 11. Jackson. "The weight of ideas in decolonization: Normative change in 
international relations." in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane. Ideas and foreign policy: 
beliefs, institutions and political change. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): 111.
104 Peter A. Hall. "Policy Paradigms. Social Learning, and the State: The Case of 
Economic Policymaking in Britain." Comparative Politics, 25, No. 3 (Apr., 1993): 275.
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process o f  social learning expressed through policy ."105 The puzzlem ent then leads to
selection o f  strategies, some which work and some that do not, for exam ple, the US
governm ent supported Bay o f P igs' invasion o f  Cuba in 1962 with the intention to change
the governm ent, which had little success.
The im portance o f  ideas is further em phasized by Robert Lieberm an. L ieberm an
argues that ideas "can fill this explanatory gap" o f the policy choices that governm ents
select. Lieberm an further argues that ideas
constitute much o f  the substantive raw  materia! upon which institutional theory 
feeds— the goals and desires that people bring to the political w orld and, hence, 
the ways they define and express their interests; the meanings, interpretations, and 
judgm ents they attach tc events and conditions; and their beliefs about cause-and- 
effect relationships in the political w orld and, hence, their expectations about how 
others will respond to their own behavior.106
The belief then that citizen diplom acy can change the way states interact is not new. In
fact, ideas such as the Concert o f Europe; M etternich’s Congress o f  V ienna: W ilson 's
League o f  Nations; H itler's appeasem ent in his conquest o f  parts o f  Europe; the United
Nations; the SALT and START an u s reduction treaties constituted changes o f  ideas other
than m ilitary means o f  expanding influence. The idea o f  diplomacy conquering military
force is expressed by Heffermehl, who quotes Napoleon Bonaparte and V ictor Hugo. The
spirited Bonaparte was quoted as saying that "there are only two forces in the w orld, the
sword and the spirit. In the long run, the sword wall always be conquered by the spirit."
1(13 Hugh Heclo and Aaron B Wildavsky. The private government o f  public money; 
community and policy inside British politics. (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 
1974): 305-306.
106 Robert C. Lieberman. Ndeas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political 
Change." American Political Science Review, 96, No. 4 (December 2002): 697.
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V ictor Hugo said "there is one thing stronger than all the arm ies in the w orld, and that is
an idea whose time has com e."107
G reat Powers have often recognized the benefits o f  global engagem ent other than
through war. This is evident through the actions o f  past G reat Powers such as G erm any
and their leaders (K laus von M ettem ich. Otto von Bism arck) and the US (W oodrow
W ilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Trum an) in pursuing the course o f  peace
where their hard-pow er capabilities w ere assigned them hegem onic pow er status. The
pursuit o f  soft power strategies such as citizen diplom acy is therefore in line with the
arrayed tools o f  statecraft. As the U nited States has found in the new m illennium , the
pow er o f ideas can attract -  and repel -  friends and foes, and is therefore w orthy o f
pursuit through the activities o f  citizen diplomacy.
This in no way suggests that the utility o f  hard pow er is past its time: quite to the
contrary. W hile soft pow er is growing in im portance, hard power is still a prim ary
strategy in the conduct o f  foreign policy. As Thom as Hobbes observes,
the laws o f  nature, as justice, equity, modesty, m ercy, and, in sum , doing to others 
what w'e would be done to, o f  them selves, w ithout the terror o f  som e pow er to 
cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to 
partiality, pride, revenge and the like. A nd covenants, without the sword, are but 
words and o f  no strength to secure a m an at a ll.108
The United States is a unique pow er
The US is, rightfully, an unusual power. It is a  hegem on o f  unprecedented proportions 
without serious competition. It is a m ilitary pow er that spends more on its defense than
l0, Fredrik S. Heffermehl "How long is the Run for Peace?" in Jorgen Johansen and John 
Y. Jones. Experiments With Peace: Celebrating Peace on Johan Galtung's 8 ( f‘ Birthday.
(Nairobi: Pambazuka Press, 2010): 68.
108 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. Forgotten Books, 2008 (Republished): 116.
the next 20 countries. It is an econom ic pow er with approxim ately triple the size o f  the 
nearest rival economy. It is a cultural pow er whose brands such as Coke, Nike, the Statue 
o f  Liberty are global icons, as is Hollywood, dem ocracy. Peace Corps, baseball and 
football. The US did not rise to its current powerful status through conquest o f  territory 
and colonialism , much like m ost o f  the form er European G reat Powers did. yet its 
influence stretches across all the continents. The US is an empire w ithout im perial 
am bitions, but often has m ilitary presence and bases in every strategic region o f  the 
w'orld, but still does not consider itse lf an empire. A ccording to the form er President G. 
W. Bush. "America has never been an empire. We may be the only great pow er in history' 
that had the chance and refused, preferring greatness to pow er and ju stice  to g lory ,"109
The argum ent against the US em pire is one o f  never having occupied significant • 
territory (save that o f  the A m erican Indians, Germ any and Japan post-W orld W ar II), 
unlike the British, Spanish or the O ttom an Em pires that preceded it. Yet. the US is an 
ideological empire; its influence is driven by ideas such as democracy. The US therefore 
behaves unlike m ost other em pires, on the one hand favored by geography (distance from 
any other proxim al lands) and tim e (distance from the em pire-building periods through 
conquest o f  foreign territory). The notion o f  freedom  has generally been incom patible 
with the European-tvpe territorial expansion and subduing o f  "‘inferior civilizations.”
Due to these spatial and geographical separations and its history, the US to a large 
extent developed a unique character o f  statehood and o f  cultural traditions. True to its 
uniqueness, its foreign policy approach has included but also defied m ost traditional 
forms o f  statecraft. The strategies for US statecraft have also included funding non-profit
,09 Kal Raustiala. "America abroad: US may not be imperial, but it does have an empire." 
The New York Times. 7/2/2003. http:/-\vw\v.mtimes.com/2003/07/02Ypinion/02iht- 
edraust _ed3_.html (Web). Accessed 6-26-2012.
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and quasi-governm ental organizations w hich in theory are independent o f  governm ent 
activity, control and in terest for exam ple the National Democratic Institute and the 
International Republican Institute, both o f  which receive funding from  the State 
D epartm ent’s United States Agency for International Development. Such funding is not 
com m on am ong many world governm ents and m ay be enabled by the character o f  the US 
nation as a dem ocratic country.
O ther aspects o f  the unique character o f  the US are seen in the leveraging o f  
citizen diplom acy for the purposes o f  advancing state interests. W hile the Peace Corps 
was not the first citizen diplom acy program  (the United K ingdom's V olunteer Service ■ 
O verseas started in i 958), the m assive support o f  the executive arm o f  the US 
governm ent, funding by Congress and visibility across the globe has m ade it a key 
feature o f  US presence abroad.
The US, true to its unique character, utilizes these diplomats in addition to 
pursum g other strategies -  economic, im m igration, trade, foreign aid. m ilitary alliances, 
m ilitary aid and the undeniable global hard power capabilities to m aintain its presence 
globally. O ther countries including prior hegem ons, have often leveraged only some o f 
the tools available to them, or were not benevolent global powers, m ainly due to their 
path to pow er (for exam ple, Britain was a colonial power, with hardly a flattering record 
for mutual attraction). The US, in this respect, is a uniquely benevolent power.
Avenues for further research
Soft power, as a contem porary and future strategy in the conduct o f  foreign policy and 
study o f  international relations, requires more study, as well as more specification o f
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term s and m easurem ent. It offers an opportunity to  create a robust research agenda that 
m ay lead to a better understanding o f  how countries will deal with the challenges o f  
lim itations o f  hard power. The ideas espoused by soft pow er have not even approached 
the threshold o f  paradigm  change. H owever, it is im portant to  review the process o f  a 
paradigm  changes, and the potential that soft pow er holds and probability o f  a  new 
paradigm  in studying state behavior and understanding foreign policy.
Thom as Kuhn's Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions is perhaps the m ost well- 
regarded foundation o f  explanations regarding how new paradigm s com e into being. In 
Chapter 6, Kuhn articulates how paradigm  changes occur through discovery  brought 
about by encounters between "norm al science" with anom aly :; i.e. the existing paradigm  
can no longer adequately explain phenom ena. W hen “norm al” science discovers 
anom alies, such anom alies can remain unacknow ledged, ignored or denied. A w areness 
and intrigue o f  the area o f  anom aly is then explored, and when theory or paradigm s are 
reviewed and re-exam ined so that the anom aly becom es the 'expected', a  paradigm  
change can be said to have taken place.
O f course there are questions on whether social sciences can be considered to be 
as scientific, for exam ple in their m easurem ents, in the same way as natural sciences.110 
Debate on whether social sciences are actually sciences will not be the subject o f this 
argument; however, it is well established that social sciences can be subjected to the same 
em piricism  as natural sciences.111
' 10 Thomas S Kuhn. The structure o f scientific revolutions. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 1970).
See, for example, Stanley Hoffmann. "An American Social Science: international 
Relations." Daedalus, 106, No. 3, Discoveries and Interpretations: Studies in Contemporary 
Scholarship, I (summer, 1977): 42-46; David Thomas. Naturalism and social science: a post-
Colem an. Skogstad and A tkinson write o f  three orders o f paradigm  and policy 
change: changes in the settings o f  policy instrum ents, the replacem ent o f  one policy 
instrum ent w ith another, and a dram atic departure in policy goals, based on a new 
theoretical and ideological framework or paradigm , and typically involves state and 
societal ac to rs.112
Foreign policy behavior tow ards the US is an im portant beginning in the research 
into the soft pow er paradigm. There are other areas o f  inquiry, for exam ple, how to 
measure the mutual attraction o f  one country tow ards another, where neither o f  the tw o 
countries is a great power, m iddle pow er or a rising power. For exam ple, how7 can the 
mutual attraction and/or soft pow er effects be m easured between territorially  contiguous 
countries? How can soft power and mutual attraction be measured betw een non- 
territorially contiguous countries w ith obvious pow-er differentials be m easured? Is soft 
pow er subject to the relationship between great pow7ers and all other countries, or is 
mutual attraction detectable and m easurable betw een any dyadic pairs o f  countries?
These are im portant questions that further research can delve into and provide answ ers to. 
For this research, the soft power variable o f  citizen diplom acy influences the foreign 
policy behavior o f  countries in dyadic relationships with the United States.
Conclusions and implications
The correlation between citizen diplom acy and congruent voting w ith the US at the UN 
General A ssem bly has been argued quantitatively and quantitatively. C itizen diplom acy,
empiricist philosophy o f social science. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), among 
others.
1,2 William Coleman, Grace Skogstad and Michael M. Atkinson. “Paradigm shifts and 
policy networks: Cumulative Change in Agriculture. ” Journal o f  Public Policy, 16 (1996): 274.
w hose practice is not entirely new. is grow ing in stature and significance as a soft pow er 
and foreign policy strategy. Now we can also confidently state that there is a correlation 
between citizen diplomacy and foreign policy behavior o f  states. N ations and 
international organizations, from the U nited States to Canada to the U nited K ingdom  and 
the United Nations, have successfully leveraged private citizens' altruism  in order to 
further their strategic interests, interests that quite often cannot be achieved through 
traditional hard pow er approaches, or through traditional diplom acy approaches.
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A PPEND IX  I- V A RIABLES, V ARIA BLE G ROU PS A N D  CO DIN G
The following are the study variables, their coding in the dataset and sources
Variable Coding Source Explanation




Congruence in voting 
w/US
1 All UNGA Votes ( votes only) ALLUNGA
Congruence in voting 
w/US
2 Citizen Diplomats (Peace 
Corps)















FDI from USA FDIOUT State Dept. FDI from the US to 
the dyadic country
FDI into the USA FDI2USA State Dept. FDI from the dyadic country to the US
Foreign Aid NETUSODA State Dept. N et US Foreign Aide given
Immigration to US (Green 
Card) IMMIGRATE
State Dept. Legal Permanent 
Residents
Military Aid in Smillions MILAID$(M) State Dept. M ilitary assistance form the US













Education expenditure (% o f 
GDP) EDU%GDP State Dept.
Country expenditure 
on education
GDP per capita GDPPC World Bank GDP per capita
Level o f Globalization GLOBEX KOF KOF globalization index data
Military Expend, as % o f 
GDP
MILITARY World Bank Country expenditure on military















s Region: Africa dummy AFRICA None Countries in Africa
Region: Asia dummy ASIA None Countries in Asia
Region: Europe Dummy EUROPE None Countries in Europe
Region: North America 
dummy N A MERIC A None
Countries in North 
Am erica
Region: Oceania dummy OCEANIA none Countries in Oceania
Region: South America 
dummy SAMERICA None
Countries in South 
Am erica
Year o f  Observation Year None Year
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